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Abstract: The well-replicated observation that many people maintain mental health despite exposure to severe psychological or physical
adversity has ignited interest in the mechanisms that protect against stress-related mental illness. Focusing on resilience rather than
pathophysiology in many ways represents a paradigm shift in clinical-psychological and psychiatric research that has great potential
for the development of new prevention and treatment strategies. More recently, research into resilience also arrived in the
neurobiological community, posing nontrivial questions about ecological validity and translatability. Drawing on concepts and ﬁndings
from transdiagnostic psychiatry, emotion research, and behavioral and cognitive neuroscience, we propose a uniﬁed theoretical
framework for the neuroscientiﬁc study of general resilience mechanisms. The framework is applicable to both animal and human
research and supports the design and interpretation of translational studies. The theory emphasizes the causal role of stimulus
appraisal (evaluation) processes in the generation of emotional responses, including responses to potential stressors. On this basis, it
posits that a positive (non-negative) appraisal style is the key mechanism that protects against the detrimental effects of stress and
mediates the effects of other known resilience factors. Appraisal style is shaped by three classes of cognitive processes – positive
situation classiﬁcation, reappraisal, and interference inhibition – that can be investigated at the neural level. Prospects for the future
development of resilience research are discussed.
Keywords: adaptation; allostasis; appraisal; aversion; coping; emotion; emotion regulation; interference; inhibition; mental health;
motivation; PASTOR; prevention; reappraisal; recovery; resilience; stress; stressor; trauma
Recent data from epidemiological surveys in Europe show
that approximately 30% of the population suffer from a
mental disorder, such as anxiety, depression, chronic
pain, or addiction, that can at least to some extent be
traced back to the inﬂuence of exogenous or endogenous
stressors such as traumatizing events, challenging life cir-
cumstances, or physical illness. Stress-related disorders in
the broadest sense, meanwhile, contribute more to the
total all-cause morbidity burden than does cardiovascular
disease (Wittchen et al. 2011). The direct and indirect eco-
nomic costs incurred by these conditions in Europe are
estimated to be around €300 billion per year (Olesen
et al. 2012). These ﬁgures are higher than in other
regions of the world, yet not atypical for Western industri-
alized societies (Wittchen et al. 2011). The high incidence
of stress-related disorders is puzzling given the historically
unprecedented levels of physical health, wealth, and secur-
ity these societies have achieved – and the accompanying
massive reductions in threats to survival and bodily integri-
ty. It is, therefore, fair to say that the promotion of mental
health is probably one of the greatest challenges developed
countries currently face, and that there is an urgent need to
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advance research on stress-related disorders. Such research
must also address the question of why there has been so
little progress in the ﬁeld over recent decades, in particular
with respect to the treatment of stress-related disorders.
Among the many obstacles that psychiatric research
faces today is a diagnostic classiﬁcation system that is cate-
gorical and based on signs and symptoms that often do not
adequately reﬂect underlying neurobiological and behavio-
ral dysfunctions (Craddock & Owen 2010; Kapur et al.
2012). For example, following Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (2013) a person is diagnosed
with major depression if at least ﬁve out of a list of nine
symptoms are present nearly every day during a period of
two weeks or more. The list of symptoms contains,
among others, depressed mood; loss of interest or pleasure;
change in weight or appetite; loss of energy or fatigue; feel-
ings of worthlessness or guilt; and suicidal ideation or
attempt. Either depressed mood or loss of interest or plea-
sure must be present.
A consequence of this algorithm is that a person with
only four of those nine symptoms will not be classiﬁed as
depressed, even though his or her functional state may be
very similar to that of an individual who meets just one cri-
terion more. Another consequence that is particularly prob-
lematic for mechanistic research is that patient samples in
studies comparing depressed subjects with healthy controls
may be symptomatically highly heterogeneous, comprising,
for instance, subjects whose major impairments are related
to anhedonia and lethargy (e.g., loss of interest and plea-
sure, loss of appetite, fatigue or loss of energy) as well as
other subjects who suffer mainly from sadness and hope-
lessness (e.g., showing predominantly depressed mood,
feelings of worthlessness or guilt, and feeling pessimistic
about the future). Hence, study results may vary extensively
as a function of patient sample characteristics. Sympto-
matic heterogeneity is almost certainly accompanied by
pathophysiological heterogeneity; that is, a diagnosis of
major depression does not indicate a common underlying
pathomechanism. Rather, it groups together patients who
are depressed for a range of various reasons. This latter
point in particular makes the classical comparison of
patient to healthy control largely meaningless. Finally,
most symptoms cannot be determined objectively, for
example, based on a laboratory test; and cutoffs between
normal and pathological symptom levels are arbitrary, in-
troducing much further variability and uncertainty.
On this basis, it has been argued that the current categorical
diagnostic system is unsuitable for mechanistic – and in partic-
ular, neurobiological – research in psychiatry (Craddock &
Owen 2010; Kapur et al. 2012). One proposed solution is to
abandon diagnosis-based studies and instead to focus on di-
mensions of neurobiology and observable behavior that can
be investigated across conventional diagnostic boundaries
and without the need for a healthy control group (Cuthbert
& Insel 2013; Schumann et al. 2013).
We can expect such transdiagnostic studies to greatly
improve our understanding of disease mechanisms and
make important contributions to the identiﬁcation of new
treatment strategies. In this review, we begin by proposing
that an approach that focuses on resilience rather than
disease could be another way around the described
problem and could have great potential for advancing trans-
lational neurobiological research and disease prevention.
The transdiagnostic approach and the resilience approach
are not mutually exclusive. Rather, we believe resilience re-
search can beneﬁt a lot from the integration of transdiag-
nostic thinking. The second proposal we would like to
state at the beginning of this work, therefore, is that resil-
ience research must be transdiagnostic to achieve its full
potential.
1. Investigating health, not disease: An ongoing
paradigm shift
1.1. Resilience research
The term resilience refers to a well-described phenome-
non: Many people do not become, or only temporarily
become, mentally ill despite signiﬁcant psychological or
physical burdens (e.g., Bonanno & Mancini 2011; Feder
et al. 2011; Sapienza & Masten 2011). Resilience thus
viewed is an outcome, not a static property of the individual
or a personality or character trait (Mancini & Bonanno
2009). A current tendency is to go even further and to
see resilience as a dynamic process that may have a trajec-
tory of undisturbed, stable mental health during and after a
potentially traumatizing event or a prolonged period of ad-
versity, or also consist of temporary disturbances followed
by a relatively rapid, successful recovery (American
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Psychological Association 2010; Kent et al. 2014; Mancini
& Bonanno 2009; Norris et al. 2009; Sapienza & Masten
2011).
Resilience researchers are not interested in pathophysi-
ology; instead of investigating the mechanisms that lead
to stress-related illness, they investigate the mechanisms
that prevent illness. The topic has become increasingly
popular over the last 10 years and, though initially proposed
by psychologists and clinicians (Werner 1993), has in the
meantime even motivated neurobiological research in
animal models (Feder et al. 2011; Franklin et al. 2012;
Friedman et al. 2014; Liberzon & Knox 2012; Russo
et al. 2012; Scharf & Schmidt 2012; Southwick &
Charney 2012). Many resilience researchers make the
basic assumption that resilience is not simply the result of
an absence of disease processes but also reﬂects the work
of active adaptation mechanisms that have a biological
basis (Friedman et al. 2014; Russo et al. 2012). This devel-
opment effectively constitutes a paradigm shift from
disease- to health-oriented research in the ﬁelds of clinical
psychology and psychiatry. The shift is not yet complete,
however.
1.2. Resilience to dysfunctions, not to disorders
Much resilience research has been done in the context of
particular diseases, such as post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), major depressive disorder, or addiction, focusing
on why some people do not develop a particular disorder
although they are subject to the same kind of adversities
that cause the disorder in other people (for an overview,
see Southwick & Charney 2012). Implicitly, this is based
on the assumption that there are disorder-speciﬁc disease
processes that are antagonized by speciﬁc protective pro-
cesses. These types of studies remain rooted in a categorical
way of thinking about psychiatric disease. If, however,
current disease categories are unsuitable for mechanistic
research, then it makes more sense to ask why someone
does not develop a certain type of symptom or dysfunction
(such as generalized anxiety, hypervigilance, lethargy, an-
hedonia, or impulsive behavior, for example). This also
takes into account that symptoms and dysfunctions
overlap between disorders, and that disorders are frequent-
ly comorbid. Hence, one element of exploiting the new
transdiagnostic approach in resilience research would be
to explicitly search for dysfunction-speciﬁc resilience mech-
anisms rather than for disorder-speciﬁc resilience
mechanisms.
That approach is also more compliant with an evolution-
ary perspective. Evolution may have equipped us with
mechanisms that assure the proper working of organismic
functions such as defense, eating, or mating even when
they are compromised by stressors. Hence, we may to
some extent be protected against exaggerated and indis-
criminate fears or against hypo- or hypermotivational
states, but it is unlikely that evolution has had an interest
in protecting us against PTSD or depression.
1.3. Resilience to many, not to single dysfunctions
The notion of dysfunction-speciﬁc resilience mechanisms
leads to the interesting question of whether there may
also be superordinate resilience mechanisms that protect
from more than one dysfunction. The existence of such
general resilience mechanisms is not entirely improbable
for two reasons. First, as mentioned, stress-related disor-
ders are frequently comorbid, which implies that the differ-
ent types of symptoms or dysfunctions that are typical for
these disorders are not fully independent. One way to
explain the (partly) correlated occurrence of stress symp-
toms is by the failure or breakdown of general resilience
mechanisms, allowing stress to negatively affect various
functional systems at the same time. For example, a
failure to terminate the stressor-induced activation of the
hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal gland (HPA) axis when
the stressor has subsided may lead to unnecessarily pro-
longed release of the stress hormone cortisol, which can
result in long-term dysfunction of many parts of the brain
and the body (De Kloet 2008; Holsboer & Ising 2010;
McEwen & Stellar 1993; Popoli et al. 2012). Hence, mech-
anisms that support ﬂexible HPA axis deactivation would be
possible general resilience mechanisms.
The example of pathological cortisol effects points to the
second reason why the concept of a general resilience
mechanism has some theoretical appeal. Any stimulus or
situation perceived by the organism as a threat to its integ-
rity will induce an aversive motivational state and evoke a
threat or stress response that will engage a wide range of
nervous system and body functions in an orchestrated
fashion. Observable components of the stress response
may include coordinated changes in attention (e.g., vigi-
lance or attentional focusing), cognition (e.g., threat ap-
praisal as well as problem solving, planning, and other
forms of cognitive coping efforts), subjective experience
(e.g., feelings of nervousness, anxiety, or fear), and sympa-
thetic system and HPA axis activity, with their associated
peripheral physiological changes. Finally, stress responses
often include overt behavior – that is, primary (defensive)
or secondary (compensatory and recuperative) coping re-
sponses such as ﬂight or ﬁght, avoidance, impact prepara-
tion, support seeking, resource building, and so forth.
(Lazarus & Folkman 1984; McEwen & Stellar 1993;
Selye 1976; Sterling & Eyer 1988; Weiner 1992).
Hence, the stress response, by its very nature, is a multi-
system response that necessarily comes with considerable
costs for the involved systems in terms of energy consump-
tion and processing priorities. Therefore, although primar-
ily adaptive, stress responses can become deleterious if they
are very intense, prolonged, or chronic – by exhausting in-
ternal, but also social or monetary resources and interfering
with the pursuit of other important goals, as summarized in
the concept of allostatic load (McEwen & Stellar 1993). As
a consequence, any mechanism that helps the organism
ﬁne-tune stress responses to optimal levels, to terminate
them if no longer necessary, and to remain ﬂexible
enough to switch to possible alternative coping strategies,
thereby facilitating efﬁcient deployment of resources, is
likely to protect all or most of the systems involved in the
stress response and therefore to prevent a large range of
stress-related dysfunctions.
If humans possess general resilience mechanisms, that
has important consequences for resilience research.
Because strengthening superordinate resilience mecha-
nisms is likely to be a more efﬁcient prevention strategy
than strengthening dysfunction-speciﬁc resilience mecha-
nisms, resilience research would be well-advised to focus
on the identiﬁcation and understanding of general resil-
ience mechanisms.
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The distinction between general and dysfunction-speciﬁc
resilience mechanisms may become clearer when we con-
sider another facet of allostatic load. Every stress response
is accompanied by plastic adaptations in the involved
systems that serve to facilitate future dealing with identical
or similar stressors (McEwen & Stellar 1993). Take the
example of an employee suffering from high performance
pressure, whose primary (adaptive) stress response involves
fear of failure and correspondingly increased efforts at work.
In case working harder is eventually met by success, the em-
ployee’s fear will subside and his behavior will be instrumen-
tally reinforced, increasing the likelihood that he will also
respond to future challenges with a similar coping strategy.
The employeemay also feelmore competent than before. In
psychological terms, he will enjoy higher perceived “self-
efﬁcacy” (Bandura 1977). A different learning experience
will occur in case of failure despite repeated efforts. A com-
bination of classical Pavlovian and instrumental mechanisms
will lead to dislike for the job, decreased efforts or even
avoidance of work, and diminished job-related self-efﬁcacy
perceptions. Like the positive reinforcement of working
harder in the ﬁrst case, the negative reinforcement of
working and the consequent behavioral adaptations that
take place in the second case can be considered helpful
because they prevent pointless perseverance and exhaustion
(Schwager & Rothermund 2014b). They are, however,
helpful only as long as they motivate the employee’s
search for alternative coping strategies, such as reducing
ambitions and redeﬁning work objectives or looking for
another job.
Such a ﬂexible, positive approach to a severe social
threat, however, requires to not be overwhelmed by it
and to not extend aversion and reduced self-efﬁcacy per-
ceptions to work life generally or even to any kind of chal-
lenging situation. In other words, the organism needs to
limit the aversive state evoked by the stressor to necessary
levels; and plastic, allostatic adaptations have to be restrict-
ed to generating aversive memories about speciﬁc events
and actions. Inability to optimally regulate stress responses
via general resilience mechanisms might result in feelings
of helplessness and a generalized amotivational, lethargic
state.
The further disease process might involve secondary
dysfunctions such as social withdrawal, despair and suici-
dal tendencies, aggression, and alcohol abuse. The devel-
opment of a particular secondary dysfunction may be
promoted by situation-dependent risk factors or individ-
ual predispositions and prevented by speciﬁc protective
circumstances or the activation of dysfunction-speciﬁc in-
dividual resilience mechanisms. For example, alcohol
abuse might be prevented by religious beliefs or
strong impulse control. None of these secondary dys-
functions will, however, occur if the initial aversion
evoked by the experience of failure and the accompany-
ing aversive learning processes have been well tuned in
the ﬁrst place. Hence, people who react to social stress-
ors with optimized aversion are likely to be protected
from many types of possible dysfunctions, even if any
particular dysfunction-speciﬁc protective mechanism
may not be very effective in a given person (e.g., if he
or she has poor impulse control).
From this analysis it follows that the deﬁnition of general
resilience mechanisms as protecting from various dysfunc-
tions implies that they work by optimizing stressor-induced
aversion. A question addressed further below is whether
there may be general resilience mechanisms that deal
not only with certain, but with many or all types of
stressors (e.g., social as well as physical stressors). We
coin these hypothetical mechanisms global resilience
mechanisms.
To give an overview, we differentiate between
dysfunction-speciﬁc resilience mechanisms (protecting
against a single stress-induced functional impairment or
symptom);
general resilience mechanisms (protecting against
several stress-induced functional impairments or symp-
toms); and
global resilience mechanisms (protecting against
several functional impairments or symptoms, induced by
exaggerated stress responses to a large range of different
stressors).
The example of the stressed employee also shows that
the speciﬁc pattern of dysfunctions occurring in an individ-
ual person when general resilience mechanisms collapse
may strongly depend on speciﬁc circumstances and person-
al factors, the latter being shaped by genetic or epigenetic
background, learning history, and so forth. One person may
show suicidal tendencies, another aggression, another
alcohol abuse, and yet another a combination of these.
Hence, if resilience research wants to investigate general
resilience mechanisms, it should not focus on resilience
to any speciﬁc dysfunction, as such studies might reveal
only dysfunction-speciﬁc resilience mechanisms. Rather,
outcome measures should test for a wide range of dysfunc-
tions, and they should assess the individual’s global or
average burden from several dysfunctions, rather than
looking at a speciﬁc pattern of dysfunctions (i.e., a
disorder).
1.4. Resilience to quantitative, not to categorical
deterioration
So far, we have incorporated transdiagnostic thinking by
proposing that resilience research should focus on dysfunc-
tions rather than on disorders. Pursuing this argument has
led us to the further-reaching conclusion that resilience re-
search should focus not on any speciﬁc dysfunction or
pattern of dysfunctions but on global or average dysfunc-
tion. Proponents of the transdiagnostic approach also em-
phasize that symptoms or dysfunctions do not occur in a
binary fashion (Craddock & Owen 2010; Kapur et al.
2012). One is not either lethargic or not. Moreover, as
said, the threshold at which the intensity of a dysfunction
is considered pathological is essentially arbitrary.
A further element in completing the paradigm shift away
from conventional disease-focused and toward health-
focused research would then be to measure dysfunctions
quantitatively and to use quantitative – ideally continuous –
outcome variables. Combined with the above suggestions,
this leads to a strategy that consists of adding up or averag-
ing quantitative scores on several functional dimensions in
order to derive something like an individual global mental
health score. An example of such an approach can be
found in the general health questionnaire (GHQ), which
has been used to agglomerate symptoms of somatic irrita-
tion, anxiety, social dysfunction, and despair in a single
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quantitative outcome variable (Goldberg & Hillier 1979),
or also in the adult self report (ASR; Achenbach & Rescorla
2003), which additionally includes externalizing behaviors.
One big advantage quantitative outcome variables have
over categorical measures is that changes in these variables
between measurement time points (e.g., from before to
after stressor exposure or treatment) can be quantitatively
analyzed, even if a change does not involve passing from
one side of an arbitrary cutoff to the other. We only
mention here that it would be desirable eventually to
replace self- or other-report–based measures such as the
GHQ or the ASR with measures based on objective physi-
ological or behavioral parameters.
To conclude this introductory discussion, the currently
ongoing paradigm shift from disease to resilience research
provides an opportunity to change clinical focus from cor-
recting speciﬁc pathophysiological processes to fostering
general protective mechanisms. As well as bringing new
ideas into therapy research, this would also facilitate the
development of new and better prevention strategies. Pre-
vention is of particular interest; intervening before the
negative consequences of stress occur is likely to be
more effective in reducing human suffering and economic
costs than is treating the consequences (Sapienza &
Masten 2011). Reaching these goals might be facilitated
by integrating new transdiagnostic thinking through the
use of quantitative average mental health scores. For neu-
robiologists, and especially for those using animal models,
an important implication of this change in perspective is
that it is no longer necessary to model a particular
disease or syndrome (“Are my mice depressed?”); rather,
researchers can ask the much simpler and more easily
objectiﬁable question of whether their animals survive a
stressor without strong and lasting functional impairments
in a range of meaningful behavioral assays. Hence, al-
though challenging, the intellectual adventure to rethink
how clinical research addresses stress and its consequenc-
es from the vantage point of resilience could open up
interesting avenues to new insights.
2. Deﬁnitions and scope
Before elaborating on these general ideas and exploring
whether it is possible to develop a uniﬁed conceptual
framework for transdiagnostic resilience research that
aims at identifying and understanding general resilience
mechanisms, it is useful to deﬁne the key terms used in
this paper, as well as its scope.
Resilience as we understand it is an empirically observ-
able phenomenon, namely that someone does not
develop lasting mental health problems although he or
she is subject to adversity. Adversity is understood in the
broadest sense and may include short-term (acute) or
long-term (chronic), social or physical stressors. For the
sake of brevity, we take the term mental health problems
also to embrace stress-related somatic problems. Thus, re-
silience is an outcome or, if mental health is measured at
more than one time point, a series of outcomes – that is,
a process. As brieﬂy alluded to before, individuals with
certain traits may be more likely to have positive outcomes
(e.g., Miller & Harrington 2011), but this relationship is not
deterministic (i.e., it is impossible to predict with certainty
that someone with a “hardy” or “positive” personality will
not be affected by a stressor). Therefore, resilience-condu-
cive traits are not to be confounded with resilience as an
outcome (Mancini & Bonanno 2009).
As also mentioned earlier, several researchers have de-
scribed various temporal proﬁles of outcomes, and pro-
posed to give them different labels. So, Bonanno refers
to stable functioning throughout the process as “resilience,”
to temporary dysfunction followed by return to previous
levels as “recovery,” and to persistent dysfunction as
“chronic distress” (for more detailed discussions, see
Bonanno et al. 2011; Norris et al. 2009). For reasons we
discuss in section 5.2, we do not make this distinction,
and here use the term resilience for any trajectory that
eventually leads to levels of functioning that are compara-
ble to or even better than at the outset.
The deﬁnition of resilience as an outcome or process also
differentiates resilience from resilience factors; that is, em-
pirically derived variables that statistically predict a resilient
outcome. Resilience-conducive traits, for instance, would
have to be classiﬁed in our terminology as resilience
factors. Resilience must also be differentiated from any
mechanism by which a positive outcome is achieved (resil-
ience mechanism). For example, it might be that someone
with a resilience-conducive personality (resilience factor)
is more likely to have a positive outcome because her per-
sonality predisposes her to cope with stressors in a proac-
tive way (e.g., by focusing on effectively removing the
stressors). Such a person would ultimately be less
exposed to stressors, and therefore would not develop
mental problems. Proactive coping would therefore be
the resilience mechanism in this example.
The example also illustrates the way we distinguish re-
silience and stress coping in this paper. Although in
general language, coping is often equated with success
in dealing with a challenge (i.e., with a positive
outcome), we here exclusively use it for the cognitive
and behavioral efforts produced to deal with the chal-
lenge, whether successful or not (Lazarus & Folkman
1984). Thus, coping is an inherent aspect of the stress
response (see also sect. 1.3).
We have begun this paper by emphasizing the need to
act against stress-related mental illness, and therefore
limit the scope of our discussion to resilience to dysfunc-
tions as they typically occur in the context of these disor-
ders. We thus exclude resilience to dysfunctions that do
not have a clear stress-related etiology, such as age-
related memory impairments or the positive symptoms of
schizophrenia. This focus of course requires a deﬁnition
of stress. In section 1.3, we provided a phenomenological
deﬁnition of stress or stress responses as orchestrated
multisystem reactions to threat. Insofar as emotions or emo-
tional reactions are phenomenologically deﬁned as orches-
trated multisystem reactions to motivationally relevant
stimuli or situations (Moors 2009), stress responses are par-
ticular types of emotional responses.
Functionally, the role of emotions is to prospectively
assure survival and reproduction when there is a signiﬁcant
change in external or internal conditions that cannot be an-
swered by reﬂexes or habits, that is, by simpler and more
rigid types of behavior (Scherer 2001). Globally, emotions
can be subdivided into aversive (negative) and appetitive
(positive) reactions, depending on whether their immediate
objective is to avoid, remove, or minimize a threat or to
obtain a reward, respectively (Dickinson & Pearce 1977;
Kalisch et al.: A conceptual framework for the neurobiological study of resilience
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Gray 1976; Konorski 1967; Mowrer 1960). The aversive-
appetitive subdivision is therefore a motivational one; phe-
nomenologically, aversively and appetitively motivated
reactions may not always be easily distinguishable. For
example, an animal may remain immobile so as not to
attract the attention of a predator – or of prey. Also, a
similar motivational state may be expressed as different pat-
terns of physiological activation and coping behavior. For
example, aversion to a predator may result in the prey’s im-
mobility or escape or ﬁght. Nevertheless, certain physiolog-
ical (e.g., HPA axis activation), behavioral (e.g., facial
expression), or, in humans, subjective-experiential criteria
(e.g., self-reported valence of feelings, intentions) can be
used as relatively good discriminative markers of aversive
versus appetitive motivation. On this basis, we classify
stress as an “aversive” or “negative” emotional response
and will often use these terms as well as threat response
or fear response interchangeably. We will also interchange-
ably speak of stressors or threats or of stimuli or situations
that evoke aversive or negative emotional responses.
The root cause of stress, then, is aversive motivation, and
the most effective way to prevent stress and stress-related
dysfunctions is to limit aversion. This is why in section 1.3
we equated general resilience mechanisms with mecha-
nisms that ﬂexibly adjust aversive motivation to appropriate
levels. Emotion regulation mechanisms that act primarily
on the behavioral expression of aversion – for example, pro-
moting the suppression of behavioral impulses (cf. expres-
sive suppression [Gross 1998] or impulse control [Bari &
Robbins 2013]) – cannot be expected to have comparably
generalized protective effects. The same can be assumed
for the isolated regulation of any other stress response com-
ponent, be it the temporary reduction of negative thoughts
and feelings through distraction (Gross 1998) or the auto-
matic regulation of physiological (autonomic, hormonal) ac-
tivation through negative feedback mechanisms (Holsboer
& Ising 2010). Successful optimization of aversion, on the
other hand, will facilitate behavioral optimization (see the
example of the stressed employee in sect. 1.3 whose gener-
alized aversive state makes it impossible for him to look for
alternative solutions) and also will result in appropriate ad-
justments of other response components. The critical ques-
tion, then, is what determines aversion. We will address this
question in section 4, where we attempt to develop a theory
of resilience.
Finally, we have brieﬂy mentioned that resilience re-
searchers often emphasize the role of active processes or
mechanisms that support resilience (Russo et al. 2012).
Active as we understand the term does not necessarily
refer to behavioral activity but refers to any resource-
demanding process, and may therefore also apply to
cognitive processes. The emphasis on active processes is
important for resilience research as it further demarcates
the discipline from pathophysiological research. Not
falling mentally ill is not a passive process, nor the result
of not being subject to some stressor or pathological
agent or endogenous degenerative process, or of not car-
rying some molecular abnormality that makes someone
else susceptible to a stressor (Russo et al. 2012). Instead,
the maintenance or quick recovery of mental health
results from processes that shape the organism’s stress re-
sponses in a way that permits long-term functioning. By
describing active resilience mechanisms, resilience re-
search addresses questions that are not in the focus of
pathophysiological research, thus making an original
contribution to clinical science.
3. Identifying resilience factors
3.1. Transdiagnostic quantitative study designs in
humans
Having explained the key concepts and the most funda-
mental assumptions on which we base our theory develop-
ment, we would like to introduce a more practical aspect by
asking what a resilience study in humans would look like,
and in what way a transdiagnostic quantitative design
would differ from the more conventional designs still
widely used in resilience studies. (For excellent overviews
of the current state of the art, see Kent et al. 2014;
Southwick et al. 2011a.) A conventional longitudinal resil-
ience study might involve a mental health characterization
at some time point T1 before the likely occurrence of major
adversity (e.g., before entering a risky professional career
track or beginning a major phase of life transition such as
from adolescence to adulthood), focusing on a disorder or
a closely related set of disorders that typically develop in
such circumstances. Adversity occurring between T1 and
the end point T2 is somehow assessed (usually by retro-
spective self- or other-report), and the T2 mental health
characterization usually boils down to an outcome
measure of the type PTSD or not?
Instead of employing a diagnosis-based binary metric, a
transdiagnostic design could base outcome on a quantita-
tive tool such as the GHQ or the ASR (see sect. 1.4) or
others to obtain a global sum score of mental burden
across various dysfunctions. Mental problems P at T1 and
T2 can therefore be expressed in sum scores ΣPT1 and
ΣPT2, and the outcome would be the change in mental
problems from T1 to T2:
DSP = SPT2 − SPT1
where a positive sign of the outcome variable signiﬁes an
increase in mental problems. Where T1 data are not avail-
able, as is often the case in trauma research, ΣPT2 would be
the outcome.
Similarly, one could attempt to express an individual’s
cumulative stressor load between T1 and T2 through a
quantitative sum score ΣS. The basic assumption of
general resilience mechanisms that are not dysfunction
speciﬁc (see sect. 1.3) would then permit us to argue that
someone is the more resilient at T2 the less that person de-
velops mental problems between T1 and T2 (the smaller
ΔΣP), in proportion to the stressor load accumulated
between T1 and T2 (ΣS). Normalization of outcome by
stressor load is essential, as it pertains to a central question
in resilience research, which is why people differ in their
long-term responses to stressors. Comparisons of health
outcomes between people who have experienced different
stressor load would be meaningless without normalization.
Especially for illustrative purposes, it might therefore be
useful in some cases to express this relationship between
mental problems and stressor load in a quantitative
outcome quotient1:
RT2 = 1/ DSP/SS
( ) = SS/DSP
See Figure 1 for illustration.
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3.2. Identiﬁcation of resilience factors
Resilience is thus operationalized as a quantitative outcome
variable (inverse of ΔΣP, or, if advantageous, R) that is
ideally continuous in nature and can be used, for instance,
to ask whether independent variables measured at T1
predict resilience at T2. In our terminology, this would
be resilience factors (see sect. 2). So, one could calculate
the degree to which variance in RT2 in the study sample
is explained by, for example, a T1 measure of executive
functions, a particular genotype combination, or some
measure of social integration before or at the time of ﬁrst
adversity.
Provided measures are repeated, one could also corre-
late changes in some variable of interest taken at both T1
and T2 with RT2 (cf. Benight & Cieslak 2011). If, for
example, an increase in executive performance co-varied
with RT2, this would support a relationship between resil-
ience and executive functions. Several prototypical scenar-
ios are conceivable: (1) T1 executive performance predicts
RT2 but does not change over time, suggesting executive
performance is a relatively stable individual property or re-
source that protects from stress-related mental illness; (2)
T1 executive performance predicts RT2 and executive per-
formance increases from T1 to T2 in a way that correlates
with RT2, suggesting executive performance is a malleable
protective resource that is trained by use; (3) T1 executive
performance does not predict RT2, but an increase in exec-
utive performance from T1 to T2 correlates with RT2, sug-
gesting that executive functions really improve only during
times of adversity.
3.3. Advantages of transdiagnostic quantitative analysis
The practical advantage of using a quantitative outcome
variable for the identiﬁcation of resilience factors is
twofold: First, in cases where dichotomization of the
outcome variable is difﬁcult and sometimes arbitrary
(PTSD or not?), a quantitative variable preserves the inher-
ent variance of the data and therefore permits a much more
sensitive analysis; second, in samples where only few
subjects fall into the disease category (only few develop
PTSD, whereas many others perhaps show subdiagnostic
problems that may still signiﬁcantly affect quality of life,
social integration, and professional performance), statisti-
cal analysis is still feasible because this subdiagnostic vari-
ance is retained. Hence, an operationalization of resilience
as a transdiagnostic, quantitative outcome variable not
only circumvents the conceptual problems of diagnosis-
based research but also provides more power for statistical
analysis.
3.4. Quantiﬁcation of stressor load
The accurate quantiﬁcation of stressor load in the earlier
equation is of clear importance for a successful quantitative
analysis of resilience in the way we advocate it, and it
therefore deserves some discussion. In particular, it is not
self-evident why stressor load should be expressed in a cu-
mulative sum score ΣS and how this can be done practical-
ly. For example, in trauma research, the relevant stressor is
often a single dramatic event, and one may be inclined
to express stressor load in a simple binary variable (0 or
1). Interindividual differences in ΣPT2 within the trauma-
tized group would then essentially not be qualiﬁed by ΣS,
which is 1 in every subject. Stressor exposure will,
however, not be identical for all victims in a study. For
example, the individual impact of a terror attack, a techno-
logical disaster, or a natural disaster may vary with respect
to the amount of physical damage caused to the victim, to
the extent to which friends or family are involved, to the
proximity of the event to one’s work or living place, or to
whether one witnesses other people being harmed (Galea
& Maxwell 2009). That is, there are several stressor dimen-
sions, some being more physical in nature, some social, and
on closer inspection, each of them is rather non-binary.
There is another complication. The treatment of a poten-
tially traumatizing event as an isolated, acute stressor is to
some extent artiﬁcial; any major event will have long-
lasting consequences to both the person and the person’s
environment (Norris & Elrod 2006). Injury during a
terror attack may cause chronic physical impairments that
constitute stressors in their own right, and the death of a
relative may negatively affect social networks or ﬁnances.
These sequelae of trauma will occur differently in different
people, introducing variance that needs to be taken into
account when quantifying resilience.
Both complications may be less problematic in life-event
research, where subjects usually retrospectively indicate
the occurrence of items from a list of potential signiﬁcant
types of events (death of a family member, loss of employ-
ment, trafﬁc accident, etc.), and researchers typically sum
up the number of adverse events, sometimes weighted by
a rating of an event’s aversiveness or by the age at which
it occurred, to obtain ΣS (Caspi et al. 1996). The underlying
assumption here is that interindividual differences in the
quality of, or in the exposure to, an event and in the seque-
lae of events are averaged out when considering a large
number of potential event classes, making the sheer
number of experienced events a reasonably accurate
index of stressor load. This already points to a solution for
the problem. It will always be practically impossible to ac-
curately quantify each single stressor or stressor dimension;
but by extending stressor monitoring to a wide range of po-
tential stressors that are summed up or averaged, many
Figure 1. Transdiagnostic quantiﬁcation of resilience. Resilience
(R) is calculated as the ratio of changes in summed mental
problem burden ΣP between time points T1 and T2 (ΔΣP) and
the summed stressor load ΣS accumulated between T1 and T2.
Three potential trajectories (of ΣP) are shown.
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smaller interindividual differences in stressor quality, stres-
sor exposure, and stressor consequences, can be ignored.
In addition to major life events, even minor events (the
so-called “daily hassles” such as relationship or work con-
ﬂicts, ﬁnancial problems, noise, trafﬁc, or housing prob-
lems; Hahn & Smith 1999) can have profound effects on
mental health when frequent and accumulated over
longer intervals (Serido et al. 2004). This implies that stres-
sor monitoring in any longitudinal resilience study should
extend beyond the monitoring of major events. Faced
with this challenge, many chronic stress researchers have
resorted to deliberately assessing broad categories of
stress experiences (e.g., social stress from private life or
work life; Petrowski et al. 2012), rather than asking about
speciﬁc stressors or stress situations, thereby, however,
giving up the differentiation between stressors and stress.
We would therefore favor extended life calendar–like in-
ventories that also include more mundane events as well
as chronic stressors. Monitoring less remarkable events re-
quires closely spaced monitoring intervals. Self-report
could be complemented by data from other records,
where possible (e.g., when studying the effects of physical
illness or ﬂight noise or commuting). Stressor reporting
will be increasingly facilitated and made more precise by
the development of ambulatory methods (ecological mo-
mentary assessments; Kubiak & Stone 2012).
A ﬁnal complication is that one cannot assume that dif-
ferent types of stressors will affect mental health in the
same way, and that general resilience mechanisms as
deﬁned in section 1.3 will also be global; that is, protect
from the effects of any type of stressor. As said, it may
well be that the organism regulates aversion to, for in-
stance, minor versus major (e.g., daily hassles vs. trauma)
or physical versus social stressors (e.g., pain vs. social exclu-
sion) differently. Even this classiﬁcation may be too broad,
and one may have to make a differentiation between, for in-
stance, different classes of physical stressors (pain, noise,
handicap, etc.). This would require choosing study
cohorts who are confronted with single classes of stressors
only or, where this is unrealistic, such as when looking at
the consequences of massive trauma, generating separate
scores for single classes of stressors represented in the
cohort. These could then be related to outcome ΔΣP or
ΣPT2, and further analyses could be restricted to those
scores that show a strong relationship to the outcome.
We will come back to this issue in section 4.2.8.
3.5. State of research and current challenges
What resilience factors have been detected to date?
Current reviews cite long lists of factors that are presum-
ably causal for resilience. Beyond the extent and quality
of the stressors, these include external factors, such as
social support or socioeconomic status, as well as internal
or personality factors, such as certain character traits,
coping style, age, sex, ethnicity, (epi)genetics, spirituality,
life history, cognitive abilities, brain function, hormonal
factors, and so forth, often complemented by their interac-
tions (e.g., Feder et al. 2011; Mancini & Bonanno 2009;
Sapienza & Masten 2011; Stewart & Yuen 2011). These
lists are cumbersome, and it has been pointed out that
many of these factors overlap conceptually and presumably
mediate or otherwise depend on one another (Stewart &
Yuen 2011). For instance, it is well conceivable that life
history shapes a character and thereby affects resilience,
or that cognitive abilities and brain function are intricately
linked and therefore exert nonindependent effects.
4. Identifying resilience mechanisms
4.1. Factor-mechanism distinction
A deeper, conceptual problem in this research, which likely
contributes to the plethora of seemingly unrelated ﬁndings,
becomes apparent when one starts to make a distinction
between resilience factors and resilience mechanisms (see
sect. 2). There may be many different factors that each
partly determine whether someone will be resilient, but
there are probably fewer paths from determinant to
effect than there are determinants. In other words, it is rea-
sonable to assume that there are far fewer distinct psycho-
logical or biological resilience mechanisms (Mx in Fig. 2)
through which any given determinant (i.e., predictor or re-
silience factor, F) can act. The challenge is therefore to
identify the few general paths or shared mechanisms that
make someone more or less resilient (Mancini &
Bonanno 2009) (see Fig. 2). The closer a mechanism is to
directly affecting the cause of stress-related dysfunctions,
the more determinants it will mediate. This is where mech-
anistic psychobiological research, including in animal
models, becomes highly relevant for resilience research.
4.2. A mechanistic theory
Identifying factors requires much exploratory research;
identifying a mechanism requires a theory of how a factor
leads to an outcome. In the following, we will introduce a
Figure 2. Factor-mechanism distinction. (A) Resilience research
has identiﬁed many factors (Fx) such as social support, social
status, personality, life history, coping style, genetic background,
brain function, etc., that partially determine resilient outcome
R. But these factors frequently overlap conceptually (F1 may be
similar or identical to F2, F1 to F4 may converge onto a
common end-path) and may interact statistically (F5 may
mediate the effects of F6, F8 may moderate the effects of F7).
It is postulated that a limited set of shared psychological or
biological mechanisms (Mx) ultimately mediate the effects of
these factors. (B) A radical possibility that is explored in this
paper is that there is a single mediating mechanism M1 that
constitutes the common end-path to resilience.
Kalisch et al.: A conceptual framework for the neurobiological study of resilience
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theoretical framework that is based on the idea of general
resilience mechanisms that can protect against a wider
range of stress-related dysfunctions rather than being re-
stricted to protecting single systems or functions. We
believe this is a good starting point because mechanisms
that can prevent many dysfunctions simultaneously are
likely to be closer to the cause of stress-related impairment
than are mechanisms that can prevent only a speciﬁc dys-
function. Strong impulse control in the example of the
stressed employee in section 1.3 might protect against ha-
bitual drinking, but it cannot abolish the exaggerated
stress response to failure and might be useless against
social withdrawal or despair. By contrast, successful limita-
tion of the aversion to failure that motivates the stress re-
sponse in the ﬁrst place will protect against many
dysfunctions at a time.
Our theory is sufﬁciently broad to be applicable to resil-
ience research in both animals and humans, therefore, we
hope, facilitating translational mechanistic investigation.
As the theory posits that a positive appraisal style is the
key resilience mechanism, we refer to it as positive appraisal
style theory of resilience, or PASTOR.
4.2.1. Claim 1: Appraisal. We propose that all resilience
factors Fx identiﬁed so far converge, directly or indirectly,
to a common ﬁnal path; that is, there is a proximal cause
for mental health in the domain of stress-related dysfunc-
tion. This common ﬁnal path (corresponding to a single
mechanism M1, as in the general terminology used in
Fig. 2B) is the way an individual evaluates (appraises, in-
terprets, analyzes) potentially threatening stimuli or situa-
tions in terms of their meaning for the functioning of the
organism (PASTOR claim 1).
This claim is rooted in appraisal theory, which holds that
the type, quality, and extent of emotional reactions (includ-
ing stress reactions) are determined not by simple, ﬁxed
stimulus-response relationships but by the context-depen-
dent evaluation of the motivational relevance of a stimulus
or situation (Arnold 1969; Frijda 1993; Lazarus & Folkman
1984; Roseman & Smith 2001; Scherer 2001) (Fig. 3). The
outcome of this evaluation determines both the degree of
aversive or appetitive motivation toward a stimulus and
the speciﬁc behavioral reaction that is chosen to reach
the aversive or appetitive goal (Lazarus & Folkman
1984). To achieve the contextually appropriate outcome,
the appraisal process integrates different types of internal
and external information, or stimulus and situation dimen-
sions. These appraisal dimensions range from basic ones
such as stimulus intensity, novelty, or intrinsic (un)pleasant-
ness; to more computationally demanding ones such as
outcome probability, (un)predictability, or compatibility
with one’s goals and needs; up to complex dimensions
such as causation (e.g., agency), relation to coping potential
(resources, power, control), or norm compatibility (Scherer
2001). As a result, one and the same stimulus may evoke dif-
ferent emotional reactions in different circumstances or in-
dividuals (e.g., because goals or coping potential differ).
In this framework, an individual’s stress or threat reac-
tion results from the analysis that a signiﬁcantly unpleasant
or goal- or need-incompatible outcome is to be expected
with some probability and that he or she may not be able
to prepare for or deal with this outcome (Lazarus &
Folkman 1984). Stress is therefore mainly determined by
estimations of outcome magnitude (unpleasantness, goal
or need incompatibility), outcome probability, and coping
potential. The employee will feel the more performance
pressure, and thus work the harder, the more aversive
the consequence of failure would be to him (outcome mag-
nitude; e.g., criticism, salary cut, job loss) and the more he
believes he might fail (outcome probability). Both esti-
mates strongly depend on estimated coping potential. For
example, outcome magnitude appraisals may be affected
by perceived control or resources (“Have I saved enough
money?” or “Do I have enough family support to survive
a salary cut or temporary unemployment?”) or self-efﬁcacy
and power (“Am I qualiﬁed enough to easily ﬁnd another
job?”). Self-efﬁcacy perceptions may also affect outcome
probability appraisals (“Can I manage the job?”).
If further considering that outcome magnitude depends
on the importance one attributes to a threatened goal or
need (e.g., “To what extent do I need the positive afﬁrma-
tion that a job or a high salary provides me with?”), it
becomes evident that even a seemingly basic and simple
emotion such as stress or fear is the result of a complex in-
terplay of different appraisals along different appraisal di-
mensions, especially where the stressor is social in nature.
The resulting intraindividual (context-dependent) and in-
terindividual (person-dependent) variability in emotional
reactions to similar stimuli or situations is further accentu-
ated by the inherent subjectivity of most appraisals. Where
the consequences or the probability of an aversive outcome
can only be estimated, interindividual differences in how
people assign values to appraisal dimensions become im-
portant in determining the stress response. An extreme
example is the tendency of some people to catastrophize
about normal internal perceptions of bodily arousal in a
physically challenging situation (a pounding heart, sweaty
hands) and to overinterpret them as signifying a potentially
lethal threat. This can lead such a person into a vicious cycle
of fear and appraisal that eventually results in panic attacks
(Beck et al. 1985; Reiss &McNally 1985). Another example
is the documented individual differences in the use of pos-
itive reappraisal strategies that allow a person to see a neg-
ative situation from a different, more benign angle,
resulting in less fear (Gross 1998; Lazarus & Folkman
1984).
Hence, appraisal is multidimensional, context-dependent,
and subjective. Another important point is that the basic
deﬁnition of appraisal is a purely functional one: To get
from a stimulus or situation to an emotional response
takes appraisal; and by taking into account the various stim-
ulus or situation dimensions (by assigning different values
to different dimensions), appraisal produces differentiable
emotional responses (Moors 2009). This deﬁnition does
not suggest what cognitive or neural processes could be
Figure 3. Appraisal theory. Emotional reactions to any stimulus or situation are determined by the appraisal process.
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involved in appraisal. In fact, there is considerable debate
about the information processing mechanisms (e.g., associ-
ative vs. rule based) that underlie appraisal and about what
format of representation they work on (e.g., perceptual vs.
propositional) (Moors 2009). Neurobiological investiga-
tions of appraisal processes are still at relatively initial
stages (Kalisch & Gerlicher 2014; Sander et al. 2005).
Nevertheless, most appraisal researchers agree that ap-
praisal involves not only a single process but probably mul-
tiple cognitive operations occurring in parallel or serially.
Most researchers would also agree that some appraisal pro-
cesses can be relatively quick, automatic, and unconscious,
such as in many conditioned reactions, or also slow, con-
trolled, and conscious, especially where judgments are dif-
ﬁcult and complex (Leventhal & Scherer 1987; Robinson
1998). (It is worth pointing out that it is a common misun-
derstanding that appraisal theory deals only with conscious
or higher-order processes or with processes that may only
be available to humans; Moors 2010). Finally, appraisal is
dynamic and interactive, owing to the need to continuously
integrate new incoming information (including about one’s
own current emotional state) and to continuously adjust ap-
praisal outcomes, leading to online changes in emotional
reactions (Scherer 2001). Therefore, in addition to being
multidimensional, context-dependent, and subjective, ap-
praisal is procedurally heterogeneous and dynamic. And,
of course, appraisal processes are thought to have a biolog-
ical basis.
4.2.2. Appraisal styles. Why should appraisal theory be
relevant to both clinical and animal researchers? In the
clinical ﬁeld, many etiological theories of stress-related dis-
orders have made explicit or implicit reference to appraisal
concepts by proposing that the cause of these disorders is
intense and prolonged stress reactions, which in turn
result as much from a patient’s typical ways of appraising
potentially aversive situations as they result from the pres-
ence of these situations (e.g., Beck & Clark 1988; Clark &
Beck 2010; Foa et al. 1996; Gotlib & Joormann 2010; Korn
et al. 2014; Mathews & MacLeod 2005; Reiss et al. 1986;
Seligman 1972).
The underlying idea is that an individual usually inter-
prets similar situations in a similar fashion, and therefore
can be characterized by his or her individual appraisal
style or typical appraisal tendencies. These appraisal
styles – partly overlapping terms often found in the litera-
ture are beliefs, appraisal habits, cognitive styles, attitudes,
or interpretive biases –may be more or less negative. In the
case of a patient suffering from a stress-related disorder,
the individual appraisal style is overly negative, and
thereby frequently produces strong aversive states. For
example, the patient might consistently overestimate the
aversive consequences of challenging situations (outcome
magnitude dimension) or the probability of such aversive
consequences (outcome probability dimension), or both;
he may also consistently underestimate his ability to cope
(coping dimension).
Depending on which type of negative appraisal domi-
nates in the patient, the exact nature of the aversive re-
sponses he typically produces may vary. So, a pessimist
who mainly overestimates outcome probabilities may act
with preemptory aggression in many harmless situations,
whereas a person with low perceived self-efﬁcacy (low
coping potential) may remain passive even when harm is
likely and could easily be avoided by active coping. Never-
theless, all responses will be fueled by aversive motivation
(cf. sect. 2) and will produce undesirable allostatic costs
(cf. sect. 1.3), which justiﬁes to subsume different negative
appraisal patterns under an umbrella term of “negative”
appraisal style.
The counterpart – a non-negative, or (for simplicity)
“positive” – appraisal style would be characterized by the
absence of such consistently negative evaluations on all
three of the described appraisal dimensions, or alternative-
ly, in consistently very positive evaluations on one or two di-
mensions that outweigh consistently negative evaluations
on the other dimension(s). The latter might be the case,
for instance, when a person tends to see threats in many
places (negative outcome probability estimates) but feels
strong enough to deal with whatever happens (positive
coping potential estimates). The result of a positive apprais-
al style is a low frequency of strong aversive states.
An appraisal style does not mean that an individual will
produce the same emotional response in every potentially
challenging situation. Individuals may also have speciﬁc ex-
periences or beliefs associated with speciﬁc situations, and
those may result in atypical evaluations and responses, in-
cluding occasional positive appraisals or reactions in other-
wise negative appraisers or vice versa. But what counts for
mental health, especially if people are confronted with var-
iable and diverse stressors over longer time periods, is the
typical way in which they react to challenge. If a person has
a tendency to see things negatively, she will more frequent-
ly be in a negative emotional state, and therefore more
likely to develop stress-related dysfunctions.
Also, our deﬁnition of appraisal style does not imply that
appraisal styles are invariable and ﬁxed over the course of
a lifetime (Benight & Cieslak 2011; Troy & Mauss 2011).
Although appraisal styles may well have a hereditary com-
ponent, it is unquestionable that the appraisal of a speciﬁc
situation or a whole class of situations can change. An
obvious example where appraisals are modiﬁed by experi-
ence is that of traumatic conditioning, where trauma-
associated stimuli and often also perceptually similar
stimuli and entire contexts can dramatically change in
value. A more positive example is cognitive-therapeutic in-
tervention, where appraisal values are changed deliberately
through a combination of experience and instruction in
order to improve the patient’s emotional behavior. The
changes in self-efﬁcacy perceptions that occur in the hypo-
thetical stressed employee in section 1.3 following his more
or less successful active coping efforts are another example.
Appraisal styles therefore constitute longer-term or charac-
ter-like processing tendencies that remain, however, mal-
leable to some extent.
On this basis, we introduce a further speciﬁcation of
PASTOR claim 1, positing that a general tendency for pos-
itive appraisal (a positive appraisal style) is protective and
should therefore be considered the primary pathway (M1)
to resilience (Table 1). As explained above, positive apprais-
al style is an umbrella term that applies to any appraisal
style that typically produces non-negative, non-aversive (in-
cluding positive or appetitive) emotional reactions when
the individual is challenged.
4.2.3. Appraisal in animals. For animal researchers, the
causation of emotional reactions by appraisal processes
may at ﬁrst be less obvious. Conditioned fear reactions,
Kalisch et al.: A conceptual framework for the neurobiological study of resilience
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for example, are still often considered to be simple, inﬂex-
ible stimulus-response phenomena where, through pairing
with the unconditioned stimulus (UCS), the conditioned
stimulus (CS) such as a tone gains access to the uncondi-
tioned response (UCR) that is normally evoked by the
UCS (e.g., an electric shock to the feet), and then
becomes the conditioned response (CR). An alternative
but similarly long-standing view is that CRs result from
the activation of a stimulus-stimulus (CS-UCS) association
that in turn evokes a species-typical preparatory threat re-
action (CR).
The ﬁrst model is clearly wrong, because a CR such as
freezing or the enhanced vigilance and muscle tension as-
sessed with startle probes is different from the UCR to a
shock, in which case the animal will jump around. The
second model also implies inﬂexibility of conditioned re-
sponding, whereas in fact there are many examples that
CRs are expressed in a context-dependent fashion.
Perhaps the best example is UCS inﬂation and deﬂation,
where, after a learning phase, the UCS is presented in
either stronger (inﬂation) or weaker (deﬂation) magnitude.
The result, consistently observed both in animals (Bouton
1984; Rescorla 1974) and in humans (Gottfried & Dolan
2004; Hosoba et al. 2001; White & Davey 1989), is that
the CR to a subsequent CS is also inﬂated or deﬂated.
Hence, the CS must somehow gain access not only to the
mere sensory representation of the UCS but also to a rep-
resentation of its value or meaning, and this is what deter-
mines the strength of the CR. In other words, a simple
form of appraisal governs conditioned responding.
Formal associative learning models such as the famous
Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla et al. 1972) and its suc-
cessors (Dayan & Abbott 2001), though using terminology
such as “associative strength” (v) to describe the CS-UCS
link, actually formulate predictions of the UCS by the
CS, whose strength changes as a function of sampled
UCS probability and magnitude. Hence, the CS-UCS asso-
ciation is not a “stupid” stimulus-stimulus link that is ﬁxed
once learned. Instead, it has direction (the CS predicts
the UCS, not vice versa), meaning (the CS signals potential
harm that is deﬁned by UCS magnitude and probability),
and a truth value (the prediction may be right or wrong).
It is therefore much closer to a proposition than to what
is commonly considered an association (Mitchell et al.
2009). Flexible, meaning-dependent emotional responses
can also be demonstrated in the context of appetitive stim-
ulation (Hatﬁeld et al. 1996; Nonkes et al. 2010; Pickens
et al. 2003), indicating that emotion causation by appraisal
is a general principle. This insight makes appraisal theory a
framework that can be used to bridge the gap in mechanis-
tic resilience studies between humans and animals.
4.2.4. Appraisal as a mediator.
4.2.4.1. From factor to mechanism. What follows from the
PASTOR claim that generalized positive (non-negative) ap-
praisal leads to resilience? One important consequence is
that any resilience factor F that has been identiﬁed can
only be causal for resilience insofar as it promotes positive
appraisal. In other words, a positive appraisal style medi-
ates all other factors. Or, visually, in Figure 2B, M1 can
be replaced by an index of appraisal style, AS. For instance,
a robust and reliable social support network may mentally
stabilize an individual (Janicki-Deverts & Cohen 2011)
because she knows it will help her cope with many prob-
lems. Good executive functions may be an asset (Southwick
& Charney 2012) because they allow a person to suppress
negative information easily and instead to adopt a more
positive perspective when necessary. And if the person is
lucky enough to have a protective genetic or epigenetic
background (Caspi et al. 2010; Franklin et al. 2012; Hoch-
berg et al. 2010; Lesch 2011; Meaney 2010), that back-
ground is protective because it shapes brain function in a
way that facilitates positive appraisal.
An immediate criticism might arise from the analysis of
the social support example. If the employee in section 1.3
is embedded in a strong social network, does this stabilize
him in case of a job loss because it enhances his perceived
coping potential or resources, or rather because it actually
attenuates the tangible negative consequences unemploy-
ment has for him? Does he really react to the new situation
less negatively when he has strong ties with family and
friends because he knows he can count on their help (per-
ceived social support) or rather because he gets help (say, a
loan from a family member) (received social support)? The
answer that an appraisal theorist would give is that actually
getting help acts by improving his appraisal of the situation
(unless, of course, the help is disappointing; Norris &
Table 1. Positive appraisal style theory of resilience (PASTOR)
Claim 1: Positive appraisal style
A generalized tendency to appraise potentially aversive stimuli or situations in a non-negative/nonaverse (“positive”) fashion is the
proximal cause for resilience to stressors (adversity, challenge, trauma). A positive appraisal style is the common resilience mechanism
onto which all resilience factors converge and through which they exert their protective effects on mental health.
Claim 2: Positive reappraisal
In mildly aversive situations, positive appraisal is achieved easily by positive situation classiﬁcation (comparison with earlier, successfully
managed situations or activation of positive cultural stereotypes). However, in aversive situations that are strong enough to
automatically trigger negative appraisals, protective (less negative) appraisals (see claim 1) result from positively reappraising the
situation, either volitionally or nonvolitionally.
Claim 3: Interference inhibition
The positive adjustment of appraisals in strongly aversive situations (reappraisal proper) requires a capacity to inhibit the interference
resulting from competing negative appraisals and from the accompanying aversive emotional reactions.
Refer to sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. (for claim 1), 4.2.5 (for claim 2), and 4.2.7 (for claim 3) for more details.
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Kaniasty 1996). Hence, the primary cause for mental stabil-
ity is a less pessimistic appraisal.
This becomes clearer when considering an example
where someone has a strong negative appraisal tendency
that makes her catastrophize about the situation in spite
of good support (perhaps wondering how long a friend’s
help will last or what she will have to give in return for
that help, or perceiving being helped as a loss of control
or an attack on her self-esteem). This answer therefore per-
tains to the inherent subjectivity of appraisal, and it again
underscores the basis of appraisal theory: Any given emo-
tional state, whether positive or negative, strong or weak,
reﬂects the underlying appraisal of the stimulus or situa-
tion. There is no other way between a situation or stimulus
conﬁguration and the emotional state.
There is an even simpler mathematical answer to the
question. Received social support (getting help) will
change the situation and reduce overall stressor load ΣS.
Because resilience is quantiﬁed as maintained or reduced
mental problem burden ΔΣP normalized by ΣS (see sect.
3.1), any reduction in ΔΣP measured in a situation of re-
ceived social support would constitute a resilient outcome
(enhance R) only if it is relatively larger than the reduction
in ΣS. Reductions in ΔΣP that are comparable to reductions
in ΣS would simply reﬂect diminished challenge. They
would not require the activation of any psychobiological re-
silience mechanism. In particular, they would not challenge
a person’s capacity for positive appraisal.
This highlights an important additional advantage of
quantifying resilience as proposed in section 3.1. Received
social support would be considered a resilience factor (cor-
relate with R) only if its positive effects on mental health
(negative correlation with ΔΣP) are caused by more than
a reduction in stressor input (comparable negative correla-
tion with ΣS); for instance, by also changing general ap-
praisal tendencies. In this case, ΔΣP would drop more
than ΣS, and received social support would show a positive
correlation with R. Otherwise, received social support
could be eliminated from the list of factors that must be
investigated.
4.2.4.2. Statistical modeling. But how can mediation by ap-
praisal style be demonstrated? Let us assume we have only
a T1 measure of social integration (“Soc”) that does not dif-
ferentiate between perceived and received social support.
Many measures of resilience factors do not differentiate
between those aspects of a factor that work by changing ap-
praisals and those aspects that work by changing stressor
input ΣS. For instance, executive functions may facilitate
positive appraisal, but they may also facilitate adaptive
coping behavior and thereby prevent many unfortunate sit-
uations. In the causal model in Figure 4A, social integration
Soc negatively affects ΣS by providing factual help. ΣS en-
hances mental health problems ΔΣP. Critically, this
happens via appraisal processes. That is, the appraisals
are the mediators of the stressors.
It is, however, impossible to measure every appraisal of
every stressor and therefore to obtain sum scores of ap-
praisals (in analogy with the sum score of stressors, ΣS).
Instead, all produced individual appraisals must be
assumed to be well represented by appraisal style. This re-
ﬂects the speciﬁcation of PASTOR claim 1 in section 4.2.2.
that the way an individual typically appraises the stressors
encountered governs how the stressors affect ΔΣP. The
model therefore employs a quantitative appraisal style
score AS (for how this could be generated, see sect. 4.3),
with higher values signifying a more positive appraisal
style. Logically, a style or trait cannot mediate stressor
effects, only modulate them. Therefore, AS is introduced
as a moderator of the effects of ΣS on ΔΣP. This expresses
that stressors have a less deteriorating effect on mental
health if the appraisal style is positive. Finally, in addition
to affecting ΣS, Soc also affects AS (positively), in particular
by enhancing the individual’s perceived coping resources
(see sect. 4.2.1).
By introducing AS into the model, the direct path
from Soc to ΔΣP (reﬂecting that Soc is an important re-
silience factor) should not be signiﬁcant anymore (grey
in Fig. 4A). Instead, Soc is expected to affect ΔΣP
only via its effects on ΣS and AS; moreover, the effect
of Soc on ΔΣP via ΣS is expected to be modulated by
its effects on AS. Hence, taking into account these rela-
tionships should eliminate direct inﬂuences of social in-
tegration on resilience and therefore reduce the role
of social integration from a potential resilience mecha-
nism to a mere “upstream” resilience factor. In the
model, it may well be that AS turns out to have an ad-
ditional direct effect on ΔΣP, which, however, would not
invalidate the claim that appraisal style is the central re-
silience mechanism.
Similar mediation models could be built for any other re-
silience factor. For instance, a protective genetic back-
ground might also act via positively shaping appraisal.
Additionally, it might determine risk-seeking or avoidance
behaviors, thereby also affecting stressor exposure (posi-
tively or negatively, respectively). We can also envisage sce-
narios where no relationship between a resilience factor F
and ΣS exists. For example, stressor exposure during a
terror attack might not depend on social integration. In
such cases, it would be advantageous to eliminate the
Soc→ΣS path and instead to lump ΣS and ΔΣP together
in the outcome quotient R, which is greater the less a
Figure 4. Example of appraisal effects on mental health
outcome. (A) The relationship of stressors (ΣS) present between
measurement time points T1 and T2 and mental health
problems (T2 outcome ΔΣP) (cf. Fig. 1) is moderated by the
individual’s appraisal style (AS). By taking into account likely
causal relationships between an established resilience factor F
such as social integration (Soc) and both ΣS and AS, the direct
path between the resilience factor and ΔΣP becomes non-
signiﬁcant (grey). There are no remaining effects of the factor
on ΔΣP that are independent of AS. (B) In cases where a
resilience factor does not inﬂuence stressor exposure, the T2
outcome can also be expressed as the quotient R (inverse of
ΔΣP, see Fig. 1) and AS can be introduced as a mediator.
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person’s mental health is affected by stressors (see sect.
3.1). Variance normally attributed to the Soc→R path
would then be absorbed by introducing AS as a mediator
of the effects of Soc on R (Fig. 4B).
A basic causal model like that in Figure 4 can in theory
be extended by including potential confounders, that is,
other resilience factors. So, if social integration is the resil-
ience factor of interest and the intention is to show that its
effects are mediated by appraisal style, then we might want
to consider that both social integration and appraisal style
could be inﬂuenced by, for instance, life history or geno-
type. Provided we have performed a sufﬁcient T1 baseline
characterization to capture all potential confounders and
have a sufﬁcient sample size, we could include such rele-
vant factors in one multifactorial model (after appropriate
stepwise or factor-analytic selection procedures).
4.2.4.3. Modeling plasticity. We have earlier described
stress responses as involving plastic (“allostatic”) adapta-
tions that can change the way the individual deals with
future stressors (sect. 1.3). We have also emphasized that
appraisal styles are not invariable and may change over
time as a result of experience or instruction (sect. 4.2.2).
So, in the example of the stressed employee, we have dis-
cussed the possibility that self-efﬁcacy perceptions increase
when active coping efforts are successful and decrease
when they are not (sect. 1.3). Similarly, the employee’s
social support perceptions might increase when received
help is effective and decrease when it is not (sect.
4.2.4.1). Thereby, modiﬁcations of appraisal style during
or after stressor exposure are cases of allostatic plasticity
and are likely consequences of any major stressor exposure.
The inclusion of time-dependent variables has become
possible, at least in theory, by the rapid progress in
complex causal modeling over the last 15 years (Daniel
et al. 2013; Pearl 2009; Rubin 2005), and thus including
time-dependent variables constitutes a relevant potential
extension of the basic model architecture introduced
above. Time-dependent modeling may also be advanta-
geous when stressor load is seen to change over time,
which is a likely consequence of using closely spaced
stressor monitoring intervals, as proposed in section 3.4.
Time-dependent variables raise the problem of time-
dependent confounding, where adjustment for some vari-
able might be desired on the one hand to address potential
confounding, but adjustment would also remove a mediat-
ed effect. For example, a positive appraisal style might lead
to reduced stressor exposure (e.g., via reduced aversive mo-
tivation, which may permit more-ﬂexible coping behavior;
see sect. 1.3); this, in turn, might affect ﬁnal outcome.
That is, stressor exposure becomes a mediator for the
effects of appraisal style on outcome. At the same time,
stressor exposure needs to be adjusted for in a statistical
model to make subjects comparable (see sect. 3.1). To dis-
entangle such effects, multiple measurement time points
are required and thus more expensive designs. However,
such designs would also allow for looking at the temporal
order of changes in the involved variables and may, there-
fore, actually help in elucidating causal relations.
Such potential future elaborations notwithstanding, the
basic claim of PASTOR that a positive appraisal style medi-
ates the effects of all other resilience factors provides a new
perspective on the causal relationships between known
resilience factors. It also raises the critical question of
how appraisal style can be operationalized and measured.
4.2.5. Claim 2: Reappraisal. Before addressing how ap-
praisal styles can be measured, a deeper look into the
basic construct of positive appraisal style is necessary. In sit-
uations that are only mildly aversive, positive appraisals may
be relatively easily generated and stress responses may be
prevented from occurring altogether without much cogni-
tive effort. An individual may do this by a simple (often au-
tomatic) process of classifying a situation by referring to
similar situations that the person has experienced earlier
and retrieving the positive values on the relevant appraisal
dimensions that she or he has stored in memory for the
given class or type of situation. (“This is not the ﬁrst time
I have managed a cut in income!”) Classiﬁcation may also
be done with reference to stereotypes that are of cultural
origin (“In my family, we don’t panic over such things!”),
or there may be genetically imprinted appraisal patterns
for phylogenetically relevant classes of situations. We
could call this memory-based process positive situation
classiﬁcation. The more generalized these appraisal pat-
terns are across different types of situations, the more
likely a positive appraisal outcome. In more strongly aver-
sive situations (e.g., a job loss), initial stress responses
may, however, be essentially unavoidable. A critical ques-
tion for a person in these less-benign situations is
whether she or he can beneﬁt from changes toward the
better that may occur over time in a situation or from the
emergence of new, more positive information.
It may be helpful to imagine the employee immediately
after being sacked. He may initially doubt whether he will
receive any support, and thus feel the full blow of the bad
news. Later, however, he realizes that friends and family
can be counted on. In such a situation, will his initially neg-
ative appraisals easily be adjusted to reﬂect the new, more
positive perspective? The answer is probably both yes and
no. Neurobiologists have found ample evidence for the ex-
istence of evolutionarily old affective circuitry located
mainly in brainstem and subcortical areas that is responsi-
ble for generating low-threshold defense behavior whenev-
er there is a potential threat and that works in a relatively
automatic and uncontrolled fashion (LeDoux 1998). The
motto is: Better safe than sorry. The same circuitry is hy-
peractive in individuals diagnosed with anxiety disorders
(Etkin & Wager 2007) and most likely is responsible for
the exaggerated negative response beyond their control,
even if another part of their mind knows a particular fear
or worry is unfounded.
This again highlights an important aspect of appraisal
already mentioned (sect. 4.2.1): Appraisal, even within
any single appraisal dimension, is not supported by a
single, monolithic process, but rather by a collection of pro-
cesses that are presumably subserved by several brain cir-
cuits that often work in parallel to generate behavioral
output (Scherer 2001). As a consequence, the brain may
produce deviating or even conﬂicting appraisals of the
same stimulus or situation. One part may want to run
away from a potential threat, another part may say this is
not necessary, and yet another part may see interesting
aspects that are worth exploring further. And even if its
ﬁnal decision is to suppress the tendency to run away,
and instead to stay and explore, the desire to run away
may persist. Coming back to the social support example,
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the sacked employee may feel relieved by a friend’s help,
but at the same time also continue to negatively appraise
the situation that made him need help in the ﬁrst place.
Emotional improvement in a changing environment,
then, is some kind of sum game.
To summarize, for a less aversive state to develop when
an aversive situation improves or when new, positive infor-
mation arises during or after stressor exposure, appraisals
need to change; that is, negative appraisals must become
less negative or be complemented by alternative, positive
appraisals. This could be referred to as reappraisal. Such
reappraisal also takes place when new information is pro-
duced entirely internally; that is, when an individual re-
members past experiences relevant to the current
situation, takes a different mental perspective, or detects
new aspects in the situation. Reappraisal, in other words,
can also happen without any external change.
This is a particularly important point. If we assume that
people have a natural motivation to avoid aversive states
such as fear, anxiety, or stress, and considering the inherent
multidimensionality and subjectivity of appraisal that gives
individuals many degrees of freedom in evaluating any sit-
uation (sect. 4.2.1), then reappraisal can and will happen in
most aversive situations, whether or not it is invited by
changes in the external situation. This shifts the emphasis
from the external situation (or changes in the situation) to
the individual’s ability to ﬂexibly adjust a current negative
appraisal or to implement new, more positive appraisals
and then to maintain those appraisals. Both processes
have to occur in the face of interference from automatic
and uncontrolled negative appraisals and the accompanying
aversive emotional states.
This theoretical insight necessitates an addition to
PASTOR claim 1, that positive appraisal style is the single
mediating resilience mechanism. We therefore introduce
PASTOR claim 2: that in aversive situations that are
strong enough to activate the brain’s vestigial defense cir-
cuitry, protective, less negative appraisals (see claim 1)
result from easy positive reappraisal (see Table 1). Positive
reappraisal ability is therefore an inherent aspect of positive
appraisal style as the one mediating resilience mechanism,
in that it will determine typical appraisal outcomes, espe-
cially in strongly aversive situations (i.e., during major stres-
sor exposure).
The term reappraisal here is used in the broadest sense
of a reinterpretation or reevaluation, not necessarily refer-
ring to a volitional or controlled mental act. Of course, an
individual can actively try to see a situation in a more pos-
itive light (Gross 1998; Lazarus & Folkman 1984), and the
ability to do so is important for easy reappraisal. On a lower
level of cognitive hierarchy, however, reappraisal can
simply consist of an automatic adjustment or replacement
of negative appraisals that no longer adequately reﬂect
the situation, such as in the example of the employee
above or in a UCS deﬂation experiment (see sect. 4.2.3).
Reappraisal is also not restricted to any particular appraisal
dimension. The aversion induced by a potential threat can
be attenuated by reducing outcome probability estima-
tions, by downsizing the subjective importance of an in-
compatible goal, or by reminding oneself of past
successful coping experiences, to give just a few examples.
4.2.6. Appraisal contents and appraisal processes. Up to
now, we have discussed appraisal styles solely as a function
of the typical appraisal contents that characterize them; that
is, of the values someone typically assigns to appraisal di-
mensions such as outcome magnitude, outcome probabili-
ty, or coping potential. The consideration of reappraisal has
introduced a new element, which relates to the neurocog-
nitive processes that mediate appraisal. In reappraisal, an
individual who is better in detecting new, positive external
information or better in internally generating new, more
positive appraisals and who can more easily defend them
against competing negative appraisals is also more likely
to produce an overall positive appraisal outcome in any
given aversive situation, whatever the speciﬁc situation or
his or her prior experiences with similar situations may
be. In other words, an appraisal style in severely challeng-
ing situations may primarily reﬂect the effectiveness and ef-
ﬁciency of the cognitive operations that produce and
maintain positive (less negative) appraisals in the face of
stress.
These operations and their functionality may or may not
be the same for different appraisal dimensions; for
example, somebody might be good at correcting negative
outcome probability but not outcome magnitude estima-
tions. But the important point is that, for strongly aversive
situations, an individual’s typical appraisal outcomes (the
content) are shaped not so much by the positive or negative
experiences he has had in life or by the beliefs conveyed by
his culture (memory content), but rather by the good or
bad workings of his reappraisal processes. By contrast, in
less aversive situations, the process or processes permitting
positive situation classiﬁcation can be considered compara-
tively simple and undemanding, and appraisal content is
dominated by memory content; that is, by the appraisal
values already stored in the individual’s memory for that
class of situation. For PASTOR, this analysis implies that,
in addition to considering content, we must also consider
the processes that produce content.
4.2.7. Claim 3: Interference inhibition. Positive appraisal
adjustment and maintenance in strongly aversive situations
(in the further: “reappraisal proper”) occur while the brain
still generates conﬂicting negative appraisals and mentally
costly negative emotional reactions. How is such interfer-
ence resolved? Experimental psychology and behavioral
neuroscience tell us that, almost certainly, this involves in-
hibition. Many important insights are derived from
counter-conditioning procedures, where a CS ﬁrst acquires
one value (e.g., appetitive, through pairing with a rewarding
UCS) and then a conﬂicting, second value (e.g., aversive,
through pairing with a punishing UCS). In the terminology
introduced in section 4.2.5, this could be considered a pro-
totypical reappraisal experiment. In such experiments,
learning of the aversive value is usually retarded and
expression of aversive CRs is usually suppressed relative to
a comparison CS that undergoes aversive conditioning
without prior appetitive conditioning. These well-replicated
observations can be explained within a model of mutually
inhibitory appetitive and aversive motivational systems
(Dickinson & Pearce 1977; Konorski 1967; Solomon &
Corbit 1974), but not with other current learning models
(for an in-depth discussion, see Nasser & McNally 2012).
Extinction of conditioned fear is another prototypical
example of reappraisal, where a CS ﬁrst acquires aversive
value (again through CS-punishment pairings) and then
no longer predicts punishment (because it is repeatedly
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presented in the absence of the UCS). It is well known that
the conditioning-extinction procedure generates both a
fear memory (CS-UCS association) and a safety memory
(CS–no UCS association), which, when the CS is presented
again later, are both retrieved and give rise to conﬂicting
appraisals of the CS (Bouton 2004). If the safety appraisal
wins out (if attenuation of CRs is lasting), this necessarily
involves successful neural inhibition of the fear circuitry
(Milad & Quirk 2012).2
Hence, in many cases, reappraisal success requires a ca-
pacity to inhibit interfering appraisals or other distractors.
This is PASTOR claim 3 (Table 1). Interference inhibition
is necessary but not sufﬁcient for successful reappraisal.
The primary element of reappraisal is to take the alterna-
tive, more positive perspective (reappraisal proper). Inhibi-
tion may permit reappraisal proper and protect the new
appraisal against interference. Again, we assume that this
inhibitory capacity is a character-like trait or style that
however remains malleable. It might be interesting to see
whether the type of inhibition required during appraisal
conﬂicts is the same as or similar to inhibition in other
domains, such as in motor impulse (Aron 2011) or atten-
tional (Corbetta & Shulman 2002) or cognitive (Stahl
et al. 2014) control, and might perhaps constitute a
general inhibitory trait. We point out, however, that atten-
tional control that is used to (self-) distract from aversive
stimuli (Gross 1998) is unlikely to lastingly reduce aversion,
because it is improbable that the processing of massive or
repeated stressors can be effectively blocked over longer
time periods.
4.2.8. Summary of PASTOR. We started this theory
section with the radical claim that positive appraisal style
is the one general resilience mechanism M1 that mediates
the effect of all other reappraisal factors Fx on resilience
R (PASTOR claim 1; cf. Fig. 2B). The following theoretical
considerations have then led us to the conclusion that a pos-
itive appraisal style (i.e., overall positive appraisal contents
in most challenging situations) is determined by at least
three elements.
In only mildly aversive situations that do not necessarily
and automatically generate a stress response, stress re-
sponses are prevented by a process of classifying the situa-
tion positively based on its similarity with positively valued
prior experiences or cultural stereotypes (positive situation
classiﬁcation or process class 1, PC1). The neurocognitive
processes underlying classiﬁcation are considered relatively
undemanding, and hence memory content plays a domi-
nant role in determining appraisal content in mildly aver-
sive situations. Any change in memory content as a result
of coping experiences can be considered a case of allostatic
plasticity that affects future reactivity.
In addition, positive appraisal style is shaped by individ-
ual reappraisal ability (PASTOR claim 2). Reappraisal pro-
cesses are particularly important in strongly aversive
situations, where an initial stress response is essentially un-
avoidable because the situation is automatically classiﬁed as
negative. Reappraisal attenuates an ongoing stress response
by appropriately adjusting negative or generating comple-
mentary positive appraisals (positive reappraisal proper
or process class 2, PC2). Reappraisal proper requires the
permissive inhibition of interfering negative appraisals
and emotional reactions (PASTOR claim 3; interference in-
hibition or process class 3, PC3). The processes or process
classes of reappraisal proper and interference inhibition
constitute mental faculties or skills that determine appraisal
outcomes during signiﬁcant stressor exposure. Their effec-
tiveness and efﬁciency may have both a heritability and a
training component (the latter constituting another form
of allostatic plasticity), but they rely less on stored appraisal
values (memory content) as a result of experience or
culture.
By differentiating the neurocognitive processes that
govern the appraisal of mildly versus strongly aversive situ-
ations (minor or major stressors), we come back to a theme
started in section 3.4 on the quantiﬁcation of stressor load,
where we have discussed that aversion to different types of
stressors may be determined differently. General resilience
mechanisms working through optimization of aversion may
then not be global; that is, they may not help deal with any
kind of stressor (see also sect. 1.3). We have therefore an-
ticipated it might be necessary in resilience studies to
choose study cohorts that are confronted with single
classes of stressors or to generate separate scores for differ-
ent classes of stressors represented in a cohort. We can now
predict that positive situation classiﬁcation as one class of
processes (PC1) determining positive appraisal style will
explain the relationship between exposure to minor stress-
ors and mental health outcome. Such stressors could be
daily hassles or minor negative life events. By contrast, pos-
itive reappraisal ability based on reappraisal proper and in-
terference inhibition as two additional, separate classes of
processes (PC2, PC3) determining positive appraisal style
will explain the relationship between exposure to major
stressors and mental health. Such stressors could be
highly aversive chronic stressors or single potentially trau-
matizing events.
We now formulate this using the terminology of the lon-
gitudinal study design proposed in sections 3.1 and 4.2.4. A
ﬁrst, very simple approach to testing PASTOR could be to
use some hypothetical global T1 index of appraisal style
(AS) that, for instance, uses self-report to measure typical
appraisal content or outcome in both mildly and strongly
aversive situations. AS should predict R (or ΔΣP) at time
point T2 and mediate the effects of upstream resilience
factors Fx on R (see Figs. 2B and 4) in any cohort. This con-
cretion of Figure 2B is shown in Figure 5A. If, however, the
appraisal of minor and major stressors is determined by dif-
ferent processes, it is not clear whether the respective ap-
praisal outcomes would correspond and whether they
could be subsumed in a single score.
A more elaborate approach would therefore be to use
separate AS scores for minor and major stressors, respec-
tively (ASmin, ASmaj). This would equate to dividing the
conjectured single mediating resilience mechanism M1
into two more or less independent variables (Fig. 5B). In
cohorts that are exposed to minor stressors only, ASmaj
would not exert any effect; conversely, in cohorts mainly
exposed to major stressors, ASmin would be irrelevant. In
cohorts exposed to a combination of minor and major
stressors, stressor load would also have to be expressed in
separate subscores ΣSmin (to be moderated by ASmin) and
ΣSmaj (to be moderated by ASmaj). One would then have
to identify those variance components of R (or ΔΣP) that
respond to ΣSmin and ΣSmaj, respectively, in order to
compute the causal model proposed in Figure 4A. (Such
decomposition of R is not illustrated in Figure 5B, for sim-
plicity.) This adjustment of the initial model also implies
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that different upstream resilience factors Fx may exert their
effects via separate paths. Both approaches (Fig. 5A, B)
focus on appraisal content.
A third approach would be based on the three process
classes identiﬁed above as determining appraisal style,
and therefore use appropriate T1 indices PCx (x = 1, 2, 3)
of these three elementary constituents (Fig. 5C). PC1 (pos-
itive situation classiﬁcation) should independently inﬂu-
ence R such that mildly aversive situations do not
produce stress and the consequential allostatic load
effects. PC2 (positive reappraisal proper) should indepen-
dently inﬂuence R wherever subjects are exposed to
those more aversive situations in which initial negative ap-
praisals are essentially unavoidable. PC3 (interference inhi-
bition) should moderate the effects of PC2 (interact with
PC2 in determining R) for these situations, because inhibi-
tion is necessary for reappraisal success. In cohorts that are
exposed to minor stressors only, PC2 or PC3 would not
exert any effect; conversely, in cohorts mainly exposed to
major stressors, PC1 would be irrelevant.
Finally, if considering that the situation classiﬁcation pro-
cesses (PC1) producing positive appraisal content (ASmin)
during minor stressor exposure are undemanding and
that appraisal content in these situations is dominated by
stored memory contents, then the best graphical represen-
tation of PASTOR would be a hybrid model where stored
content (ASmin) determines R for minor stressor exposure
and process classes PC2 and PC3 determine R for major
stressor exposure (Fig. 5D). The emphasis on content for
minor stressor exposure does not exclude that an investiga-
tion of processes can be interesting here, as well. The more
interesting processes, however, would be related to the
storage of positive appraisal contents during and after suc-
cessful coping experiences, rather than on their retrieval at
the time of exposure. So, the study of the learning and con-
solidation processes leading to strong, stable, and general-
ized safety memories could explain why some people
beneﬁt more from positive coping experiences than
others and are more inclined to classify potentially aversive
situations as benign (see also sect. 4.3.3 further below).
4.3. Experimental operationalization in humans
4.3.1. Measuring appraisal contents and processes. There
are a number of useful self-report instruments that assess
appraisal contents; that is, the values that individuals
typically assign to speciﬁc relevant appraisal dimensions.
These include perceived general coping potential or self-
efﬁcacy (Bandura 1977; Benight & Cieslak 2011), or the
closely related construct of perceived control (Levenson
1981). Other questionnaires, especially those with a clinical
focus, take classes of typical potentially aversive stimuli
such as pain, bodily arousal, or negative feelings as a start-
ing point and assess the summed occurrence or strength of
(usually negative) appraisals on a range of relevant appraisal
dimensions for these stimulus classes (e.g., catastrophizing
about the severity and likelihood of negative health out-
comes when one is aroused) (Reiss et al. 1986; Sullivan
et al. 1995). A different class of instruments tries to
assess the habitual use of speciﬁc cognitive processes
such as reappraisal (Garnefski & Kraaij 2006; Gross &
John 2003).
Questionnaire instruments, of course, measure only
those appraisal contents or processes of which they
Figure 5. Elaboration of PASTOR: mediation of resilience factors by positive appraisal contents and positive appraisal processes. In the
simplest model (A), positive appraisal contents or outcomes (positive appraisal style, AS) determine resilience, R. AS here corresponds to
the single resilience mechanismM1 in Figure 2B. There is no differentiation between mildly versus strongly aversive situations (e.g., daily
hassles or minor negative life events vs. highly aversive chronic stressors or single potentially traumatizing events). A more elaborate
model (B) takes into account that positive appraisal contents are produced differently in mildly and strongly aversive situations,
respectively (appraisal styles ASmin and ASmaj). A process-based model (C) highlights the role of positive situation classiﬁcation (PC1)
in mildly aversive situations, and of positive reappraisal proper (PC2) and interference inhibition (PC3) in strongly aversive situations.
The ﬁnal model (D) emphasizes the dominant role of stored appraisal contents for appraisal outcomes in mildly aversive situations
and the dominance of neurocognitive processes in determining appraisal outcome, and therefore resilience, in strongly aversive
situations. Fx denote upstream resilience factors (cf. Fig. 2).
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inquire and those that are available to consciousness and
can be reported verbally. They are further limited by
problems related to the quantiﬁcation of introspective
qualia, semantic ambiguity, and socially desirable report-
ing. Finally, and crucially for a theory that attempts to
promote translational investigation, they cannot be used
in animals. If the ambition is to compare ﬁndings across
species, then instruments for testing PASTOR should rely
on observable and objectively quantiﬁable entities such as
behavior, physiology, or brain activity.
The obvious downside of a strategy to assess appraisal
based speciﬁcally on behavioral or physiological indices is
that these indices will reﬂect appraisal contents only indi-
rectly, via the resulting emotional reaction, and that they
are currently not able to determine the speciﬁc pattern of
appraisal-dimension values that leads to the measured reac-
tion. A stressor-induced aversive behavior or accompanying
physiological activation may be primarily driven by a high
outcome probability estimate or by perceived low coping
potential, but which of these prevail will be hard to
decide based on behavioral or physiological measures.
Measuring appraisal style (appraisal contents) with these
nonsubjective measures, therefore, has to rest on the as-
sumption that the consequences of appraisal-induced aver-
sion for mental health do not depend on which appraisal
dimensions contribute most to aversive responding in a
given individual and situation. Neural measures in particu-
lar may come closer to providing correlates of value (e.g.,
Levy & Glimcher 2012); but here, too, it needs to be
studied to what extent these reﬂect values on different, sep-
arable appraisal dimensions or some resulting summary
valuation.
Another downside is that nonsubjective measurements
require a relatively controlled experimental environment,
which limits ecological validity. This problem is particularly
pertinent for brain activation studies in humans that typi-
cally use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
or electroencephalography (EEG). These types of
studies, however, are the only ones that have the potential
to not only track the outcome or contents of appraisal (via
the resulting emotional reaction), but to also observe the
emotional reaction “in its making”; that is, to image the
neurocognitive processes that underlie appraisal. (For a dis-
cussion of how appraisal-related activity can be distin-
guished from activity related to other processes involved
in emotional reactions, namely to downstream response ex-
ecution, see Kalisch & Gerlicher 2014). Hence, a special
contribution that neuroscience can make to resilience re-
search lies in the examination of appraisal processes.
A pragmatic approach to testing PASTOR in humans
might therefore be a stepwise one, in which initial studies
rely on questionnaire instruments. Scores should ideally
be combined somehow into a single AS score (Fig. 5A) or
into separate scores ASmin and ASmaj for exposure to
minor and major stressors, respectively (Fig. 5B). A
further set of studies could be based on emotional respons-
es (measured via self-report, behavioral observation, and
physiological parameters) to a wide range of typical or po-
tential stressors in settings that are as close to real life as
possible. Here, as in the quantiﬁcation of stressor load
(sect. 3.4), ambulatory methods (Kubiak & Stone 2012)
might be of particular value. The underlying appraisal-the-
oretic assumption would be that emotional responses
reﬂect appraisal (sect. 4.2.1, Fig. 3). Compared with the
questionnaire studies, a challenge would lie in the combina-
tion of multi-modal data into comprehensive AS scores. A
third set of studies could employ laboratory measures of
emotional responding, including elaborate recordings of
physiological or neural activity. At the expense of being per-
formed in a relatively artiﬁcial environment, such studies
would permit the use of well-studied and controlled exper-
imental paradigms that cannot only be employed to
provoke aversive emotional responses (to indirectly assess
appraisal style, or content; Fig. 5A, 5B), but can also
serve to speciﬁcally induce and analyze processes of posi-
tive situation classiﬁcation (or the preceding learning and
consolidation processes), positive reappraisal proper, and
interference inhibition (Fig. 5C).
The following sections will make some general sugges-
tions for studies in the laboratory. When describing suitable
laboratory paradigms, we will also brieﬂy highlight some of
the major brain areas or neural processes associated with
these paradigms. These examples are mainly meant for il-
lustration, but they may also provide some starting points
for a future detailed neurobiological elaboration of
PASTOR.
4.3.2. Measuring positive situation classiﬁcation (PC1).
Measuring PC1 or the resulting positive appraisal values
attributed to minor stressors (ASmin), as said, is based on
the assumption that emotional responses are caused by ap-
praisal. It could therefore be done by recording subjective,
behavioral, or physiological affective reactions to aversive
stimulation in more or less naturalistic situations. Potential
neural measures could include activation of the amygdala
and the rostral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC).
Both structures are involved in attributing relevance and
potential threat value to aversive stimuli and also in gener-
ating exaggerated negative appraisals, such as during cata-
strophizing (for review, see Kalisch & Gerlicher 2014;
Sander et al. 2003). They might thereby provide inverse
measures of positive (non-negative) appraisal.
The circuits speciﬁcally supporting positive appraisal
during aversive situations have been less studied but are
likely to involve reward valuation areas such as the ventral
striatum or the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
(Levy & Glimcher 2012), areas that have also been involved
in experiencing safety during otherwise threatening situa-
tions (Raczka et al. 2011; Schiller et al. 2008). It must be
noted, though, that it is not clear at present whether
these proposed neural activation measures reﬂect appraisal
contents (values, outcomes) or processes (i.e., positive sit-
uation classiﬁcation).
In the choice of stimuli, it would certainly be advanta-
geous to use a range of different types of stimulations.
These could include physical stressors such as pain, CO2 in-
halation, or conditioned or instructed threat of shock, as
well as social stressors such as aversive pictures or
movies, anticipation of public speaking, or task perfor-
mance pressure, for example. Next to enhancing validity,
the use of various stressors might help average out potential
idiosyncratic responses to a speciﬁc stimulation (a subject
may come with a particular history of pain experiences or
expertise in public speaking). It would also permit the
extent to which responses to different stressors co-vary to
be tested, using factor-analytic methods. If this revealed
latent hidden variables that span more than one stressor re-
sponse or even more than one class of stressor responses
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(physical and social), and if such a variable predicted the
outcome (resilience R at T2), this would be evidence for
general resilience mechanisms that even protect from the
effects of more than one stressor or class of stressors – or
in other words, evidence for global resilience mechanisms
(see sect.1.3).
4.3.3. Measuring positive reappraisal proper (PC2). PC2
could be measured in a laboratory battery that involves ex-
ternally deﬁned changes in the meaning of stimuli. Exam-
ples such as UCS deﬂation, counter-conditioning, and
extinction –where appraisal changes are implicitly invited
by a change in outcome values or contingencies – and cog-
nitive reappraisal experiments –where appraisal changes
are explicitly instructed – have already been mentioned.
There already exists a considerable literature on the neuro-
biology of these processes (e.g., Buhle et al. 2013; Gottfried
& Dolan 2004; Kalisch 2009; Milad & Quirk 2012; Nasser
& McNally 2012; Ochsner & Gross 2005; Phelps et al.
2004).
A further possibility that involves implicitly invited reap-
praisal is discrimination learning (or its counterpart, gener-
alization). For example, one can study responses to neutral
cues that are present in many conditioning experiments, as
control cues that never get paired with the aversive UCS
(“CS−”). Subjects often take some time to learn the
safety value of such cues, initially attributing the occur-
rence of the UCS to any stimulus present, and their
ability to ﬁnally discriminate between actual UCS predic-
tors (CS+) and safety cues (CS−) may also predict positive
health outcomes (Britton et al. 2011; Craske et al. 2012;
Gazendam et al. 2013). Similar reappraisal abilities may
be needed when learning to distinguish a UCS predictor
from physically similar but nonpredictive cues (Lissek
et al. 2009; Vervliet et al. 2006) or when learning that the
context in which conditioning occurs is not in itself a
good UCS predictor (Grillon et al. 2006; Kaouane et al.
2012). Assessing discrimination learning has the desirable
quality that it can be done as part of a fear conditioning par-
adigm used to measure PC1. Furthermore, the existing
neurobiological literature on hippocampal and vmPFC
function in discrimination already provides good neuroana-
tomical hypotheses (e.g., Kaouane et al. 2012; Kheirbek
et al. 2012; Lissek et al. 2014; Xu & Südhof 2013).
Finally, the termination of an aversive stimulation per se
is of course an event that invites reappraisal. Therefore, the
measurement of recovery times from aversive stimulation
as performed in a PC1 test battery might be another cost-
effective way to index positive reappraisal proper (e.g.,
Javaras et al. 2012; Verduyn et al. 2012).
Successful reappraisal is a special case of a positive
coping experience, characterized by the experience of
relief and safety, that may leave traces in memory. Success-
ful reappraisal may thereby lead to the storage of positive
appraisal values for the reappraised situation that can be re-
trieved at a later confrontation with the same or with com-
parable situations. The more these positive reappraisal
memories generalize to similar situations and the stronger
and more stable they are, the more they can facilitate the
process of positive situation classiﬁcation (PC1) that is re-
sponsible according to PASTOR for optimizing aversion
to minor stressors (sect. 4.2.8).
Hence, the study of positive reappraisal proper (PC2)
and of the subsequent memory consolidation processes
may also inform the study of positive situation classiﬁcation.
An example is the safety memory that is generated during
extinction when subjects ﬁnd out that a CS is no longer fol-
lowed by the UCS (the “extinction memory” or “CS–no
UCS association”; cf. sect. 4.2.8). If the extinction
memory is successfully retrieved during a later confronta-
tion with the CS, it can prevent the generation of aversive
CRs (Bouton 2004). Consolidation of this particular type of
reappraisal memory appears to involve concerted activity of
the dopaminergic midbrain and the vmPFC during the
hour following extinction, a neural process that also pre-
dicts generalized vmPFC activation at the later CS confron-
tation (Haaker et al. 2013). Hence, interactions of the
mesocortical dopamine system with putative positive situa-
tion classiﬁcation areas such as the vmPFC during reap-
praisal memory consolidation may be one important
aspect of positive situation classiﬁcation (PC1).
4.3.4. Measuring interference inhibition (PC3). PASTOR
claim 3 implies that the inhibition of conﬂicting negative
appraisals and interfering emotional reactions is probably
involved in the success of any reappraisal measured in a pu-
tative PC2 test battery. How can the generation and main-
tenance of more positive appraisals per se (positive
reappraisal proper, PC2) be distinguished from the inhibi-
tion of interfering information processing? Time may be
part of the answer. In extinction retrieval situations, the
function of the retrieved extinction memory is to inhibit
CR generation, and as outlined in sect. 4.2.7, in laboratory
animals this necessarily involves the recruitment of inhibi-
tory amygdala interneurons by efferents from the
vmPFC. Hence, vmPFC activation and amygdala deactiva-
tion during an extinction retrieval test could be used as a
proxy for fear inhibition (Etkin et al. 2011; Haaker et al.
2013; Kalisch et al. 2006a; Milad et al. 2007). Interestingly,
the vmPFC is less consistently active during the preceding
extinction learning phase, and in animals, is not necessary
for extinction learning to succeed (Milad & Quirk 2002),
suggesting that it is not directly involved in the change of
appraisals that occurs during extinction. Reappraisal
during extinction more likely involves ventral striatal rein-
forcement learning systems (Abraham et al. 2013; Raczka
et al. 2011).
A similar distinction between positive reappraisal proper
and the later exertion of inhibition should in theory also be
observable in other reappraisal paradigms provided an ap-
propriate task design. This idea, of course, comes close to
measuring positive situation classiﬁcation (PC1), a potential
confound that could be avoided by making the retrieval
session itself strongly aversive. “Pure” inhibition of emo-
tional distraction (without a prior reappraisal step,
thereby circumventing any PC1 confound) may be inferred
from interference or conﬂict resolution paradigms where
subjects have to perform a cognitive task while being dis-
tracted by salient emotional material, a function that
again involves the vmPFC (Etkin et al. 2011). Another
powerful measure to assess inhibition is conditional dis-
crimination (for details, see Jovanovic & Ressler 2010).
4.3.5. Potential results. To sum up, an ideal human longi-
tudinal resilience study should include some combined
testing battery for PC1 or ASmin, or both, as well as for
PC2 and PC3 to determine M1 at time point T1 (and possi-
bly T2, or even at intervening time points). The battery
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might, for instance, contain an element of discriminatory
fear conditioning (PC1, PC2), subsequent extinction
(PC2), and later extinction memory testing (PC3), plus a
range of other stressors (PC1) with intermittent recovery
periods (PC2), plus maybe some volitional reappraisal task
(PC2). Important measures could be derived from psycho-
physiology and neuroimaging. Factor-analytic methods
might be used to reduce the data and extract latent
hidden variables, which should map onto constructs 1 to 3.
Those hidden T1 variables that turn out to predict resil-
ience R at T2 (and which perhaps change from T1 to T2
in proportion to R; see sect. 3.2) could then be taken to
index likely general resilience mechanisms – or with
PASTOR, elementary constituents of a positive appraisal
style as the central resilience mechanism M1. They can
be expected to mediate the effects of other, more distal
resilience factors (social integration, executive functions,
genetics, etc.).
It is important to note that such an approach might well
result in a number of predictive hidden variables that
exceeds three. As emphasized, appraisal is presumably me-
diated by a heterogeneous collection of (unconscious and
conscious) processes distributed over a wide neural circuit-
ry. It is those processes that PASTOR is ultimately interest-
ed in, and the assumption of three classes of processes PC1
to PC3 is mainly of heuristic value. It may also be that some
of the identiﬁed hidden variables span two or three of the
classes, which would be unproblematic.
In any case, the elucidated mechanisms would be worthy
of further behavioral and neurobiological investigation, in-
cluding in animal models, and would be rational targets for
developing preventive interventions. For example, if a pre-
dictive hidden variable should happen to mainly reﬂect ex-
tinction memory performance (or, at the neural level,
perhaps vmPFC activity during extinction memory retriev-
al), this could stimulate research in extinction memory
mechanisms (or corresponding vmPFC function) in
rodent and human laboratory models. It would also place
extinction training in the focus of prevention programs,
which, ultimately, might also involve an adjunctive neurobi-
ological-based intervention. Demonstration of improved
prevention through improved extinction would also
provide the missing causal link between this mechanism
and resilience.
4.4. Speciﬁc considerations for animal research
The ﬁeld of extinction research is a particularly good
example of how animal research has already informed
human research to paint a coherent (yet still incomplete)
cross-species picture of a central emotion-regulatory
faculty (Milad & Quirk 2012). Translational research in
the ﬁeld of extinction has been so successful because
animal and human researchers speak a common language
and share a conceptual framework. Our motivation to
propose an appraisal-based theory of resilience is to
provide such common ground for the broader ﬁeld of resil-
ience research.
In the remainder of this paper, we will try to show that
our logic of examining certain important hypothetical resil-
ience mechanisms (according to PASTOR: neurocognitive
mechanisms underlying positive situation classiﬁcation,
PC1; positive reappraisal proper, PC2; and interference in-
hibition, PC3) in a prospective longitudinal design that
involves stressors ΣS and a mental health outcome ΔΣP
or R can and should also be applied to the design and inter-
pretation of animal studies, albeit with some adaptations.
4.4.1. Basic design choices.One could simply continue as
usual and use theoretical considerations or the above hypo-
thetical result from a human resilience study to investigate,
for instance, extinction or also some neural function identi-
ﬁed in that study to relate to extinction performance. (For
ﬁrst evidence suggesting that a role for extinction in resil-
ience is more than hypothetical, see Lommen et al.
2013). This might yield valuable insights into extinction
mechanisms, which might in turn be exploited for improv-
ing extinction in humans. However, such an approach
would not help to understand whether improved extinction
or related neural functions actually improve an animal’s re-
silience, thereby missing out on one of the major advantag-
es of animal laboratory models – that causality can be
established relatively easily.
Let us therefore consider two more ambitious scenarios.
In scenario 1, the hypothesis is that a particular type of
adaptive behavior (e.g., good extinction memory) promotes
resilience; in scenario 2, the hypothesis is that a particular
neural mechanism (e.g., dopamine release in the vmPFC
during extinction memory consolidation) promotes resil-
ience. Such a hypothesis could be motivated by ﬁndings
that suggest this neural mechanism is involved in extinction
memory (e.g., Haaker et al. 2013), combined with evidence
from retrospective (post-stress) neurophysiological com-
parisons of resilient versus non-resilient mice for a role of
dopamine in the vmPFC in resilience (Chaudhury et al.
2013; Friedman et al. 2014). In scenario 1, it would be de-
sirable to show that individual differences in extinction
memory predict resilience, or better, that a manipulation
to enhance or decrease extinction memory also enhances
or decreases resilience. In scenario 2, it would be desirable
to show that individual differences in vmPFC dopamine
release or an appropriate manipulation of it affect resil-
ience, ideally complemented by some assessment of how
those differences, or the manipulation, affect extinction.
In either scenario, one needs a resilience readout R,
which would require two elements: (1) a battery of stressors
that tries to appropriately model the life stressors ΣS expe-
rienced by an unfortunate human and (2) a “mental health”
testing battery that assesses the animal’s functioning before
and after having being subjected to the stressor battery to
model the psychiatric assessments made at T1 and T2 in
human participants (ΣPT1, ΣPT2). Determining the effects
of the stressor battery on ΣP ideally would require a com-
parison group of nonstressed animals. The inclusion of
such a control group also could make T1 functional
testing dispensable, provided appropriate randomization.
T2 functional testing should in any case not be performed
immediately after the stressor battery, but some time
(weeks) following stressor termination, to avoid capturing
the acute stress response and to instead provide a long-
term outcome. This criterion could be dropped if an imme-
diate measure can be reliably shown to strongly correlate
with a delayed measure and thereby serve as a surrogate
marker (Krishnan et al. 2007).
4.4.2. Resilience readouts: Combined stressor and func-
tional testing batteries. Some elaborate stressor and func-
tional testing batteries (whose roles in the design should not
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in any way be confounded with the testing battery for PC1,
PC2 and PC3 suggested above for human studies) have
already been proposed (e.g., Franklin et al. 2012; Russo
et al. 2012; Scharf & Schmidt 2012), and it is beyond the
scope of this paper to discuss them in detail. It sufﬁces
here to make three general points. First, for the stressor
battery, ecological validity may be higher when choosing
chronic rather than acute stressors, and a combination of
multiple (physical and social) stressors rather than a
single type of stressor. This follows from our discussion in
section 3.4 about the diverse nature of stress experiences
humans make when confronted with major adversity. Ha-
bituation to repeated physical stressors such as restraint,
which can be a problem, could be prevented by randomly
switching between a social and a physical stressor over
days. This would additionally introduce an anxiogenic
element of unpredictability. These considerations, of
course, do not apply when one is interested in resilience
to speciﬁc stressors.
Second, in the selection of function tests, it would be a
mistake to try to produce human-like disease symptoms
(such as when trying to see a depressed, lethargic state in
a rat’s ﬂoating during a Porsolt forced swim test). Rather,
one should start from some species-speciﬁc normal adap-
tive behavior and establish whether it is vulnerable to dis-
ruption (including exacerbation) by prior stress, making it
a sensitive marker for nondisruption – that is, resilience
(Russo et al. 2012). Good examples are social interaction,
hedonic and reproductive behaviors, aversive behaviors,
higher cognitive functions, and sleep.
Third, it has been argued that relying on more than one
type of readout is preferable. That is, one needs more than
one function test and ideally a combination of behavioral,
physiological, and molecular measures (Franklin et al.
2012; Russo et al. 2012; Scharf & Schmidt 2012). One
obvious reason is reliability. Another reason is that an iden-
tiﬁed resilience mechanism (say, extinction memory) can
be classiﬁed as general only if it protects more than one
behavioral function (see sect. 1.3).
Whatever the exact experimental choices, such ambi-
tious longitudinal studies in animals involving a causal ma-
nipulation of a hypothesized resilience mechanism and an
analysis of its effects on resilience via combined stressor
and function batteries would be extremely powerful tools
to examine the behavioral and neurobiological pathways
to resilience. They would have obvious advantages over
designs that only manipulate a hypothesized resilience
mechanism without assessing the resilience outcome, but
also over designs where behavior in a single task is used
to index resilient outcome. An unavoidable limitation of
animal studies is that they are restricted to resilience mech-
anisms that are homologous between humans and animals.
5. Comparison with other perspectives on
resilience
In this text, we have argued that the big challenge for resil-
ience research in humans is to proceed from collecting
more and more resilience factors to identifying and charac-
terizing general resilience mechanisms. We have advocated
four measures to aid this transition: an operationalization of
resilience as a transdiagnostic and quantitative outcome;
hypothesis generation on the basis of an appraisal-theoretic
framework; an emphasis on neurobiological examination;
and closer alignment of animal and human studies on the
basis of prospective experimental designs and a common
mechanistic theory. We have made suggestions for what
mutually informative human and animal neurobiological re-
silience studies could look like. We recognize that these
suggestions involve relatively ambitious designs, but we
are nevertheless conﬁdent that any attempt to approximate
these ideal designs will be instrumental in advancing next-
generation resilience research.
We would like to ﬁnish by comparing PASTOR with
some other existing approaches to the question of resil-
ience, with the intention of further clarifying some of its
key aspects.
5.1. Appraisal theories of resilience
Other theorists have stressed the relevance of appraisal
mechanisms for resilience. Mancini and Bonanno (2009)
have likened appraisal to social support in its importance
for resilience, albeit not considering appraisal a mediator
of the effects of social support. Benight and Cieslak
(2011) have gone further, in arguing that appraisals also
can mediate social support effects. These authors have
focused on conscious appraisals of self-efﬁcacy or coping
potential as can be accessed via self-report instruments.
Troy and Mauss (2011) have suggested that the ability to
volitionally reappraise negative information is potentially
crucial for resilience. Generally speaking, the notion that
appraisal processes might be key mediators of resilience
appears to be gaining ground and might serve as a unifying
framework for resilience research in the next decade. We
have tried here to unite these various strands and further
promote this research avenue by extending the framework
to nonconscious or nonreportable appraisals, by naming po-
tential underlying neurocognitive processes, and by propos-
ing experimental paradigms that allow the limitations of
self-report studies to be surpassed and appraisal research
to be extended to animal models. We expect that incorpo-
rating appraisal concepts into neurobiological investiga-
tions, including in animal models, will turn out to be
crucial for developing a coherent theory of resilience.
5.2. Temporal proﬁles of resilience
As mentioned in section 2, life-event research has de-
scribed various temporal proﬁles of resilience responses,
ranging from maintained mental health to a proﬁle of
initial dysfunction followed by recovery (Bonanno &
Mancini 2011; Norris et al. 2009). In principle, one could
extend the longitudinal study scheme developed in
section 3.1 with additional measurement time points TX
to delineate trajectories of ΣS, AS, and ΣP (or R) across
time and to thereby more accurately describe resilience
as a process rather than a single outcome. This approach
might logistically be considerably more demanding.
However, as pointedout in thediscussionof time-dependent
confounders in section 4.2.4.3, repeated measures of
factors, stressors, mediators (appraisal style), and outcomes
might also be able to shed a brighter light on causal rela-
tionships. It is important to note that such more ﬁnely
grained temporal analysis ultimately would resolve what
appear to be distinguishable proﬁle classes (resilience, re-
covery, chronic distress) into individual cases where the
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temporal evolution of the individual’s appraisal style and its
stressor exposure determine outcome at any given mea-
surement time point.
6. Conclusion: Implications for prevention
PASTOR is in its essence a relatively radical program to
focus resilience research on those psychobiological mecha-
nisms that are likely to provide most leverage when trying
to improve people’s mental health prospects. PASTOR is
based on the idea that individual differences in stress and
eventual mental health outcome are determined by subjec-
tive appraisal processes, provided individual differences in
stressor exposure are factored out by normalizing mental
health outcome to stressor load (our operational deﬁnition
of resilience). External or social factors affect resilience in-
directly by affecting either appraisal or stressor exposure or
both. This has the consequence that we ultimately place re-
silience in the individual.
We by no means try to deny the well-documented inﬂu-
ence of socio-environmental factors on mental health
(Janicki-Deverts & Cohen 2011; Zautra 2014), but we con-
sider them as distant inﬂuences. We also do not deny the
potential that lies in interventions focusing on the building
of social relationships, on the strengthening of communi-
ties, or on the improvement of the physical environment
for promoting mental health (Janicki-Deverts & Cohen
2011; Reissman et al. 2011; Southwick et al. 2011b;
Zautra 2014). We also acknowledge the important role
that social factors play in determining an individual’s
belief system (i.e., consciously available appraisal values).
All these insights can, and should be, exploited when
trying to change stressor exposure and appraisal styles.
Nevertheless, new ideas for prevention that might
emerge from the type of research that we propose are
likely to target individual factors. Next to changing an indi-
vidual’s contents of appraisal, such prevention will focus on
training the cognitive machinery or mental skills (the neu-
rocognitive processes) that allow an individual to produce
positive and to inhibit negative appraisals in the face of
stress. Our hope is that our proposals can make an original
contribution to the promotion of mental health through the
development of new and better methods of prevention.
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NOTES
1. To avoid a negative denominator, ΔΣP could be range cor-
rected (ΔΣPrc). To avoid a denominator of 0, ΔΣPrc could be re-
placed by sqrt (ΔΣPrc
2+var(ΔΣPrc)) such that the denominator
mainly expresses the outcome error variance when ΔΣPrc is 0 or
close to 0. A person’s change in mental problems between T1
and T2 would then have a greater weighting the more it
exceeds the error variance in mental problem changes in the
sample, thereby also protecting the quotient against the inﬂuence
of potential limited test-retest reliability of the ΔΣP measure.
2. The existence of opponent (mutually inhibitory) appetitive
and aversive systems is also supported by ﬁndings of an inverse re-
lationship between negative and positive emotions (Zautra 2000).
This relationship is speciﬁcally observed during aversive but not
normal situations (Zautra 2000). The best explanation is that pos-
itive (safe or relieving) aspects of an otherwise stressful situation
provide a basis for reappraisals (see sect. 4.2.5), leading to positive
emotion (Moskowitz et al. 1996). This activation of the appetitive
system in turn inhibits the aversive system.
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Abstract: The PASTOR framework needs to be reconciled with existing
research on positive illusions, which ﬁnds that positive appraisals of
stressors have a short shelf life as a mechanism of resilience, do not
draw on costly executive functioning, and rely on neural networks that
are distinct from those found in studies of experimentally instructed
reappraisal or value.
The PASTOR framework is an exciting development in research
on stress because it takes a transdiagnostic view of mechanisms
of resilience. The framework would be further strengthened if it
were revised to account for its inconsistencies with the existing lit-
erature on the behavioral and neural mechanisms of positive illu-
sions. Positive illusions are the human tendency to appraise
stressors, situations, personal control, and personal abilities as
more positive or “non-negative” than is indicated by objective
measures (Taylor & Brown 1988).
It is understandable that the PASTOR framework may not have
initially addressed this existing research because of the focus on
generating hypotheses that cross human and animal research. Pos-
itive illusions have not been a focus of animal research because of
measurement challenges. The positive illusions appraisal style is,
however, a fundamental aspect of human cognition with impor-
tant consequences for resilience (e.g., Colvin et al. 1995; Robins
& Beer 2001; Taylor & Brown 1988). Therefore, the behavioral
and neural research on positive illusions warrants incorporation
into any meaningful framework of the association between ap-
praisal style and resilience.
Despite initial hypotheses to the contrary, three decades of re-
search ﬁnd that this positive appraisal style has only short-term
beneﬁts for managing stress (e.g., Colvin et al. 1995; Robins &
Beer 2001; Taylor & Brown 1988). For example, students charac-
terized by this positive appraisal style are more resilient in the face
of immediate, short-term stressors but show long-term decline
when emotional well-being is tracked over the four years of
college (Robins & Beer 2001; Thomaes et al. 2009). Furthermore,
this positive appraisal style undermines the ability to develop
strong social networks of support (i.e., social relationships tend
to be poor: Colvin et al. 1995; Paulhus 1998). In contrast to the
main hypothesis of the PASTOR framework, this research
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suggests that positive appraisals of stressors have a short shelf life
as a mechanism of resilience.
Furthermore, the PASTOR framework proposes that positive
appraisals draw on costly executive function; yet research ﬁnds
that cognitive demand increases positive appraisals rather than di-
minishing them. Time restrictions or distracting tasks tend to ex-
acerbate the positivity of appraisals about one’s qualities or future,
and that effect persists when stressors challenge positive self-
evaluations (e.g., Beer et al. 2013; Paulhus et al. 1989). These
ﬁndings suggest that positive appraisal either does not rely on ex-
ecutive function or relies on executive function that has become so
practiced that it is not undermined when cognitive resources are
taxed.
Finally, the target article partially draws candidate neural net-
works from studies that instructed participants to reappraise situ-
ations in a positive manner, yet it ignores the literature on the
neural basis of spontaneously occurring positive illusions. This lit-
erature suggests that functional connectivity between orbitofron-
tal cortex (OFC) and the striatum supports the tendency to
maintain positive appraisals in stressful circumstances (Flagan &
Beer 2013; Hughes & Beer 2012a; 2012b; 2013). For example, in-
creased functional connectivity between OFC and striatum sup-
ports the ability to positively appraise the self in the face of
contrary information (Hughes & Beer 2013). Therefore, the
PASTOR model should be revised to include the neural research
on spontaneous positive appraisals of stressors.
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Abstract: Little work has focused on resilience amongst older adults, and
few factors have been identiﬁed that promote their resilience. Kalisch et al.
suggest that socioenvironmental factors are distant inﬂuences. We argue,
however, that community and societal inﬂuences are as important as
individual ones. Further, an ecological framework explains why some
older adults are resilient whilst others are not.
One of the strengths of the paper by Kalisch et al. on a framework
for the neurobiology of resilience is the way in which it focuses on
general resilience mechanisms that may be appropriate across dif-
ferent challenges and protect from stress-related mental illness.
The authors’ suggestion that the inﬂuences of diverse resilience
factors on good outcomes are mediated through a limited
number of resilience mechanisms is intriguing. The model they
propose potentially lends itself to testing beyond the neurobiolog-
ical community, and we would welcome the opportunity to
explore the strengths and limitations of broadening the theory.
Kalisch et al. suggest that numerous factors have been identi-
ﬁed that inﬂuence resilience. In relation to later life, we suggest
that relatively few factors have been identiﬁed (Windle 2011;
Windle & Bennett 2011). This is in part because research on re-
silience in later life has received far less attention than at the
other end of the age spectrum (Windle 2012). We would argue,
therefore, that examining whether or not this may offer an advan-
tage to further understanding resilience mechanisms is a worthy
extension of the authors’ theory.
Kalisch et al. focus on an intraindividual mechanism. They
comment that they regard socioenvironmental factors as distant
inﬂuences, although they acknowledge that these inﬂuences are
well documented. And in speaking of these as “inﬂuences,”
Kalisch et al. distance them from the resilience factors that they
discuss, suggesting that the former are not central. The key
factor that Kalisch et al. focus on is appraisal, an intraindividual
factor. We would strongly argue, however, that these interperson-
al and socioenvironmental inﬂuences are instead important and
proximal factors in resilience (Bennett 2010; Windle 2012).
We propose an ecological model of resilience that explains re-
silience more fully in older adults. In our formulation, we refer
to these factors as resources. We identify these resources at
three, nonhierarchical, interacting levels, which we call “individu-
al,” “community,” and “societal” (Windle 2012; Windle & Bennett
2011) (see Fig. 1). At the individual level, we identify the following
resources: psychological, material, biological, health behaviours,
age, and gender. Appraisal, as outlined by Kalisch et al., can be
seen as a psychological resource. At the community level, we
believe that social support, social cohesion and participation,
and housing are important. Finally, at the societal level, resources
such as social, health, and welfare services; social policy; the
economy, and neighbourhood all have the potential to contribute
to resilience.
Taking one aspect of Kalisch et al.’s argument, we can illustrate
how the ecological model can effectively explain resilience in
older adults. If one takes Kalisch et al.’s own example of social
support, we argue that this is a community-level resource. Al-
though, their theory reduces it to a mediator of appraisal, it
remains an important component of resilience. When one looks
at the literature both on stress and on resilience, social support
remains a signiﬁcant factor (Bennett 2010; Fuller-Iglesias et al.
2008; Netuveli et al. 2008; Wells 2010). This remains the case
when aspects of social support – for example, its availability,
quality, and quantity – are examined. We would argue that social
support has a greater inﬂuence than its mere appraisal. One can
extend that argument to other resources such as social participa-
tion, social and health service provision, and culture, including re-
ligion (Lee et al. 2008; Seddon et al. 2006; Ungar 2011). We do
not believe that the majority of people can be resilient without
these resources, and indeed, the utilisation of these resources.
Drawing on our own work with older adults in the ﬁeld of resil-
ience, we recognise the broader antecedents, processes, and out-
comes of resilience. Whereas intraindividual factors such as
mastery (Windle & Woods 2004), personal control, competence,
and self-esteem are important in older adults for what has been
described as psychological resilience (Windle et al. 2008), so are
community and societal factors, as well (Windle & Bennett
2011). Bennett (2010) found that amongst older widowed men,
social support, both formal and informal, was a key factor in deter-
mining who became resilient and who did not. Similarly, in work
with spousal carers of people with dementia, Donnellan et al.
(2014) found that social support from friends (as opposed to
family) was a key factor in determining whether a carer became
resilient or not. Societal factors such as social policy, culture,
and religion also have been identiﬁed as important contributors.
For example, Donnellan et al. (2014) found the provision of
support groups by the third sector and local government was an
important factor in resilience, as was the availability of respite ser-
vices, as well.
Kalisch et al.’s formulation suggests that fundamentally, resil-
ience lies within the individual and that the individual is required
to act in achieving resilience by appraising situations in a particular
way. We would argue, however, that the acquisition of resilience
does not necessarily require the action of the individual; that is,
the individual may be at least initially passive. We would argue
that in some circumstances, resilience could be facilitated by
external agency (Bennett 2010). For example, in the case of
some older widowed men, it required external agency and the in-
volvement of neighbours, strangers, and health and welfare
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professionals to provide the ﬁrst steps towards a resilient outcome
(Bennett 2010). These widowers would not have been able to
achieve resilience alone, and certainly not by appraisal alone
(Bennett 2010). Hence, we would argue that the environment/
context is an important aspect of positive development and
subsequent resilience. It follows, then, that individual-level
factors (e.g., traits and characteristics), whilst important, are
strongly inﬂuenced by the content and function of these environ-
ments. Any subsequent appraisal processes are then determined
by the interaction between the individual and that individual’s
environment.
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Abstract: Kalisch and colleagues present a conceptual framework for the
study of resilience, using a neurobiological approach. The present
commentary examines issues arising for the study of resilience from
epidemiological data, which suggest that resilience is most likely a
normative function that may operate as a kind of psychological immune
system. The implications of the epidemiological data on the
development of a neurobiological theory of resilience are discussed.
The target article by Kalisch and colleagues presents a uniﬁed con-
ceptual framework for the study of resilience at the neurobiological
level. The authors argue that resilience is best understood as a
process. They suggest that resilience can be examined via the study
of appraisal style and the extent to which appraisal style protects
against stressors and mediates the effects of other factors related to
resilience. One key argument made by Kalisch and colleagues is
that a better understanding of the processes underlying resilience
will contribute to a paradigm shift in psychological and psychiatric re-
search, away from a focus on disorder and psychopathology.
The ﬁeld of psychiatric epidemiology has a long-standing inter-
est in the concept of resilience, with a range of studies examining
the factors that appear to buffer individuals from the effects of ex-
posure to severe stressors (Luthar 2003). Because these studies
employ measures of real-world stressors and psychiatric sympto-
matology, research in psychiatric epidemiology has important im-
plications for the development of a conceptual framework for the
study of resilience.
One critical issue, as noted by Kalisch and colleagues, is that
effect sizes for the associations between exposure to severe stress-
ors and psychiatric disorders are relatively modest. For example,
several studies of exposure to deadly natural disasters, including
hurricanes, ﬂoods, bushﬁres, and earthquakes, have shown that
the increase in risk of mental health disorders attributable to dis-
aster exposure is surprisingly small (Fergusson et al. 2014a). Fer-
gusson and colleagues, using data from a longitudinal birth cohort,
found that individuals with the highest level of exposure to a series
of earthquakes had adjusted rates of mental disorder that were
only 1.4 times higher than those not exposed, and that exposure
to the earthquakes accounted for only 10% to 13% of the total
mental disorder in the cohort. Similarly, studies of exposure to
severe levels of childhood sexual abuse, which has been shown
to be one of the most severe stressors to which individuals may
be exposed, also have shown modest adjusted associations
between abuse exposure and later psychiatric disorders. For
example, Fergusson et al. (2013) found that exposure to sexual
abuse in childhood accounted for 5.7% to 16.6% of mental
health problems during the period aged 18–30 years, with effect
sizes (Cohen’s d) ranging from 0.24 to 0.48.
The consistent ﬁndings of relatively modest mental health
effects attributable to severe stress exposure suggest that if resil-
ience processes are protecting individuals from more severe
symptoms, these processes almost certainly must be operating
in a global manner. Such processes could be described as a
kind of psychological immune system (Davydov et al. 2010;
Shastri 2013), and it is clear that such functioning is a normative
psychological phenomenon in humans. Such a system would ﬁt
comfortably into the framework developed by Kalisch and col-
leagues, who posit both general and symptom-speciﬁc resilience
processes.
Figure 1 (Bennett & Windle). The Resilience Framework (adapted from Windle & Bennett 2011). The ﬁgure shows the relationships
between the antecedents of resilience and the presence (or absence) of resources at the individual, community, and societal levels and
their consequences for resilience.
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To better understand the operation of such a normative system,
however, it is critical to understand factors that compromise the
system and cause it to operate less effectively. From the perspec-
tive of the psychiatric epidemiology literature, those factors may
be identiﬁed as covariate factors that exist prior to or contempo-
raneously with the exposure, and which increase the likelihood
of psychiatric symptomatology. Such factors include adverse soci-
oeconomic and family circumstances, parental and childhood mal-
adaptive behavior, genetic factors, and individual characteristics/
personality factors (e.g., Fergusson et al. 2013; 2014b). Taking
such factors into account in statistical models of the associations
between stress exposure and psychiatric symptoms generally
reduces the magnitude of the associations, suggesting that expo-
sure to a variety of adverse life circumstances increases the risk
of an individual developing psychiatric symptoms following
stress exposure.
An important implication arising from this general pattern of as-
sociations is that it will prove difﬁcult to develop models of resil-
ience that do not take into account the range of adverse
circumstances that individuals may be subject to, and that may
compromise the operation of a resilience system or process. In
the context of laboratory research on resilience, it will be impor-
tant for researchers to account for possible mediating effects of
adverse life circumstances on appraisal processes. More generally,
these considerations imply that in order to understand the pro-
cesses that protect individuals from psychopathology, it still will
be necessary to focus on factors that put individuals at risk. This
suggests perhaps not a paradigm shift, but rather a nuanced
view of the factors that mediate the associations between stress ex-
posure and psychopathology.
An additional issue arises from the small effect sizes observed in
psychiatric epidemiological studies of severe stressors and mental
health: It also will be difﬁcult to replicate such stress levels in a
laboratory environment when working with human participants.
This issue has been observed in the literature on the mechanisms
of psychological defense, in which it is both impractical and uneth-
ical to induce high levels of stress or expose individuals to strong
negative emotional material (Draguns 2004; Hentschel et al.
2004). One way of addressing this issue is to study individuals
who tend to display exaggerated responses following exposure to
laboratory stressors, such as trait repressors (Boden & Baumeister
1997; Weinberger 1990). Although it is certainly within the scope
of laboratory research to expose individuals to stress at the level of
“daily hassles,” it is not at all clear that such stress levels would
cause an effect of sufﬁcient magnitude for individuals who
respond in a normative manner to engage resilience processes
(Del Giudice et al. 2011).
In summary, the study of resilience has been a feature of the
psychiatric epidemiology literature for some time. Data from
the literature suggest that the consistent relatively small effect
sizes for the associations between severe stress exposure and
mental health symptomatology raise key considerations for
neurobiological studies of resilience. The conceptual framework
developed by Kalisch and colleagues represents a promising
advance in our understanding of resilience processes, but the de-
velopment of this model should take into account these and
related issues.
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Abstract: We argue that social psychology has unique potential for
advancing understanding of resilience. An exciting development that
illustrates this is the emergence of social-psychological interventions –
brief, stealthy, and psychologically precise interventions – that can yield
broad and lasting beneﬁts by targeting key resilience mechanisms. Such
interventions provide a causal test of resilience mechanisms and bring
about positive change in people’s lives.
If you want to understand something, try to change it.
— Walter Dearborn (in Bronfenbrenner 1979, p. 37)
In their target article, Kalisch et al. propose an overarching, trans-
diagnostic framework for the study of resilience that brings to-
gether several disciplines, most notably clinical psychology,
psychiatry, and neuroscience. One discipline, however, has
escaped the authors’ attention: social psychology. Yet social psy-
chology has unique potential for advancing understanding of resil-
ience. An exciting development that illustrates this is the
emergence of social-psychological interventions – sometimes
called “wise” interventions – that target key mechanisms to yield
broad and lasting improvements in health, well-being, and func-
tioning (for overviews, see Cohen & Sherman 2014; Walton
2014; Wilson 2011; Yeager & Walton 2011).
What are social-psychological interventions? They are similar to
clinical interventions (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy) in that
they target key mechanisms. They are, however, typically more
precise in focus, stealthier in design, and briefer in delivery. Tra-
ditional clinical interventions usually target several mechanisms at
once, consist of explicit instructions to change how a person thinks
or feels, and unfold over weeks or months. By contrast, social-
psychological interventions usually target one key mechanism;
consist of reading-and-writing exercises that, even as they
change how a person thinks or feels, may not be experienced as
“interventions”; and take an hour or less to complete. Consistent
with Kalisch and colleagues’ theorizing, social-psychological
interventions often cultivate resilience by changing how people
construe adversity – their subjective understanding or appraisal
of adverse events (Yeager & Dweck 2012; Yeager et al. 2013).
Indeed, subjective construal is a pillar of social psychology (Ross
& Nisbett 1991). Let us consider two examples.
During the transition to college, students often struggle to
make friends and connect with professors. Ethnic-minority stu-
dents, an underrepresented and negatively stereotyped group in
higher education, may view these social adversities as evidence
that they do not belong in college. An ethnic-minority ﬁrst-year
student described: “Everyone is going out without me, and they
didn’t consider me when making their plans. At times like this I
feel like I don’t belong here” (Walton & Cohen 2007, p. 90).
Such interpretations undermine health, well-being, and academic
performance (Mendoza-Denton et al. 2002). Walton and Cohen
(2007; 2011) designed a 1-hour intervention to encourage stu-
dents to attribute social adversities to the common challenges of
the college transition rather than to a ﬁxed lack of belonging on
their part or that of their group. Students read stories from upper-
classmen indicating that all students worry at ﬁrst about whether
they belong and that these worries decline with time. To help stu-
dents internalize this message, they were invited to write an essay
and deliver a speech about why students come to feel at home in
college over time. Over the next three years, the intervention im-
proved ethnic-minority students’ health and well-being and cut by
half the achievement gap in grades with White students. This
achievement boost was mediated by subjective construal: The in-
tervention prevented ethnic-minority students from seeing social
adversities on campus as a threat to their belonging.
Another form of adversity is academic failure. When students
get poor grades, they can fear that other people will judge them
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negatively and, hence, feel ashamed, insecure, and worthless
(Leary & Baumeister 2000). Such negative self-feelings, in turn,
increase students’ risk for later depression and anxiety (Sowislo
& Orth 2013). Brummelman et al. (2014a) designed a 15-
minute intervention to prevent secondary-school students from
seeing failure as a threat to their self-worth. Students reﬂected
on times when they were accepted and valued by others uncondi-
tionally. One 14-year-old girl wrote: “I was working on a task with
a friend of mine, and I made a lot of mistakes. But we are still good
friends, and she still values me.” To encourage students to fully
reﬂect on this experience, they were asked to describe it in
great detail. Would this exercise imbue students with the feeling
of being valued for who they are, even when they perform
poorly (Rogers 1961)? Three weeks later, students received the
ﬁrst report card of the school year. Without intervention, students
who received poor grades experienced increased negative self-
feelings; with it, they did not. Thus, the intervention buffered stu-
dents’ negative self-feelings in the face of distal academic failure.
How do seemingly small interventions yield effects that last
weeks, months, or even years? The interventions do not shut
people’s eyes to adversity. Nor do they simply remain accessible
in people’s minds: the accessibility of messages wanes over time
(Srull & Wyer 1979). Rather, the interventions set in motion self-
sustaining processes, whereby small initial improvements com-
pound over time (Cohen & Sherman 2014). When people are
more conﬁdent about their belonging or their regard from
others, they express more welcoming social behavior and thus
build better relationships (Walton et al. 2014). These relationships,
in turn, reinforce people’s conﬁdence in their social standing.
Kalisch and colleagues emphasize the need for longitudinal re-
search on resilience. Mere longitudinal studies are not always sufﬁ-
cient, however. Psychologist Walter Dearborn remarked, “If you
want to understand something, try to change it” (in Bronfenbrenner
1979, p. 37). Longitudinal ﬁeld experiments such as those de-
scribed above go well beyond nonexperimental longitudinal
studies. First, they provide a causal test of resilience mechanisms,
and they reveal how these mechanisms unfold over time to affect
outcomes. Second, they enable researchers to investigate how
contextual factors (e.g., timing, setting) moderate intervention
effects. Research shows that interventions can be more effective
when timed early (Cook et al. 2012; Raudenbush 1984). Interven-
tions to combat loneliness in school, for example, might be more
effective on students’ ﬁrst day of school than several days later,
when students’ relationships with peers and teachers have
become more ﬁxed (Brummelman et al. 2014b).
Researchers and policy makers increasingly recognize the
power of brief, stealthy, and psychologically precise interventions
to improve people’s lives and society at large. Such “wise” inter-
ventions do not prevent adversity. Rather, they help people con-
strue adversity in adaptive ways so as to promote growth and
improvement. As such, they simultaneously provide a causal test
of resilience mechanisms and bring about positive change in
people’s lives.
Rediscovering conﬁdence as a mechanism
and optimism as a construct
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Abstract: The target article asserts that resilience results from a
generalized tendency to appraise stressful circumstances positively.
Apparently unbeknownst to the authors, essentially the same idea has
been advanced before and studied extensively from a different research
perspective. This raises a broader issue: the critical need, when projects
attempt to span disciplines, to fully examine work from all relevant
backgrounds.
Kalisch et al. conceptualize resilience as resistance to adverse out-
comes during and after experiences of threat (for greater differen-
tiation concerning resilience as a concept, see Carver 1998). They
seek to identify a mechanism underlying resilience, as opposed to
developing a list of variables that are associated with resilience.
That is, although resilience is affected by many situational vari-
ables and individual difference variables, it almost certainly re-
ﬂects functions that are fewer in number than the many
variables that inﬂuence those functions.
Consistent with many other people, Kalisch et al. treat stress as
being a product of a subjective appraisal of the likelihood and in-
tensity of a bad outcome in a given situation, either acute or
chronic. Further, they note that given the perception that an
adverse outcome is likely, the more important the outcome is,
the greater is the resulting stress (cf. Carver 1998; Carver &
Scheier 1998, Ch. 13, 16). This is all very consonant with many ex-
isting theories.
The core of the target article is Kalisch et al.’s assertion that the
key to resilience is a tendency to make relatively positive appraisals
of potentially threatening stimuli (sect. 4.2.1). Positive appraisals
result in less emotional distress, less hypothalamus-pituitary-
adrenal (HPA) activity, and more productive coping of various
sorts. Kalisch et al. put it succinctly: “If a person has a tendency
to see things negatively, she will more frequently be in a negative
emotional state, and therefore more likely develop stress-related
dysfunctions” (sect. 4.2.2). We regard that as a very reasonable
assertion (Carver & Scheier 1998).
In our view, although Kalisch et al. never used the word expec-
tancy, a large share of what they describe as “appraisal style” –
maybe all of it, actually – appears to be captured by the concept
of generalized expectancies for good versus bad outcomes. Equat-
ing the appraisals they discuss with expectancies regarding out-
comes would link the appraisals directly to motivational
processes (expectancy-value models of motivation have had a
long history in psychology). This link to expectancies would
account nicely for the emotional effects (and consequent HPA
effects) that reﬂect resilience, and also for the coping effects asso-
ciated with resilience (for a broader discussion of expectancy-
value motivational ideas in the context of stress, see Carver
2007). Kalisch et al. also emphasize that it is desirable to think
in terms of generalized appraisal tendencies – “the typical way in
which [people] react to challenge” (sect. 4.2.2) – because a gener-
alized tendency will pertain to reactions across a wide variety of
stressors, rather than just a few.
From this point of view, then, the key to resilience would be
generalized appraisals for positive versus negative outcomes
from ongoing or upcoming life experiences. Conﬁdence about
outcomes would, in several respects, foster better results. Such
a mechanism has a good deal to recommend it. Is it new? Are
any existing constructs based on a similar mechanism? No, it is
not new; and yes, there is a construct predicated on such a mech-
anism. It is termed optimism (Scheier & Carver 1985). It is based
explicitly on the mechanism of generalized expectancies concern-
ing life outcomes as an inﬂuence on diverse aspects of behavior.
Over a period of nearly 30 years, it has been studied quite a lot,
in relation to a great many emotional, coping, adaptational, and
health outcomes (for reviews of various aspects of that literature,
see, e.g., Boehm & Kubzansky 2012; Carver & Scheier 2014;
Carver et al. 2010; Rasmussen et al. 2009; Segerstrom 2006).
Consistent with the reasoning that Kalisch et al. presented, but
apparently completely unknown to them, a great deal of research
has already shown that generalized optimism is associated with
better emotional outcomes during stressful situations, more
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adaptive proﬁles of coping with adversity, better adherence to
health-promoting behaviors, lower frequencies of health-
damaging behaviors, better life attainments, better social rela-
tions, and even better physical health (in several respects) over
extended periods of time (Carver & Scheier 2014; Carver et al.
2010). Unfortunately, this considerable literature on the effects
of generalized outcome expectancies was apparently unknown
to either the authors or the reviewers of the target article.
This situation is unfortunate, and it illustrates a broader issue. A
potential pitfall of multidisciplinary work, or of work that extends
one discipline into a topic area that has been well explored by
another discipline, is neglecting to consider the various constituen-
cies and failing to review what they have already said. The target
article clearly was more grounded in neuroscience and animal re-
search than in human behavioral research and theory, and the
failure to thoroughly examine the latter is a serious weakness.
Nonetheless, Kalisch et al. do add to the conceptual conversa-
tion. They emphasize that the appraisal processes are not fully con-
scious, and that they are ﬂuid in operation (we agree with both
points; these are ideas that, to our knowledge, have not been
widely examined, and they should be). Kalisch et al. appear to be
more interested in the neural circuits that support appraisal than
in the subjective experience of appraisal, which presumably reﬂects
their background in neuroscience. To their credit, they appropri-
ately acknowledge that there often is a good deal of ambiguity
about the meaning of neural activation (sect. 4.3.2). That is, in
this case, there is ambiguity (among other ambiguities) about
whether neural activation reﬂects appraisal contents or processes.
We are not as sanguine as they are about the prospects of
gaining useful information about positive appraisals from neuro-
science research or from animal research. But it is probably
wisest to let a hundred ﬂowers bloom and see what emerges.
After all, it is widely known that positive appraisals are generally
better than negative ones.
The challenges of forecasting resilience
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Abstract: Developing prospective models of resilience using the
translational and transdiagnostic framework proposed in the target article
is a challenging endeavor and will require large-scale data sets with dense
intraindividual temporal sampling and innovative analytic methods.
Kalisch et al. present a thought-provoking translational and trans-
diagnostic framework for studying resilience. In this commentary,
we apply their theoretical framework toward prospective predic-
tion of resilient responses to negative life events. Prospective pre-
diction is employed in many domains that depend on accurately
forecasting a future state. For example, investors develop models
to predict the future value of companies andmarkets, and epidemi-
ologists developmodels to predict the spread of disease. In the area
of resilience, a well-formulated model should be able to both fore-
cast the trajectory of an individual’s resistance and recovery and
generalize across forms of psychopathology and contexts. Such
models could transform the study of mental health, but it is not
clear how close we are to developing them.
Here, we describe three conceptual challenges for applying
Kalisch et al.’s model of resilience in a forecasting framework:
(1) resilience is a process unfolding over time, not an outcome
that can be measured at a discrete time point; (2) cognitive pro-
cesses alone are unlikely to predict resilience accurately; and (3)
low base rates pose a challenge to predictive accuracy. To help
overcome these challenges, we will need studies with large,
diverse samples and dense intraindividual temporal sampling.
1. Deﬁning resilient outcomes.Kalisch et al. deﬁne resilience as
the empirically observed absence of lasting mental health prob-
lems following adversity and propose that it can be operationalized
as the change in mental health symptoms before and after an
adverse event, with a slope of zero indicating a resilient
outcome. But at which time points should such a slope be mea-
sured? As time passes after a stressful event, the likelihood of re-
turning to a baseline measure becomes greater, increasing the
apparent “resilience” independent of any characteristics of the in-
dividual. Alternatively, we could estimate the functional form, or
shape, of symptom severity as it unfolds across time.
As resilience is likely a dynamic process reﬂecting multiple
mechanisms operating on different timescales, modeling the tem-
poral trajectory may be particularly informative about which
mechanisms are involved. This endeavor will require dense sam-
pling of intraindividual data across time and the application of
emerging statistical techniques for modeling trajectories, such as
functional data analysis (Lindquist & McKeague 2009).
2. Multiple resilient processes. Kalisch et al. adopt a predomi-
nantly cognitive view of resilience, proposing a fundamental role
for positive appraisal style, which comprises three distinct intra-
personal processes: (1) the initial appraisal, (2) subsequent reap-
praisal, and (3) inhibiting alternative interfering appraisals. We
agree that appraisal and reappraisal are critical (Wager et al.
2008); however, to develop accurate, generalizable models of re-
silience, we will likely need to incorporate a broader set of mech-
anisms, including interpersonal ones. Social support can attenuate
negative affective responses (Coan et al. 2006; Master et al. 2009)
and has been associated with positive long-term health beneﬁts
(House et al. 1988; Uchino et al. 1996). These processes are
likely not fully describable in terms of intrapersonal appraisals,
but rather will require models of bidirectional, interpersonal feed-
back loops (Butler & Randall 2013; Schilbach et al. 2013; Zaki &
Williams 2013). For example, our feelings of happiness appear to
be directly inﬂuenced by our peers and can propagate dynamically
through our social network over time (Fowler & Christakis 2008).
Therefore, as we move toward prospective models of resilience,
it will be important to incorporate both intra- and interpersonal
processes. Ensemble algorithms from statistical learning offer a
promising approach to integrate multiple mechanisms into a
single model (Hastie et al. 2009; Schapire 1990).
3. The base rate problem. One of the challenges of selecting
training data for a predictive model is dealing with a very high
base rate of resilient outcomes and an extraordinarily low base
rate of signiﬁcant negative life events on a daily basis. To make
this more concrete, based on the lifetime prevalence of depression
(Kessler et al. 2005), the probability of an individual not being de-
pressed on a given day is roughly 99.99%. Using Bayes’ rule to
combine this high base rate of not being depressed with a low fre-
quency of signiﬁcant traumatic life events (0.002%; Kessler et al.
1995) reveals a very low conditional probability that an individual
will not be depressed given an adverse life event (less than 5%).
Therefore, in the general population, resilience deﬁned as a null
change across time is actually the standard response, and it will
be difﬁcult to identify when true resistance to and recovery
from adversity occurs (King & Zeng 2001; Weiss 2004).
To account for these statistical issues, trauma researchers typi-
cally have focused on examining resilience to shared traumatic
events such as the collapse of the World Trade Center. Such an
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approach will not be sufﬁcient to develop predictivemodels of re-
silience, however, as these events are sampled a posteriori rather
than prospectively, precluding baseline assessment, and it remains
unclear how well mechanisms generalize beyond this experience.
Therefore, to increase the predictive power of such forecasting
models, it will be necessary to collect large-scale data sets and
ﬁnd a way to increase the frequency of events to train the
model (Kanner et al. 1981). Concerted, nationally funded
efforts such as the 500,000-person UK Biobank project will help
(Allen et al. 2014), and new avenues to large-scale data collection
are continually developing with the rapid proliferation of social
media, mobile sensing, and cloud computing. For example,
using experience sampling of mood from mobile devices, re-
searchers recently collected more than 500,000 samples from ap-
proximately 30,000 people (Killingsworth & Gilbert 2010;
Rutledge et al. 2014). Furthermore, general public mood can
be assessed by mining Twitter feeds, and these metrics appear
to modestly predict other global metrics such as the Dow-Jones
Industrial Average (Bollen et al. 2011).
4. Conclusion. Though the challenges we have raised in devel-
oping predictive models of resilience are substantial, they are in-
herent to many other problems (e.g., predicting the stock market,
forecasting weather, etc.) and are by no means insurmountable.
Resilience research can learn from other ﬁelds outside of psychol-
ogy and neuroscience, which have addressed parallel problems
with predicting complex and rare events. Billions of dollars are
poured into ﬁnancial markets, and the most powerful supercom-
puters in the world are continually running simulations to
improve our weather forecasts. Why should improving our
mental health by predicting resilience be any less important?
Cognitive trade-offs and the costs of resilience
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Bernard J. Crespi
Department of Biological Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC
V5A 1S, Canada.
crespi@sfu.ca
http://www.sfu.ca/biology/people/proﬁles/crespi.html
Abstract: Genetic, endocrinological, and psychological evidence
demonstrates that resilience commonly trades off with sensitivity. The
existence of such trade-offs indicates that resilience bears costs as well
as beneﬁts, and that some disorders can best be conceptualized in terms
of extremes of trade-offs rather than expression of deﬁcits. Testing for
cognitive trade-offs should be a priority for psychiatry, psychology,
neuroscience, and genetics.
In the year 2371, the android robot Data from Star Trek: The Next
Generation has an “emotion chip” installed in his brain, to aid in
his quest to understand humanity. The experiment is successful
to a fault: Data become overwhelmed with wildly positive, nega-
tive, and erratic feelings in response to pleasurable or stressful
events. The lesson is clear and supported much further by the em-
pirical evidence described below: Resilience trades off with sensi-
tivity, even at the level of the brain. Why, then, are cognitive
trade-offs virtually unstudied in psychology and psychiatry?
Trade-offs can be considered as balances between two beneﬁ-
cial but incompatible phenotypes. Resilience, as conceptualized
by Kalisch et al., can be favorable, because it reduces cognitive
and emotional sensitivity and vulnerability to stressful events;
however, it may also reduce sensitivity to beneﬁcial opportunities.
In turn, sensitivity, as a state that trades off with resilience, in-
creases both gains from opportunity and losses from threat.
These two opposite concepts form the core of the “vantage sensi-
tivity” model developed by Pluess and Belsky (2013), whereby
some individuals are relatively more sensitive than others with
regard to psychological responses to environmental events,
whether those events are negative (as in diathesis-stress models)
or positive (Fig. 1). Under this paradigm, less-sensitive individuals
are simply more resilient. In contrast, the cognitive-resilience
model of Kalisch et al., in its reliance on “any mechanism that
helps the organism ﬁne-tune stress responses to optimal levels
… and remain ﬂexible” (sect. 1.3), implicitly denies the existence
of such cognitive trade-offs. So: How important are they?
At the genetic level, cognitive trade-offs are strongly supported
by evidence showing that certain genotypes increase liability to
psychopathology for individuals in poor environments but
confer beneﬁts to individuals in good environments (review in
Pluess & Belsky 2013). By contrast, individuals with alternative,
“resilience” genotypes at these loci exhibit neither the costs of ad-
versity nor the beneﬁts of advantage. The well-known COMT
Val158Met polymorphism provides another case of trade-offs:
The Met allele mediates lower ﬂexibility, but increased stability,
compared with Val (e.g., Markant et al. 2014); strong trade-offs
also have been demonstrated from these alleles for executive com-
pared with emotional tasks (Mier et al. 2010). Comparable results
obtain from studies of human polymorphisms in mice: For
example, mice bearing the autism-associated R451C mutation
exhibit impaired social interactions, but enhanced spatial learning
(Tabuchi et al. 2007).
At the level of physiology, trade-offs are controlled by condition-
dependent effects of hormones, and for some hormones, these
inﬂuences extend to the brain. For example, intranasal oxytocin ad-
ministration leads to reduced analytic thinking, but also increased
“holistic processing, divergent thinking and creative performance”
(De Dreu et al. 2014, p. 1). Similarly, serum estradiol relative to
testosterone exhibits a negative relationship with spatial ability,
but a positive association with verbal ﬂuency (Kocoska-Maras
et al. 2013).
Finally, at the level of psychiatry, cognitive trade-offs can be
analyzed by determining whether increased risks for one disorder
coincide with decreased risks for another. For example, three
well-documented factors confer protection from schizophrenia:
large birth size (Byars et al. 2014), congenital blindness
(Silverstein et al. 2013), and duplications of the 22q11.2 copy
number locus (Rees et al. 2014). Each of these three factors
that reduces schizophrenia risk also increases risk for autism
(Byars et al. 2014; Hobson & Bishop 2003; Rees et al. 2014), pro-
viding evidence that these two disorders trade off in their causes
and can be conceptualized as diametric (Crespi & Badcock
2008). More generally, social abilities commonly trade off with
spatial skills, in autism as well as neurotypical individuals (e.g.,
Keehn et al. 2013; Russell-Smith et al. 2012), and schizophrenia
genetic risk is positively associated with higher verbal relative to
spatial skills (Kravariti et al. 2006). Perhaps most important,
these ﬁndings also suggest that some disorders themselves repre-
sent dysfunctions mediated by extremes of cognitive trade-offs, as
between empathizing and systemizing in Baron-Cohen’s (2009)
model for autism.
Figure 1 (Crespi). Cognitive trade-offs under a vantage sensitivity
model, whereby resilience engenders beneﬁts in poor environments
but costs in good ones.
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Bipolar disorder and depression represent paradigmatic disor-
ders underlain by cognitive-affective sensitivities, in that overly
positive appraisals of events and self-capabilities mediate the
emergence of mania and hypomania, whereas overly negative ap-
praisals mediate the onset and maintenance of depression (e.g.,
Beck 2008; Lee et al. 2010). In this framework, the positive-
appraisal bases for resilience postulated by Kalisch et al. may, par-
adoxically, overlap with risks for mania and hypomania. Bipolar
disorder can indeed be considered in terms of overly developed
goal seeking, driven by high reward-sensitivity; however, it also
is associated with pronounced enhancements, including elevated
IQ (e.g., Koenen et al. 2009) and high social and academic
achievement (e.g., Johnson et al. 2012; MacCabe et al. 2010).
Such beneﬁts presumably accrue primarily to individuals who
are highly motivated and sensitive to successes, but also fortunate
enough to develop in a favorable environment.
The upshot of these considerations is that diverse evidence sup-
ports a model of resilience trading off with sensitivity, such that
Kalisch et al.’s quest for purely beneﬁcial neural resilience to
stress-induced mental disorders becomes challenging at least,
and at most, quixotic. Where do these considerations leave us,
with regard to reducing risks for such disorders?
First, increased resilience certainly can be fostered among high-
sensitivity individuals beset by environmental stress, once we
know how. Determining the mechanisms for resilience, by com-
paring neural and cognitive phenotypes across resilient genotypes
for multiple differential-susceptibility loci, offers a simple way
forward.
Second, we must improve our understanding of cognitive trade-
offs, by realizing that many psychological deﬁcits are intrinsically
linked with corresponding strengths, and that psychiatric risk ge-
notypes of many genetic polymorphisms also should confer bene-
ﬁts. Such strengths, and beneﬁts, will be overlooked if the study of
psychopathology continues its usual litany of characterizing dys-
functions rather than testing for trade-offs.
With the help of the psychological counselor Deanna Troi, the
android Data eventually develops some measure of control over
his emotions. His emotion chip is later removed, however,
because it renders him vulnerable to confusion, fear, depression,
rage, and manipulation by others. He learns, as may we someday,
that the costs of sensitivity, like the costs of resilience, can some-
times exceed the advantages.
Does a positive appraisal style work in all
stressful situations and for all individuals?
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Abstract: Kalisch et al. posit that a positive appraisal style is the key to
resilience. I will argue instead that the adaptiveness of a particular
emotion-regulation strategy is determined by contextual factors. Hence,
a positive appraisal style might not always result in positive
consequences and is most likely not the only mediator of resilience.
I will begin with a positive appraisal by saying that the target
article by Kalisch et al. has many features that I applaud: strong
arguments for a transdiagnostic and quantitative analysis, clear
and straightforward terminology, a plea for measures beyond
self-report, and last but not least, the boldness to posit a uniﬁed
general theory of resilience, applicable for humans and animals
alike. In contrast to Kalisch et al., however, I will argue that it
seems unlikely that one speciﬁc emotion-regulation strategy –
namely, a positive (non-negative) appraisal style –would be the
key to resilience (i.e., the only mediator of it). Evolution has
shaped several coping mechanisms, all of which show some ben-
eﬁts and some shortcomings depending on the context. I will illus-
trate this main argument by discussing studies that stem from the
psychology of (human) emotion regulation and by focusing on
cognitive reappraisal, the second class of cognitive processes
that shape appraisal style speciﬁed by Kalisch et al.
Without a doubt, cognitive reappraisal shows reliable positive
effects on subjective, behavioral, and physiological outcomes in
most situations, whether instructed (Gross 1998), spontaneously
chosen (Egloff et al. 2006), or assessed as a personality disposition
(Gross & John 2003). There are circumstances, however, where
reappraisal is less adaptive or even maladaptive, therefore
calling into question its unconditional link to resilience. I will elab-
orate on two situational boundary conditions (intensity of stress
and controllability), cultural moderators, and whether enhanced
memory for the situation might be maladaptive when dealing
with effects of traumatic experiences.
Regarding the intensity of the stressor, Sheppes et al. (2009)
and Sheppes and Meiran (2008) showed in a series of studies
that cognitive reappraisal was less successful (as compared with
distraction) in terms of physiological and cognitive indicators of
the stress response during the regulation of sadness in situations
of high emotional intensity. Speciﬁcally, reappraisal was associated
with increased skin conductance and decreased ﬁnger tempera-
ture (indicating increased sympathetic activation; Sheppes et al.
2009) and stronger Stroop interference (indicating an expenditure
of self-control resources; Sheppes & Meiran 2008). By contrast,
reappraisal was adaptive in low-intensity situations, especially
when implemented early in the emotion-regulation process.
Thus, it might be more adaptive to cognitively and emotionally
“block” high-intensity stressors than to reappraise them. Conse-
quently, individuals prefer to choose distraction over reappraisal
in these situations (Sheppes et al. 2011).
Troy et al. (2013) showed that controllability of the stressor con-
stitutes another moderator of the relation between reappraisal and
the success of the regulation effort: For individuals facing uncon-
trollable stress in their daily lives, higher cognitive-reappraisal
ability – as assessed during an independent experiment using
subjective and objective (non–self-report) indicators –was associ-
ated with fewer depressive symptoms, whereas persons facing
controllable stress showed a positive correlation between cogni-
tive-reappraisal ability and depression. Hence, it seems that reap-
praisal is maladaptive when stressors can be controlled (i.e., when
the situation can be modiﬁed by means of active coping), therefore
calling into question the “unconditional” link between reappraisal
and resilience. Perhaps as a consequence of these moderator
effects of both intensity and controllability of the stressor, individ-
uals surprisingly rarely chose cognitive reappraisal as an emotion-
regulation strategy when they were free to do so (Suri et al. 2014).
Culture might constitute another moderator of the effective-
ness of particular emotion-regulation strategies. For example,
Butler et al. (2007; 2009) observed that emotional suppression –
a strategy that is usually associated with negative social conse-
quences (Butler et al. 2003) –was an adaptive regulation strategy
for Asian American participants as compared with European
American participants. As culture and cultural values (e.g., inde-
pendence vs. interdependence) are differentially associated with
the frequency and intensity of the use of reappraisal and suppres-
sion, and the relationships between these emotion-regulation
strategies and adjustment differ across countries and cultures
(Matsumoto et al. 2008), a universal and exclusive reappraisal-
adjustment link as posited by Kalisch et al. also seems unlikely
from this perspective.
Another issue that calls into question the unconditional and ex-
clusive link from reappraisal to health stems from the ﬁnding that
cognitive reappraisal – as compared with emotional suppression
and distraction – enhances memory for the situation (Egloff
et al. 2006; Richards & Gross 2000; Sheppes & Meiran 2008).
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This effect of reappraisal is considered beneﬁcial in everyday sit-
uations because it may enhance the predictability of future similar
moderately stressful encounters. When one has been confronted
with potentially traumatic stressors, however, the memory-
enhancing effect of reappraisal might be maladaptive at least for
some individuals because it may contribute to the consolidation
of fear memory that, in turn, may lead to posttraumatic stress dis-
order (Kearns et al. 2012).
As a logical consequence of all these considerations, a ﬂexible
implementation of different emotion-regulation strategies depen-
dent on person characteristics and situational demands should
lead to optimal coping with both daily hassles and traumatic expe-
riences. In the coping and emotion-regulation literature, this ca-
pability is termed coping ﬂexibility (Cheng 2001), regulatory
ﬂexibility (Bonanno & Burton 2013), or psychological ﬂexibility
(Kashdan & Rottenberg 2010). For intellectual honesty, I would
like to add that a recent meta-analysis, however, showed only
small to moderate coping ﬂexibility effect sizes (Cheng et al.
2014) that were comparable to those of reappraisal in another
meta-analysis (Webb et al. 2012). Therefore, much theoretical
and empirical work has to be done to demonstrate that coping
ﬂexibility is the most adaptive way of dealing with stressors in ev-
eryday life.
Taken together, any particular emotion-regulation strategy is
not adaptive or maladaptive per se – its adaptiveness depends
on several contextual factors. As a consequence, it seems un-
likely that a positive (non-negative) appraisal style always will
have positive consequences and is the only mediator of
resilience.
The value of “negative” appraisals for
resilience. Is positive (re)appraisal always
good and negative always bad?
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Abstract: In contrast to the PASTOR model by Kalisch et al. we point to
the potential negative long-term effects of positive (re)appraisals of events
for resilience. This perspective posits that emotional reactions to events
provide important guidelines as to which events, environments, or social
relations should be sought out and which ones should be avoided in the
future.
There is no doubt that positive (re)appraisals of negative events
can contribute to a person’s affective and subjective well-being.
The PASTOR model proposed by Kalisch et al. elaborates the
central role of such positive (re)appraisals for understanding the
processes contributing to resilience in the face of stressors and ad-
versities. Although we agree with the main tenets of this model,
we believe that this perspective overlooks the potentially negative
effects of positive (re)appraisals as well as the potentially positive
effects of negative appraisals of a given event or situation with
regard to functional outcomes such as mental health. In contrast
to Kalisch and colleagues, we maintain that emotional reactions
to events provide important information as to which events, envi-
ronments, or social relations should be sought out and, important-
ly, which ones should be avoided.
The question of the optimal margin of positive illusions – in the
context of the present paper, youmay say of positive (re)appraisals –
is not new, with some of it dating back to a heated debate in the late
1980s and early 1990s conducted by Taylor and Block (Colvin &
Block 1994; Taylor & Brown 1988; see also Baumeister 1989).
Too much realism is related to depression (Alloy & Abramson
1987), but too many illusions are linked with a loss of motivation
(e.g., Colvin & Block 1994). Not surprisingly, it has not been pos-
sible to deﬁne or quantify where exactly the optimal margin
between realistic and overly positive appraisals of an event lie.
Also, it is still unclear: Is the relationship linear between positive
(re)appraisals of negative events and short-term as well as long-
term well-being and mental health? Or –more likely – is the rela-
tionship more complex, such that the association is linear up to a
certain level of positive reappraisal, beyond which people fall out
of touch with a given negative reality, which is then indicative of a
delusion rather than an illusion?
Furthermore, it also may be useful to consider that different
types of outcomes can be at stake when it comes to reappraisal.
One distinction proposed by Staudinger (Staudinger & Kessler
2009) is between adjustment (i.e., fending off negative effects
of negative events in order to regain or maintain subjective
well-being) and growth (i.e., facing the negative and thereby
being able to learn from negative events and gaining life-
insight). In their lifespan model of resilience, Staudinger and
colleagues deﬁne resilience, in the sense of adjustment, as
one kind of developmental plasticity and distinguish it from
growth as another kind of plasticity (Greve & Staudinger
2006; Staudinger et al. 1995). This deﬁnition of resilience is
akin to the biological notions of homeostasis and allostasis. Ac-
cording to McEwen and Wingﬁeld (2007), allostasis refers to
the active process of achieving stability through change when
faced with events that challenge the basic maintenance of func-
tioning (i.e., homeostasis). Both concepts, homeostasis and
allostasis, include the possibility of changing the functional
set-points in order to adapt optimally to a changing environ-
ment. In this way, resilience can be considered as the basis
for growth, including the setting of future goals that motivate
behavior to change oneself and/or the environment in a way
that promotes optimal development or even progress toward
wisdom (Freund 2008; Staudinger & Kessler 2009).
Continuous positive reinterpretation of negative events might
help a person to feel better, but also jeopardizes the veridicality
of judgment. In other words, appraising challenging or threaten-
ing events as such (i.e., in a “negative” or realistic way) may be
experienced as aversive but motivate a person to actively
change the aspects of the situation/event or to acquire resources
that will help him or her adapt successfully to the situation/event
(Carver & Scheier 1998). Imagine a person who does not ac-
knowledge the negative information of having been diagnosed
with a malignant form of cancer. Exclusively appraising this sit-
uation as positive (e.g., as a message that highlights the value of
life and to enjoy every moment of it), rather than also acknowl-
edging that certain steps, even though aversive (e.g., undergoing
chemotherapy), will have to be taken to cope with the life-
threatening situation, might drastically shorten the person’s
chances of actually beating the cancer. Or imagine (re)apprais-
ing the negative critique of your behavior by your partner as
an expression of his or her insecurity, rather than facing the neg-
ative critique. The latter will motivate you to work toward
changing your behavior that causes the partnership problems.
In contrast, the former might upregulate your positive emotions
and downregulate your negative emotions in the short run,
but jeopardize the goal of maintaining a good relationship
with your partner in the long run. In other words, resilience
deﬁned as the ability to maintain well-being and mental health
in the face of daily hassles as well as more dramatic negative
events might require acknowledging the negative in order to
stay tuned with reality and change one’s behavior or the environ-
ment if necessary.
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This view is consistent with the notion that emotional reactions,
and in particular negative ones, serve as information that some-
thing in the person-situation-interaction requires to be changed
(e.g., Clore & Storbeck 2006). Just appraising negative events dif-
ferently (i.e., positive reframing) might in fact prevent such more
active ways to change the situation or to acquire new resources or
to extend one’s behavioral repertoire in order to achieve a better
person–environment ﬁt.
Taken together, resilience deﬁned as adjustment to negative
events and resulting in stable mental health is likely to proﬁt
from positive reappraisals that help to maintain positive well-
being, as assumed in the PASTOR model put forth by Kalisch
and colleagues. We posit, however, that facing the negative –
and, as a consequence, experiencing negative emotions – lies at
the heart of the ability to adapt ﬂexibly to one’s environment,
and thereby, to change oneself or one’s environment in a way
that promotes long-term resilience and serves as the basis for per-
sonal growth.
Rethinking reappraisal: Insights from affective
neuroscience
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Abstract: Kalisch et al. argue that appraisal and reappraisal are key
mechanisms promoting resilience; however, experimental ﬁndings seem
to contradict this simplistic view. We argue that a deeper look at
affective neuroscience may provide complementary and stronger
evidence on how emotional reactivity and emotion regulation may affect
resilience.
In their target article, Kalisch et al. offer both a parsimonious
theoretical approach to understanding the basic mechanism un-
derlying resilience and a wide-ranging body of evidence in
support of this position. A cornerstone of the paper is the
theory of positive appraisal style as the key mechanism that
buffers individuals from developing detrimental effects of stress-
ors. Appraisal style is broken down into a set of three cognitive
processes: (1) positive situation classiﬁcation, (2) reappraisal,
and (3) interference inhibition. The attempt to analyze resilient
factors in terms of some simpler, underlying mechanisms is
worthwhile and captures a portion of the variance in the mea-
surement of resilience. We see two major problems in this ap-
proach, however, as it underestimates the role of emotional
factors, on the one hand, and on the other, it overestimates
the role of appraisal and reappraisal as the best and fundamental
mechanisms in establishing resilience.
Appraisal theories rely on the simplistic assumption that events
generate ﬁrst appraisals and then emotional reactions, an assump-
tion not supported by several neuroscientiﬁc studies of affect (see
Panksepp & Biven 2012 for a discussion). Kalisch et al. downplay
the role of basic emotional reactivity and regulation as important
factors leading to resilience and readily jump to the “cognitive”
side of resilience (appraisal and reappraisal mechanisms).
Emotion, however, has a neurobiological primacy over cognition
in terms of temporal dynamics (information is ﬁrst received by
subcortical emotional structures; see LeDoux 1998) and anatom-
ical circuitry (direct links between perceptual systems and emo-
tional structures; see Panksepp & Biven 2012).
From a developmental point of view (of great relevance when
considering resilient mechanisms), it is now a matter of fact that
early in infant development, all animals are more dependent on
the functions of lower emotional rather than higher cognitive
brain structures (Chugani 1998). Early perturbations of such
primary processes lead to their sensitization (Panksepp & Biven
2012) and late mental health problems (Heim et al. 2010),
before cognition can have any (protective) role over the develop-
ment of stress responses. These and other data point toward the
direction of studying very basic emotional processes and basic
(rather than high-level cognitive) regulation. Without a clear un-
derstanding of emotional reactivity and regulation, we can easily
lose the focus of what really matters in terms of creating
resilience.
Kalisch et al. claim that “reappraisal processes are particularly
important in strongly aversive situations” (sect. 4.2.8, para. 3).
Behavioral and neuroscientiﬁc evidence supports the idea that
this strategy in the laboratory setting is effective in reducing
psychological and physiological indexes of emotional reactions
(Grecucci et al. 2013; Ochsner & Gross 2005). Extending
these ﬁndings outside the laboratory, it was found that the fre-
quency of use of reappraisal correlates with well-being and pos-
itive emotions (Gross & John 2003). This claim is in line with
another set of observations coming from the clinical ﬁeld, ac-
cording to which there is a negative correlation between reap-
praisal and psychological disorders (Martin & Dahlen 2005).
Such a pattern leads Kalisch et al. to propose that reappraisal
is the key to wellness; however, such a conclusion simply is
not justiﬁed by the available evidence. Not only does a correla-
tion not mean causation, but at least three lines of evidence
contradict this conclusion.
First, experiments in emotion-regulation choice, an emergent
ﬁeld that aims at understanding how we choose which strategy
to adopt in a given situation (Sheppes et al. 2011), undermine
the importance of reappraisal as a resilient mechanism. Sheppes
and colleagues (2011) demonstrate that participants used reap-
praisal to regulate only low-intensity emotional stimuli, and used
distraction for high-intensity stimuli. This result casts doubts on
the use of reappraisal during stressful events that are by nature
highly emotional. From a neurobiological point of view, experi-
mental studies show a decrease in BOLD signal during induced
emotional states in regions such as the prefrontal cortex (known
to implement regulatory strategies) (Mayberg et al. 1999).
Other studies demonstrate an inhibition of prefrontal cortex activ-
ity for emotional stimuli (Dolcos & McCarthy 2006). Hence, it
may be unlikely that during highly emotional events reappraisal-
based strategies may be fully available for regulating the experi-
enced emotion.
Last but not least, from a developmental point of view, the ev-
idence for the successful use of reappraisal as a regulation strategy
is scant in children (DeCicco et al. 2014) and nonexistent in
infants (for obvious reasons of immaturity of prefrontal regions
necessary for reappraisal to happen). It follows that other protec-
tive emotion-regulation strategies may guarantee resilience in the
face of early stressors.
Emotional reactivity and regulatory mechanisms (cognitive, but
also experiential; see Grecucci et al. 2015) are keys to understand
both pathological and resilient processes (Kring & Werner 2004;
Tracy et al. 2014; Troy & Mauss 2011). We are very far,
however, from a complete taxonomy of emotion-regulation strat-
egies and from a sufﬁcient knowledge of their efﬁcacy, optimal
frequency before becoming detrimental, short- and long-term
effects, and other relevant variables.
To this end, a critical distinction should be made between func-
tional and dysfunctional emotion-regulation strategies (F/DERS).
DERS may be related to psychopathology; however, as pointed
out by Alado and colleagues (2010), the relationship between
emotion-regulation strategies and psychopathology is not linear,
and varies as a function of type of strategies and type of psychopa-
thology. When an emotion is elicited, self-regulatory mechanisms
spontaneously reduce the emotional response. A failure in such
regulation may be due not necessarily to the lack of FERS, but
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instead to the intervention of DERS that leads to emotional dys-
regulation (Grecucci et al. 2015).
Our view is that Kalisch et al.’s proposal, to be viable, should
take into account the role of basic emotional reactivity,
self-regulatory mechanisms, and DERS. We believe that just as
a genetic proﬁle can be predictive of developing a physical
disease, the creation of an “emotional proﬁle” rather than an “ap-
praisal proﬁle” may be useful as a predictor of resilience.
Heterogeneity of cognitive-neurobiological
determinants of resilience
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Abstract: In their target article, Kalisch and colleagues advocate a
paradigm shift in research on stress-related mental disorders away from
vulnerability factors and toward determinants of resilience. We endorse
this shift but argue that their focus on “appraisal style” as the ultimate
path to resilience may be too narrow. We illustrate this point by
examining recent literature on the role of corticosteroids in resilience.
The vast majority of people do not develop psychopathology after
exposure to highly stressful or life-threatening events (Feder
et al. 2009). Fascinatingly, having experienced some adversity
may even have advantages for mental health and well-being
(Seery et al. 2010). Although research into stress-related disor-
ders historically has focused on identifying factors that confer vul-
nerability, it is becoming increasingly clear that resilience is not
simply the absence of vulnerability. In their target article,
Kalisch et al. therefore propose a paradigm shift in research
into risk factors for stress-related mental disorders to redirect at-
tention to factors that uniquely determine resilience. This is a
welcome development because an understanding of resilience
factors is critical for the promotion of mental health, one of the
most urgent contemporary challenges for modern societies
(Malenka & Deisseroth 2014).
The theoretical framework proposed by the authors draws on an
ongoing shift toward transnosological understanding of stress-
related mental disorders as heterogeneous clusters of dysfunctions
in multiple cognitive-neurobiological systems. Kalisch et al. invoke
the classical concept of appraisal (Lazarus 1993b; Scherer 1994) as
a causal factor determining whether a given situation triggers a
stress response. They acknowledge the possibility that a variety
of appraisal processes may occur in parallel in different neural
and cognitive systems, which even may lead to conﬂicting apprais-
als. Nonetheless, they propose a single mediating mechanism that
constitutes the ﬁnal common path to resilience: a positive “apprais-
al style.”
Kalisch et al. deﬁne this concept as a stable trait that determines
how a person generally interprets threatening situations. This the-
oretical framework is reminiscent of cognitive models of vulnera-
bility to stress-related disorders (Beck 2008), which assume that
development and maintenance of psychopathology ultimately is
determined by maladaptive beliefs and cognitive biases, albeit in
interaction with biological factors. We think that this strong em-
phasis on cognitive factors falls short in appreciating the heteroge-
neity of the cognitive-neurobiological determinants of resilience
and may therefore potentially hamper progress. Below, we will il-
lustrate our point by examining the paradoxical role of corticoste-
roids in adaptation and resilience to stressors.
It is becoming increasingly clear that corticosteroids, which are re-
leased through activation of the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis and are commonly seen as the hallmark of the stress re-
sponse, play a dual role in regulating the central response to stressors.
Corticosteroids can act centrally in concert with faster-acting agents
such as catecholamines to produce a state of heightened arousal and
vigilance (Hermans et al. 2011; Joëls&Baram2009). Effects that last
beyond the timewindow of concurrent catecholaminergic activation,
however, can be different and even go in an opposite direction (de
Kloet et al. 2005; Hermans et al. 2014).
For example, administration of synthetic corticosteroids (hy-
drocortisone) in humans can reduce fear responses to phobic
stimuli (Soravia et al. 2006). Hydrocortisone administration fur-
thermore leads to reduced vigilance for threat-related stimuli,
even when these stimuli are presented below conscious perceptu-
al thresholds by means of backward visual masking (Putman et al.
2007). Similar administrations prior to induction of acute stress
have furthermore been shown to have a protective effect on
mood changes elicited by stress (Het & Wolf 2007). In line
with these experimental ﬁndings, another study demonstrated
that pretreatment with hydrocortisone increased the efﬁcacy of
exposure therapy for acrophobia (fear of heights; de Quervain
et al. 2011). Further clinical studies have provided initial evi-
dence for the effectiveness of hydrocortisone in preventing
stress-related mental disorders such as posttraumatic stress disor-
der (Schelling et al. 2001; Weis et al. 2006). A recent review even
concluded that hydrocortisone is so far the only effective drug for
this indication (Amos et al. 2014). For this reason, the ability to
contain and terminate the central stress response through corti-
costeroid signaling may form an important biological resilience
factor.
Such dynamic effects of corticosteroids and other stress-sensitive
neuromodulators on appraisal processes can be understood within a
neurobiological framework of fear and safety learning. Whereas ac-
quisition of conditioned fear requires the amygdala, extinction of
conditioned fear underlying safety learning depends on the prefron-
tal cortex (Milad & Quirk 2012). Rather than replacing a fear
memory, extinction training appears to produce a new memory
that competes for expression whenever a cue is encountered that
previously was associated with the threat (Bouton 2004). Increasing
evidence shows how the amygdala and prefrontal cortex are part of
distinct larger neural systems that are differentially affected by stress
(Arnsten 2009; Hermans et al. 2014). Induction of acute stress
(Cousijn et al. 2010; van Marle et al. 2009), as well as elevation of
central levels of norepinephrine using reboxetine (Onur et al.
2009), enhances amygdala responsiveness to biologically threat-
relevant stimuli such as negative facial expressions. Similar stress
induction procedures impair prefrontal cortex function (Qin et al.
2009). This shift in dominance between these two systems may
explain why acute stress blocks recall of extinction memory
(Deschaux et al. 2013; Raio et al. 2014) and impairs the ability to
apply previously learned strategies for cognitive reappraisal of con-
ditioned stimuli (Raio et al. 2013).
In line with the dual role of corticosteroids explained above, slow
effects of corticosteroids (i.e., beyond the time window of concur-
rent catecholaminergic activity) on these neural systems are the op-
posite of the rapid effects. Administration of hydrocortisone
decreases amygdala responsiveness to threat-relevant stimuli
(Henckens et al. 2010) and increases prefrontal cortex function
(Henckens et al. 2011). Hence, resilience to stressors can be un-
derstood as the ability to adaptively engage stress-related neuromo-
dulators to balance neural systems that produce conﬂicting
appraisals.
In conclusion, we strongly endorse the research agenda focus-
ing on resilience factors put forward by Kalisch and colleagues.
The assumption that a positive “appraisal style” is the ﬁnal
common path to resilience may prove too narrow, however. Our
example of research on corticosteroids is just one illustration of
how neurobiological investigations are beginning to reveal the in-
tricate complexity of the biology of stress resilience (Enman et al.
Commentary/Kalisch et al.: A conceptual framework for the neurobiological study of resilience
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 38 (2015) 31
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14001526
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:26:01, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
2015; McEwen et al. 2015). We are optimistic that this effort will
lead to the emergence of an integrated understanding of the cog-
nitive and neurobiological determinants of resilience.
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Abstract: In their target article, Kalisch et al. explicate an appraisal-based
model to explain how people bounce back from stress. We posit that for
their model, it is crucial to understand the begin-state w (the “self”) – a state
that is shapedbyearly social thermoregulationandthroughthesocialnetwork.
In their target article, Kalisch et al. provide an appraisal-based
model to explain resilience from stress. Three cognitive classes
shape their posited individual’s appraisal style: positive situation
classiﬁcation, reappraisal, and interference inhibition. They posit
that a positive appraisal style is “the primary pathway to resilience”
and that their model provides new avenues for prevention.
We concur with the authors that we need to rely on biosocial
models to understand the development of resilience. In our
view, however, the model misses an important component: the
functional relevance of the agent’s relational experiences.
We concur that stress, and, more broadly, emotions have adap-
tive functions. But for their model and for interventions, it is
crucial to know whether emotions should be reappraised or
whether they can actually contribute to resilience. We think that
for answering this question, we need to extend Kalisch et al.’s bio-
social model by adding the agent’s begin-state w – a resilience
factor they ponder about. Prevention interventions that are
focused solely on individual facets and ignore the agent’s relational
context (the two indeed being nonindependent) may well lead to
alienation in some instances – and, we think, to greater stress,
poorer resilience, and worse health instead.
Where does the “self” (w) come from?. The begin-state w may
just as well be deﬁned as “self.” Positive situation classiﬁcation, re-
appraisal, and interference inhibition typically are regarded under
a larger umbrella that researchers have dubbed self-regulation, a
crucial factor in resilience (Hofmann et al. 2012; Lindenberg
2013). But the nature of this self is “obscure” and “mysterious
even” (Swann & Buhrmester 2012, p. 424), and the reﬂection
on our own experiences is even often wrong (Nisbett & Wilson
1977). What is it then that makes a begin-state w that, in turn, in-
ﬂuences the functionality of emotions for resilience? Humans
cannot function without others, and evolution has likely “de-
signed” humans with a biological bias to “assume that [they are]
embedded within a relatively predictable social network charac-
terized by familiarity, joint attention, and interdependence”
(Beckes & Coan 2011, pp. 976–77).
From this standpoint, facing the world alone is more challeng-
ing than with others, and the development of self is virtually im-
possible without being with others. It is nearly impossible to
ﬁnd individuals who are simultaneously well adjusted, healthy,
and socially isolated. In other words, the self, which “regulates
various reactions and activities” and “experiences life and attempts
to make sense of it” (Swann & Buhrmester 2012, p. 423, 424)
should emerge from basic relational structures.
Extending the biosocial model: The emergence of begin-
state w. A more complex and coherent self is related to a more
predictable social world, and we agree that biosocial models are
vital to understand its development. Indeed, this aspect of a pre-
dictable world can be proﬁtably unpacked in light of ﬁndings on
rodents. One of the two evolutionary causes of group living in
rodents is social thermoregulation, the idea that others are in-
volved in regulating one’s body temperature (Ebensberger
2001) and therefore metabolic resources (Beckes & Coan 2011).
As others – also for humans – are crucial in regulating our energet-
ic resources in early life (Beckes & Coan 2011), social thermoreg-
ulation can help us regulate energetic resources, incidentally and
throughout development (Beckes et al. 2014; IJzerman et al.
2014a). And social thermoregulation may free energy to be dedi-
cated to other parts of the brain. To take but one example, mater-
nal thermoregulation in rats extends the stress hyporesponsive
period, protecting the developing infant brain and allowing it to
mature (Suchecki et al. 1993). Social thermoregulation is a poten-
tial candidate for aiding the emergence of w, through speciﬁc, ded-
icated social regulation structures.
Alienation – understanding the early social network. Some re-
search on humans supports what we theorize above. For example,
kangaroo care (keeping the infant skin-to-skin, allowing for compa-
rable maternal thermoregulation) has been found to lead to in-
creased executive functioning in the child (Feldman et al. 2014).
Further, certain types of self-control lead to alienation (i.e., a
state in which the individual neglects its own needs and desires;
Koole et al. 2014), which is supportedby theﬁnding that individuals
from countries that are less (vs. more) socially integrated are more
vulnerable to becoming alienatedwhen they areunder severe stress
such as post-traumatic stress disorder (Jobson &O’Kearney 2009).
We also found that an ability that leads to better reappraisal – inter-
oception (Carlson & Mujica-Parodi 2010; Füstös et al. 2013) –
closely relates to social thermoregulatory processes: People’s inter-
oceptive abilities correlated signiﬁcantly with the comfort they feel
being touched by close others (IJzerman et al. 2014b).
So what do we need so as to make Kalisch et al.’s model sufﬁ-
ciently precise for interventions? The work we cite suggests that
the begin-state w indeed emerges from its relational context and
that, in turn, w inﬂuences the role of emotions for resilience. A
ﬁrst – but certainly not only – take on operationalizing this
begin-state w in the model is to use attachment style as proxy
for predictability in early social thermoregulation. It is well
known that securely attached individuals typically cope more con-
structively (e.g., Mikulincer & Florian 1995; Mikulincer et al.
1993) but, crucially, also reveal greater self-complexity (Miku-
lincer 1995). Comparably, state predictability – like secure rela-
tionships – allows for spontaneous facial emotion regulation,
such as a spontaneous smile to a partner’s angry face (Häfner &
IJzerman 2011). We take from this that the secure agent’s emo-
tions directly inform how the agent should act in speciﬁc social sit-
uations, allowing it to maintain its social bonds. In addition, the
display of emotions of securely attached individuals may play an
important role in validating others’ goals, which, in turn, leads
to mutual reinforcement of secure attachment (Arriaga et al.
2014). We therefore propose that in such cases, not reappraising
one’s emotions leads to greater resilience.
The agent’s begin-state w, itself dependent on social thermo-
regulation, is in this way vital in determining whether the
agent’s emotional state is likely to inform or distract the agent.
We think therefore that, paradoxically, intervening in the secure
agent’s emotional life leads to its alienation, potentially causing
worse resilience, greater stress, and poorer health instead.
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Abstract: PASTOR represents an innovative development in the study of
resilience. This commentary highlights how PASTOR can help both clarify
critical questions in and beneﬁt from engaging with new research in
personality science on behavioral ﬂexibility across situations in addition
to stability over time, and also clarify the relationship between resilience
and posttraumatic growth.
The positive appraisal style theory of resilience (PASTOR) out-
lined by Kalisch et al. represents an innovative development in
the study of resilience, capturing another step in the paradigm
shift from investigating disease to health (Jayawickreme et al.
2012). The goal of this commentary is to highlight how
PASTOR can both help clarify critical questions in and beneﬁt
from engaging with new research in personality science in devel-
oping a coherent theory of resilience.
Recentadvances inpersonalitypsychologyhaveprovidednewper-
spectives on behavioral ﬂexibility – and consistency – across situa-
tions (Fleeson & Jayawickreme 2015). Such ﬂexibility can serve as
a tool for promoting resilience as deﬁned by PASTOR. Despite the
widespread belief that personality is stable, a large literature has re-
vealed that on average, most people display moderate, mostly posi-
tive, amounts of trait change across the lifespan (Roberts et al.
2006). Hence, individuals may be able to inﬂuence the degree to
which their personality varies and changes (Edmonds et al. 2008).
Inaddition, studiesusingexperiencesamplingmethodshavedemon-
strated a surprisinglyhigh level of variability in trait-relevant behavior
in everyday life, with most individuals acting in ways that span the
entire continuum of each trait dimension (Fleeson 2001). Further-
more, individuals have the ability to convincingly change their trait-
relevant behavior (or personality “state”) in the moment, when
instructed to do so (Fleeson et al. 2002; McNiel & Fleeson 2006).
Of note, people can change their levels of happiness by “enacting”
personality states associated with happiness, such as extraversion
(Fleeson et al. 2002; McNiel et al. 2010; Zelenski et al. 2012). It
should be noted, as well, that personality states have the same
content as a trait but for shorter duration, and that states and traits
are isomorphic in some regards. Part of having a trait is simply
acting that way somewhat more often, and acting a certain way is
similar to being that way (Jayawickreme et al. 2014).
Hence, personality traits are stable in the sense that there is reli-
able between-person variation in aggregate over time, and ﬂexible
in the sense that there is also substantial within-person variation in
an individual’s trait-relevant behavior (or personality states) depend-
ing on situational and internal cues (Fleeson 2001; 2004). We need
more research on which speciﬁc personality traits (or “resilience-
conducive” traits, as Kalisch et al. term them) might promote a ﬂex-
ible and positive reappraisal style as posited by PASTOR.Moreover,
it’s anexciting idea fornewresearch:harnessingbehavioral variability
(Blackie et al. 2014; Fleeson & Jayawickreme 2015) to develop ﬂex-
ible,PASTOR-based interventions, resulting in lastingchanges in the
cognitive machinery that boosts resilience (see also Blackie et al.
2015).
Relatedly, PASTOR has implications for helping researchers un-
derstand empirical overlap between resilience and closely related
constructs. To illustrate this point, we propose that PASTOR may
help clarify the relationship between resilience and posttraumatic
growth – positive psychological change experienced as a result of
the strugglewithhighlychallenging lifecircumstances (Jayawickreme
& Blackie 2014). Whereas resilience generally is deﬁned as the
absence of negative outcomes during or following potentially
harmful circumstances (e.g., Seery et al. 2010), posttraumatic
growth corresponds to increases in positive outcomes after adversity.
(We note that Kalisch et al.’s deﬁnition of resilience conﬂates these
two distinctions, as they deﬁne resilience as “any trajectory that
eventually leads to levels of functioning that are comparable to or
even better than at the outset”; sect. 2, para. 3; emphasis added.)
Posttraumatic growth is purported to occur in ﬁve distinct life
domains – individuals report experiencing a greater appreciation of
life, more-intimate social relationships, heightened feelings of per-
sonal strength, greater engagement with spiritual questions, and the
recognition of new possibilities for their lives (Tedeschi & Calhoun
2004). Posttraumatic growth is generally viewed as both a set of pro-
cesses (e.g., coming to terms with adversity; identifying and experi-
encing cognitive, behavioral, and affective changes) and a set of
outcomes (e.g., great satisfaction with life, wisdom).
In spite of the theoretical differences between resilience andpost-
traumatic growth, empirical evidence has shown that people high in
traits such as cognitive complexity, self-efﬁcacy, and dispositional
hope are more likely to report growth (Tedeschi & Calhoun 1995;
Tennen & Afﬂeck 1998). In other words, people who report
growth may in fact be those who were more resilient to begin
with. As a result, much debate remains concerning the exact
nature of posttraumatic growth – an issue that the PASTOR frame-
work may help clarify. To date, most of the scholarship in this area
has focused on documenting self-reported retrospective changes
(i.e., perceptions of past changes). Ongoing and future research in
this area is seeking to determine whether or not retrospective self-
perceptions of change also correspond to changes in behavior and
cognition measured longitudinally (Jayawickreme & Blackie 2014;
Roepke et al. 2014; Schueller et al. 2015). This research can tease
out the degree to which resilience precedes growth, and the extent
to which both resilience and growth are brought about by or associ-
ated with the ﬂexible and positive reappraisal style as proposed by
PASTOR.Hence, PASTORhas critical implications formeaningful-
ly distinguishing between the two constructs and pushing further the
study of psychological functioning under conditions of adversity.
In addition, and related to this, PASTOR can help researchers
design thoughtful experiments and/or interventions aimed at
promoting growth following adversity. More speciﬁcally, future
research may examine the usefulness of fostering selected person-
ality states (as described above). For example, a review of past re-
search suggested that openness to experience, extraversion, and
agreeableness (candidate “resilience-conducive” traits) predict
adaptive outcomes following adversity (Linley & Joseph 2004).
Future research could assess whether experimental interventions
promoting open, extraverted, and/or agreeable behaviors may lead
to positive and ﬂexible cognitive styles described by PASTOR, and
in turn, to resilience or growth.
Resilience: Mediated by not one but many
appraisal mechanisms
doi:10.1017/S0140525X14001563, e106
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Abstract: Kalisch et al. discuss the causal process underlying stress in
terms of a multidimensional goal-appraisal process, but there are several
mechanisms at various levels of the brain that use different types of
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information to guide behavior. Depending on the mechanism, the
characteristics of the process are different. Hence, both research and
prevention must deal with appraisal in mechanism-speciﬁc ways.
Kalisch et al. offer a novel framework for resilience research,
wherein appraisal is regarded as the “global” resilience mechanism
par excellence, serving as the “proximal cause” for mental health. I
applaud their transdiagnostic approach and the focus on resilience
mechanisms over resilience factors.
By their own admission, however, the authors make some
radical claims, and sometimes they go too far. The notion that a
“positive appraisal style” mediates all other resilience factors is a
bold one, but it cannot be true. For example, genetic factors
may inﬂuence the stamina of an individual, which in turn may
affect cortisol levels in the body. This is not mediated by appraisal.
Similarly, Kalisch et al. claim that there is no other route between
an event and an emotion than appraisal, but it is possible to arouse
emotions through pharmacological agents (Izard 1993). This does
not detract, though, from the fact that most emotions are pro-
duced by some kind of stimulus evaluation.
Here the authors make another radical claim, which is the
primary focus of this commentary: “that there is a single mediating
mechanism” (Figure 2B). I will argue that resilience researchers
need to consider a range of mechanisms for stress and emotion
in a more process-speciﬁc manner, because each of the mecha-
nisms inﬂuences emotions and stress in a different manner.
Kalisch et al. seem aware that the evaluation of potential stressors
can involve many different cognitive processes (sect. 4.3.5). Yet
they do not appear to realize the consequences. The noted confu-
sion about whether neural measures show appraisal content or
process reﬂects the fact that studies have neglected speciﬁc mech-
anisms. Hence, LeDoux (1995) suggested that we should
“abandon discussion of cognitive-emotional interactions in terms
of vague monolithic cognitive processes, and instead consider
exactly which cognitive processes are involved” (p. 224).
A recent framework along these lines aimed at explaining
musical emotions, but with much wider applicability, might
serve to illustrate this approach. The framework posits nine mech-
anisms, which range from simple reﬂexes to complex judgments
and which are implemented by several, partially overlapping
brain networks that developed in an evolutionary progression:
BRECVEMAC – brain stem reﬂex, rhythmic entrainment, evalu-
ative conditioning, contagion, visual imagery, episodic memory,
musical expectancy, aesthetic judgment, and cognitive appraisal
(Juslin 2013; see also Juslin & Västfjäll 2008).
One implication of this framework is that because several of the
mechanisms are “implicit” in nature and may occur in parallel, re-
searchers cannot rely only on phenomenological report to explain
how events cause emotions. Moreover, conﬂicting outputs from
mechanisms that use different “data” to evoke emotions may
explain the occurrence of “mixed emotions”.
Much of the discussion in the target article revolves around
various appraisal dimensions, yet many of the mechanisms do not
operate in terms of dimensions. Whether appraisal dimension is
the right unit of analysis depends on the mental representation in-
volved in each mechanism (see Table 2 in Juslin 2013). If appraisal
dimensions are applied to emotion episodes aroused bymechanisms
other than “cognitive appraisal,” the dimensions lack grounding in
reality, and they take on a purely “metaphorical” status. This can
explain the occasionally poor correspondencebetween speciﬁc emo-
tions and predicted appraisal patterns (Frijda & Zeelenberg 2001).
A multimechanism framework has important consequences for
the question of how appraisal style can be operationalized and
measured. Empirically determining which emotion-induction
mechanism is responsible for a stress response, and which infor-
mation produced the outcome, is difﬁcult. Current evidence of
cognitive appraisal comes mostly from post hoc verbal reports re-
garding appraisal dimensions, but these do not warrant causal con-
clusions, because subjects may infer the “appropriate” appraisal
pattern from the affective state (e.g., fear, stress) they are experi-
encing. Because verbal report may not be able to distinguish
between various mechanisms, we simply do not know the
precise proportion of instances in everyday life when emotions
are caused by, say, conditioning, as opposed to a cognitive apprais-
al. To draw causal conclusions, we have to manipulate mecha-
nisms under controlled conditions.
A multimechanism framework also has some implications for
the development of new and better prevention strategies: It
does not make sense to subsume different negative appraisal pat-
terns under an umbrella term of “negative appraisal bias.” The
same person could have a different “appraisal style” for each
emotion-mechanism. To measure all of these would be a chal-
lenge indeed! It also means that a speciﬁc intervention (e.g.,
active reappraisal) will be ineffective if it targets the wrong psy-
chological mechanism.
In addition, how does one decide that an appraisal style is
“overly negative”? Is the resilience outcome (e.g., subjective
well-being) the criterion? If so, the test is circular. Or is the
style to be evaluated in relation to “objective” circumstances of
the individual? If so, “realism” is key, rather than mere “aversion
reduction.” Positive appraisals of potentially aversive events could
indeed arouse less stress now, but might lead to negative conse-
quences and hence more stress later. One could argue that,
more important than the original appraisal of an aversive event,
is how, if at all, the ensuing emotion leads to adaptive behavior
to resolve the problem. In some situations, resilience as an
outcome might be more effectively achieved by changing external
life factors of the individual than by trying to change the appraisal
styles at multiple levels of cognitive functioning. It remains to be
seen which of these – appraisal style or external factors –will
explain most variance in resilience outcomes.
My claim – that appraisal cannot be meaningfully addressed at a
global level, disregarding the speciﬁc mechanisms involved – does
not undermine the overall validity of the novel approach, but
shows that researchers must make choice: Either they deal with
the mechanisms and their characteristics at a “global” appraisal
level, in terms of “appraisal dimensions” that might have little
reality and lack the required precision to develop effective inter-
ventions; or they address appraisal at the level of speciﬁc mecha-
nisms – even though this adds considerable complexity to the
whole endeavor. The latter alternative is clearly more in line
with the kind of ambitious approach advocated by Kalisch et al.
Careful operationalization and assessment are
critical for advancing the study of the
neurobiology of resilience1
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Abstract: The authors’ deﬁnition of resilience is too narrow and essentially
deﬁnes resilience as the absence of psychopathology. Consequently, it is
not clear how quantitatively deﬁned resilience differs from quantitatively
deﬁned psychopathology according to the authors’ deﬁnition. We
believe the conceptual model would be improved by a broader
deﬁnition of resilience. There is also a signiﬁcant need for improved
measures of stressor load.
We greatly enjoyed reading Kalisch and colleagues’ proposed con-
ceptual framework for studying the neurobiology of resilience. As
quantitatively oriented researchers, we strongly concur with their
argument that quantitative measures are likely a better reﬂection
of the underlying neurobiology of resilience and psychopathology
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compared with traditional psychiatric diagnostic categories. We
also appreciated their emphasis on studying dysfunctions over dis-
orders; however, there were also several aspects of the model that
we believe would beneﬁt from further reﬁnement. In particular,
we had concerns about the authors’ deﬁnition of resilience as
“an empirically observable phenomenon, namely that someone
does not develop lasting mental health problems although he or
she is subject to adversity” (sect. 2, para. 2).
Although this deﬁnition is laudable because of its simplicity, it is
also an extremely narrow view of resilience. In contrast, Windle
deﬁnes resilience as:
The process of effectively negotiating, adapting to, or managing signiﬁ-
cant sources of stress or trauma. Assets and resources within the individ-
ual, their life and environment facilitate this capacity for adaptation and
“bouncing back” in the face of adversity. Across the life course, the ex-
perience of resilience will vary. (Windle 2011)
Whereas Windle (2011) explicitly excludes mental health from her
deﬁnition of resilience, the authors’ deﬁnition is entirely depen-
dent on the absence of mental health.
We believe that this overreliance on mental health to deﬁne re-
silience is problematic. First, it is unclear to us how studying a
construct deﬁned entirely by another construct can yield new ﬁnd-
ings. For example, the authors propose that a general self-report
measure of psychopathology would be an ideal measure of resil-
ience within their framework. If a measure of psychopathology
is used to deﬁne resilience, however, are we not still just studying
psychopathology? Any association between a given predictor and
“resilience” deﬁned in this manner will have an association of
identical magnitude in the opposite direction with “psychopathol-
ogy” using the very same measure. Hence, it is not clear how
quantitatively deﬁned resilience differs from quantitatively deﬁned
psychopathology in the proposed model.
Another notable difference between the two deﬁnitions is that
Windle’s (2011) is focused on adaptation to stress and also considers
assets and resources that might be available to the individual. In
contrast, Kalisch et al.’s deﬁnition does not seem to consider the
very signiﬁcant role that assets and resources play in resilience,
and it fails to recognize the well-replicated ﬁnding that people
with more resources are better able to adapt to stressful conditions
(e.g., Hobfoll 2002). The latter point is critical for researchers inter-
ested in studying theneurobiology of resilience, as it is very likely that
resources (e.g., social support, level of education,ﬁnances) andmany
other environmental factors moderate the inﬂuence of neurobiolog-
ical factors (e.g., genetic and epigenetic factors) on resilience to
stressful life events (e.g., Koenen et al. 2008; Mofﬁtt et al. 2005).
We also were surprised by the authors’ argument that “resilience-
conducive traits” (i.e., traditional measures of resilience and hardi-
ness, such as the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC);
Connor & Davidson 2003) should not be used as measures of
resilience within their model. We disagree with the authors
on this point. We think that the inclusion of traditional measures
of resilience is an ideal way of broadening the deﬁnition of resil-
ience beyond the rather simplistic “absence of psychopathology”
approach that the authors seem to advocate. An additional
advantage of including these types of measures in studies of resil-
ience is that it enables researchers to consider whether the
manner in which self-reported resilience is deﬁned (e.g.,
“absence of psychopathology” vs. “ability to bounce back”) inﬂu-
ences their ﬁndings.
A third advantage of broadening the resilience construct to
include traditional measures of resilience is that it would enable
researchers to construct latent factors that include both “trait”
and “state” resilience characteristics. To illustrate this point, we
conducted a conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the CD-
RISC, the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson et al. 1997), and
the Symptom Checklist-90 Global Severity Index (Derogatis
et al. 1973) in a sample of 2,339 U.S. veterans. The CFA model
exhibited exceptionally good ﬁt to the data, χ2(3) = 3875.020,
RMSEA = 0.00, CFI = 1.00, and factor loadings were high
across measures ≥0.65, providing strong support for this type of
latent variable modeling approach to quantitatively deﬁne resil-
ience. We believe that this approach could be further extended
to include self-report measures of functional impairment (e.g.,
Üstün 2010) and quality of life (e.g., Burckhardt & Anderson
2003), as well as measures derived from behavioral, physiological,
and neuroimaging paradigms.
A ﬁnal issue concerns the measurement of stressful life events.
The authors provide a nice summary of the many difﬁculties asso-
ciated with the assessment of both traumatic stress and daily
hassles. We agree with many of their points, as we have spent a
great amount of time trying to quantify the impact of one partic-
ular type of stressful experience (i.e., combat exposure) on return-
ing veterans’ mental health (e.g., Kimbrel et al. 2014). Although
we recognize the difﬁculties in quantifying trauma exposure that
researchers face, we also believe that there is currently a great
need to quantify stress exposure across a wide range of different
populations if we truly wish to improve our understanding of
genetic and epigenetic inﬂuences on resilience. For example,
efforts are currently under way to begin conducting meta- and
mega-analyses of genome-wide association study (GWAS) data
through the posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) working
group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium (Koenen et al.
2013); however, a key challenge currently facing researchers inter-
ested in combining GWAS datasets of PTSD is how to character-
ize trauma load, trauma type, and the timing of the trauma across
different trauma populations (Koenen et al. 2013). Both traumatic
stress and stressful life events are robust predictors of a wide
range of psychopathology. Given that, it is clear that the develop-
ment of universal measures of stressful events that can accurately
quantify traumatic load for a wide range of stressful experiences
across different populations is a crucial next step in advancing
our understanding of the neurobiology of resilience.
NOTE
1. Parts of this commentary were written as an employee of the U.S.
Government and such parts are not subject to copyright protection in
the United States.
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Appreciating methodological complexity and
integrating neurobiological perspectives to
advance the science of resilience
doi:10.1017/S0140525X14001587, e108
Birgit Kleima and Isaac R. Galatzer-Levyb
aDepartment of Psychiatry, University of Zurich; 8006 Zurich, Switzerland;
bSchool of Medicine, New York University, New York, NY 10016.
b.kleim@psychologie.uzh.ch
Isaac.Galatzer-Levy@nyumc.org
Abstract: Kalisch and colleagues identify several routes to a better
understanding of mechanisms underlying resilience and highlight the
need to integrate ﬁndings from neuroscience and animal learning. We
argue that appreciating methodological complexity and integrating
neurobiological perspectives will advance the science of resilience and
ultimately help improve the lives of those exposed to stress and adversity.
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Researchers have made big strides in investigating and under-
standing resilient responding in the face of stress and adversity.
Resilience is best understood as a process that unfolds over time
in response to a stressor or potentially traumatic event
(Bonanno 2005; Bonanno & Diminich 2013). There is now accu-
mulating evidence that resilience, deﬁned as a trajectory of limited
or no decreases in functioning over time, is a common response to
such events. This approach entails an empirical characterisation of
heterogeneous stress responses (Galatzer-Levy 2014). Numerous
studies have since adopted this approach through the use of mod-
eling methods such as latent growth mixture modeling (LGMM),
and they consistently have conﬁrmed that resilient individuals
compose the largest group following various types of stressors
and traumas (e.g., Berntsen et al. 2012; Bonanno et al. 2006;
2012; Galatzer-Levy & Bonanno 2012; 2014). These ﬁndings
have led to a conceptual shift that Kalisch et al. take up in their
present article, away from a focus on risk factors and psychopa-
thology and towards a focus on protective factors and resilience.
The critical questions to be tackled, however, remain: Who
adopts such a resilient response trajectory? What are the precise
mechanisms leading to a resilient response? As empirical studies
have indicated, multiple pathways to resilience exist, and these
may sometimes be unexpected and achieved by means that
might not be adaptive under other circumstances (Bonanno
2005). Kalisch et al. identify several routes to a better understand-
ing of such mechanisms and highlight the need to integrate ﬁnd-
ings from the neurosciences and animal learning.
Key neurobiological processes, often in interaction with envi-
ronmental factors such as adverse experiences during childhood
or trauma load, have been shown to affect psychological adjust-
ment in the aftermath of exposure to trauma. A major challenge
will be to integrate and translate such ﬁndings to clinical interven-
tions and prevention efforts. We may, on the basis of neuroscience
ﬁndings, be able to characterise individuals in the early aftermath
of exposure to stress and adversity and to discriminate those who
are likely to be resilient from those likely to succumb to stress
(Galatzer-Levy et al. 2014a). Neurofeedback methods have
been developed that may directly target patterns of brain func-
tions that support resilience (Stoeckel et al. 2014). Further
strides will be necessary to pave the way for such efforts and to
put research ﬁndings into practice by developing effective inter-
ventions that boost resilience.
Finally, human studies need conversely to inform preclinical
animal learning studies. For example, it is increasingly understood
that pathways to resilience and susceptibility to stress-related dis-
orders are, at least in part, distinct in males versus females.
Despite these ﬁndings and that stress-related disorders are signiﬁ-
cantly increased in women compared with men, the vast majority
of animal models, however, have been conducted in male animals
(Lebron-Milad & Milad 2012; Shanksy 2015), which hampers
transferability to both sexes in humans.
The task of identifying complex resilience mechanisms clearly
beneﬁts from a collaborative effort of researchers from different
domains; that is, neuroscience, behavioral and cognitive science,
and others. As pointed out by Kalisch et al., a common language
and a shared conceptual framework will be critical to advancing
the ﬁeld. Resilience has been conceptualized many ways, but a
straightforward and face-valid approach has been to identify a
population that demonstrates positive adjustment in the face of
adversity by disaggregating those individuals who demonstrate
only transient stress or symptom responses following trauma,
using methods such as LGMM (Bonanno & Diminich 2013).
This same approach can be used to identify distinct trajectories
of response in animal models of threat learning, extinction, and
motivated behavior, thus increasing the translatability of such
models to understand patterns of stress response including resil-
ience, as animal models are key to the identiﬁcation of neurobio-
logical mechanisms (Galatzer-Levy et al. 2013; 2014b). From
molecules to circuits, to behavior and neuroendocrine response,
to conscious and non-conscious cognitions and emotions, the
responses to environmental threats and their aftermath unfold
and interact in complex and dynamic ways over time, leading to sus-
tained responses, or global organismic states (LeDoux 2014). To
add to the complexity, trauma exposure is not amenable to tight ex-
perimental control, therefore necessitating, at least in part, the use
of naturalistic cohorts such as soldiers, natural disaster survivors,
and individuals identiﬁed in emergency medical settings.
Given such complexity, the ability to identify causal mecha-
nisms and develop predictive models for early identiﬁcation may
be hindered by traditional data analytic approaches and can
beneﬁt from recent advances in machine learning. These
methods can integrate large sets of heterogeneous sources of in-
formation to predict, classify, and identify unique causal mecha-
nisms leading to distinct trajectories of response (Aliferis et al.
2010; Galatzer-Levy et al. 2014a). These approaches have poten-
tial to address the nagging limitations of traditional statistical ap-
proaches such as large variable-to-sample ratios, heterogeneous
underlying distributions, the need for individual-level predictive
accuracy, redundancy in data sources, and the need to discover re-
lationships in the data that are not hypothesized a priori.
Such methodological innovations in the study of posttraumatic
stress and resilience inevitablywill shift theﬁeld fromasking relative-
ly limited questions regarding the direct effects of individual factors
on resilient responding, to more-complex questions, such as when,
how, why, and who is resilient. Ultimately, such an approach will
improve the lives of those exposed to stress and adversity.
Resilience is more about being ﬂexible than
about staying positive
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Abstract: Kalisch et al. propose a positive appraisal style as the key
mechanism that underlies resilience. The present authors suggest that
ﬂexibility in emotion processing is more conducive to resilience than a
general positivity bias. People may achieve emotional ﬂexibility through
counter-regulation – a dynamic processing bias toward positive stimuli in
negative contexts and negative stimuli in positive contexts.
People display a remarkable capacity for bouncing back from neg-
ative life events. To be sure, tragedy, threats, and other adverse
conditions may give rise to considerable emotional upheaval. In
most cases, however, the emotional impact of such events
endures only for a limited period of time, after which well-being
returns to baseline (Brickman et al. 1978; Luhmann et al. 2012;
Lyubomirsky 2011). Such positive adaptation in the face of signiﬁ-
cant adversity is widely referred to as resilience (Luthar et al. 2000;
Masten et al. 1990).
From the 1970s onward, resilience has become the focus of a
growing number of scientiﬁc investigations (for an overview, see
the recent volume by Kent et al. 2014). Originally, researchers
sought to locate resilience factors, variables that statistically
predict resilient outcomes. Among the most widely studied resil-
ience factors have been personality traits such as hardiness (e.g.,
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Maddi 2013) and social support (e.g., King et al. 1998). In more
recent years, however, attention has shifted toward underlying
mechanisms; that is, the question of just how resilience factors
allow people to achieve resilient outcomes. For example, some re-
searchers have tried to link resilience to neuroendocrine function-
ing (Russo et al. 2012), whereas other researchers have related
resilience to dynamic shifts in affective processing (Schwager &
Rothermund 2014b).
Building on and extending the trend toward more-mechanistic
theories, Kalisch et al. propose a new conceptual framework that
bridges basic and applied research on resilience. One of their most
important innovations is their systematic elaboration of general re-
silience mechanisms and dysfunctions in these mechanisms that
are not restricted to speciﬁc forms of disorders. Such a transdiag-
nostic approach makes eminent theoretical sense, given the high
overlap that exists at functional, behavioral, and neurobiological
levels between disorders that are treated as categorically different
by current diagnostic systems. A transdiagnostic approach there-
fore holds the key to a uniﬁed understanding of resilience re-
search and its clinical applications.
Chief among the global resilience mechanisms that Kalisch
et al. distinguish is a positive (or non-negative) appraisal style,
which the authors regard as “the key mechanism that protects
against the detrimental effects of stress and mediates the effects
of other known resilience factors” (Abstract). From this perspec-
tive, resilience is ﬁrst and foremost a matter of staying positive in
the face of adversity. Being biased toward positive outcomes is not
always beneﬁcial, however. First, positivity biases may lead people
to close their eyes to real dangers, leading to inaccurate beliefs
that may have severely negative consequences (e.g., Colvin et al.
1995). Second, positivity biases may set up people for unnecessary
disappointments, in cases when negative feedback is inevitable
(Norem 2001). Third and last, positivity biases may promote
intense positive emotional states that are inherently volatile
(Diener et al. 1991) and pose a physiological burden (Pressman
& Cohen 2005).
In view of these considerations, we suggest that psychological
adaptation is best served by maintaining a steady emotional
balance. If this view is valid, then people’s ability to stay positive
in the face of adversity may not be driven by a general positivity
bias. Instead, it may be part of a broader tendency to respond
to negative and positive emotional events with an opposite ten-
dency in affective processing. We refer to this dynamic mecha-
nism as the counter-regulation principle (Rothermund 2003;
2011; Rothermund et al. 2008). Counter-regulation leads affective
processing to become automatically biased toward information
that is contrary in valence to the current context or affective-
motivational state of the person. In negative contexts, counter-
regulation activates positive states; in positive contexts, however,
counter-regulation activates negative states. We regard counter-
regulation as a vital psychological mechanism that allows people
to maintain a balanced receptiveness to positive and negative in-
formation. As such, counter-regulation should foster resilience
(Schwager & Rothermund 2014b).
On the basis of the counter-regulation principle, we would
expect people’s attention to become directed toward information
that is opposite in valence to anticipated or experienced positive
and negative outcomes. This prediction is supported indirectly
by many studies showing that positive and negative events tend
to have only short-term consequences for people’s emotional
states (e.g., Brickman et al. 1978; Gilbert et al. 2004; Taylor
1991). Importantly, controlled experimental studies have con-
ﬁrmed the existence of attentional biases in the opposite direction
to people’s current emotional-motivational states (Derryberry
1993; Rothermund et al. 2008; Tugade & Frederickson 2004).
Counter-regulation not only activates positive appraisals in neg-
ative contexts, but counter-regulation also activates negative ap-
praisals in positive contexts (Rothermund 2003; Rothermund
et al. 2008; 2011; Schwager & Rothermund 2013a; 2013b;
2014a). Moreover, consistent with the resilience-promoting
function of counter-regulation, various studies have shown that
counter-regulation tendencies are most pronounced among
people with resilient personality traits (e.g., Koole & Fockenberg
2011; Koole & Jostmann 2004; see also Koole et al. 2012). Con-
versely, emotional inertia represents a risk factor for the emer-
gence of psychopathological symptoms (Kuppens et al. 2010;
2012). Adaptive responding to life events therefore presumes
that people are able to recruit not just positive emotions, but a
wide range of positive and negative emotional responses. This
emotional variability implies that people are able to change and
counteract emotional states before these states become chronic.
Taken together, we suggest that resilient coping is not merely a
matter of maintaining a positive outlook on life. Rather, resilient
coping involves a more context-sensitive approach, which increas-
es the salience of either positive or negative information depend-
ing on currently activated motivational or emotional states.
Resilience is traditionally deﬁned as an adaptive response
toward adverse events. The counter-regulation mechanism that
underlies resilience, however, is not restricted to negative
events. Instead, counter-regulation represents a more general
way of responding to emotionally extreme events, regardless of
whether such events are positive or negative. Counter-regulation
thus helps to prevent rigidity or extremity in emotional function-
ing. In short, resilience is more about being ﬂexible than about
staying positive.
Knowledge and resilience
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Abstract: Kalisch et al. regard a positive appraisal style as the mechanism
for promoting resilience. I argue that knowledge can enhance resilience
without affecting appraisal style. Furthermore, the relationship between
positive appraisals and resilience ought to be mediated by knowledge
and is not monotonic. Finally, I raise some questions about how
appraisals ﬁt into the dual-process model of the mind.
According to Kalisch et al. there is a single general resilience
mechanism that protects against the adverse effects of stress.
The key mechanism consists of a positive appraisal style, and it
mediates all other known resilience factors. I ﬁnd their framework
very fruitful in thinking about the relationship between appraisals
and resilience. In this commentary, I focus on the special role that
knowledge plays in promoting resilience and see whether it helps
us understand and evaluate their proposal.
Knowledge obviously can affect appraisal style, as a person
might feel more positive about an aversive situation if she
knows how to overcome it. Presumably a difference in knowledge
by itself, however, does not necessitate a difference in appraisal
style. So let us imagine two similar subjects with exactly the
same appraisal style. Given identical stimuli, they would have ap-
praisals of the same strength, and emotional responses of the same
valence. (They also can have the same dispositions when it comes
to reappraisals and interference inhibition.) But suppose one of
them knows more about how to achieve her goals, and has
better metacognitive knowledge about her own weaknesses and
motivators. Using her knowledge, she is more skillful in avoiding
temptations, overcoming obstacles, and maneuvering herself
into situations that trigger positive appraisals. Consequently, she
encounters fewer stressors and is more resilient than her counter-
part in the long run. But their appraisal tendencies are supposed
to be identical. If this is right, knowledge as a promoter of success
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is a powerful individual factor that can enhance resilience without
altering appraisal style.
In fact, we might go further and suggest that the protective
function of a positive appraisal style is not without qualiﬁcation,
and needs to be moderated by knowledge. Although elevated pos-
itive emotions might serve important protective and motivational
functions, it is also possible that unrealistic expectations can in-
crease the likelihood of failures and frustrations, and make them
more difﬁcult to cope with. Positive valence has been linked to
more-optimistic perception of risk (Johnson & Tversky 1983),
which can lead to failure to take precautions or engagement in
risky behavior. For example, an athlete who is wildly conﬁdent
of his ability and downplays pain and other danger signs is suscep-
tible to burnout and serious injury. This can exacerbate stress and
depression later on. More generally, human beings are prone to
cognitive biases, such as overestimating their own competence
(Kruger & Dunning 1999) and being too optimistic about the
future (Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd 2001). It is worth noting
that individuals afﬂicted by mania have abnormally intense posi-
tive emotions, but the condition is associated with dysfunctional
behavior and heightened irritability (Gruber et al. 2011). In
short, positive appraisals and resilience need not have a straight-
forward monotonic relationship.
The underlying point is the familiar Aristotelian idea that
actions and feelings should display moderation and appropriate-
ness. Interestingly, Aristotle argued that not all pleasures are
worth having, because they interfere with one another. Choosing
the right pleasures is based not on the pleasures themselves, but
with reference to the goodness and badness of the activities
they are associated with. Similarly, positive appraisals are not all
equally worth having for the sake of resilience. Resilience is
better promoted not by inﬂating positive appraisals, but by
using knowledge to calibrate appraisal valence that is appropriate
to the situation, making it more effective to achieve a goal or
remove a stressor. Given the interaction between knowledge
and appraisals, I am not sure why the latter should be regarded
as the more central resilience mechanism.
The connection between knowledge and appraisals also raises
questions about how to understand potential conﬂicts between
them. Consider someone fearful of a dead spider next to him, al-
though knowing too well there is nothing to be afraid of. Accord-
ing to the popular dual-process model of the mind, this is a case
where our fast, automatic, and intuitive system 1 is in conﬂict
with the more analytic and deliberate system 2 (Kahneman
2011). If this picture is right, where are appraisals supposed to
be located? At one point, Kalisch et al. offer a functional deﬁnition
of appraisal as a state that causes an emotional response given a
stimulus. This suggests that appraisals are more closely related
to system 1. (This is not to say that system 2 reasoning cannot
lead to emotions.) Perception of the dead spider triggers a
highly negative appraisal of danger, which causes the emotion of
fear. But presumably it is sometimes possible for system 2 to over-
ride such appraisals, as when the subject forces himself to remain
next to the spider. This suggests there is a different kind of eval-
uation of the situation at work, perhaps corresponding to the con-
sciously available judgment that it is perfectly safe. It is not clear
whether Kalisch et al. will regard this evaluation as an appraisal, as
it does not seem to generate any emotion stronger than the fear.
(So I am not sure whether their discussion of competing appraisals
in interference inhibition applies here). Apart from the present
example of a positive evaluation overriding a negative appraisal,
it also is possible to have negative evaluations overriding positive
appraisals, as when we successfully resist temptations. But if
these evaluations can alter behavior and change exposure to
stressors, they constitute a different causal pathway that can
affect resilience independently of the appraisal mechanism.
Of course, we can expand the term appraisal to include such
evaluations. But this might mean severing the essential link
between appraisals and emotions. Also, given the very different
nature of these two types of appraisals, it might be more accurate
to speak of a dual-mechanism model of resilience. Obviously, the
dual-process model of the mind still is evolving and not without its
critics. But given that Kalisch et al. are interested in pursuing
psycho-biological mechanisms, I think it is not premature to see
whether the model helps us clarify the concept and functional
role of an appraisal.
Adding network approaches to a
neurobiological framework of resilience
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Abstract: In their paper, Kalisch et al. make an important attempt to
create a unifying theoretical framework for the neuroscientiﬁc study of
general resilience mechanisms. We suggest that such attempts can
beneﬁt tremendously by incorporating the recently emerging network
approaches that enable the characterization of complex brain network
architecture and dynamics, in both health and disease.
In this commentary, we will demonstrate the usefulness of
network approaches to the development of a neurobiological
framework for resilience research, by relating to two points dis-
cussed in Kalisch et al.’s paper. First, we show that the paradigm
shift to a transdiagnostic approach, emphasized by them, is
prompted in light of recent brain network studies. Second, we
propose that the network perspective may serve as a unifying
framework to various resilience mechanisms, including the ap-
praisal mechanism suggested by Kalisch et al.
Recent years have seen a surge of neuroscientiﬁc studies apply-
ing network approaches to imaging and electrophysiological data,
offering a novel perspective to study brains, both in health and in
psychopathology. These studies emphasize the use of graph theo-
retical tools to investigate brain networks. These tools characterize
not only the network’s architecture and possible physical dynamics
but also its emergent properties, including how it copes with
stressors (Sporns 2011).
Converging evidence indicates that healthy brains self-organize
toward so-called small-world networks. A small-world architecture
enables an optimal balance between local (segregation) and global
(integration) structural characteristics, which is essential for global
and fast information transmission (Fekete et al. 2014).
Relevant to the ﬁeld of resilience research is the fact that the
architecture of a network affects not only its function, but also
its robustness to perturbations (Kaiser et al. 2007). With regard
to the brain, network analysis of both structural and functional
data suggests that brains are highly robust systems (Kaiser et al.
2007). When abnormalities in network metrics occur, however,
leading to deviation from healthy architecture, general network
failure can result (Sporns 2011). Such network failure can affect
network robustness as well as efﬁcient information transfer; it
also can cause deﬁcits in the access, engagement, and disengage-
ment of large-scale networks supporting cognition and behavior
(Dosenbach et al. 2008). This understanding has led us recently
to suggest that network architecture is directly associated with
mental resilience (Levit-Binnun et al. 2013; Levit-Binnun &
Golland 2011).
With the understanding how deviations from healthy architec-
ture can have profound consequences on brain function and ro-
bustness, we now can proceed to explain why the network
perspective prompts a shift to a transdiagnostic approach.
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According to the network perspective, brain diseases are cases of
deviation from healthy architecture (Menon 2011). Indeed, devi-
ations from healthy architecture have been found across a wide
range of psychopathologies, including developmental (e.g., atten-
tion deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder and autism), psychiatric (e.g.,
schizophrenia, major depression, posttraumatic stress disorder,
and obsessive-compulsive disorder), and neurological disorders
(e.g., Alzheimer’s and other dementias) (for a review, see Levit-
Binnun et al. 2013).
Even more interesting, these deviations from healthy network
architecture are evident already in individuals who are at risk
for psychopathology but who do not present clinical signs.
Hence, neonates at genetic risk for schizophrenia, individuals pre-
senting autistic traits or carrying an autism risk gene, individuals
with familial risk for ADHD, children at risk for anxiety and
depression, and individuals with mild cognitive impairments all
present networks that deviate from healthy architecture (for a
review, see Levit-Binnun et al. 2013).
That deviations from healthy network architecture are found
across different psychopathologies and in at-risk populations sup-
ports the need for the transdiagnostic approach in resilience re-
search that Kalisch et al. describe. Moreover, this suggests that
aberrations in network metrics may be indicators of global vulner-
ability-conducive traits (Fekete et al. 2014; Levit-Binnun et al.
2013). Indeed, we recently showed that psychopathological net-
works (schizophrenia) that deviate from healthy structure
respond abnormally to a controlled perturbation induced by trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation pulses (Arzouan et al. 2014).
The network perspective also supports the attempt made by
Kalisch et al. to develop a unifying framework for the study of
general resilience mechanisms. Indeed, various internal and exter-
nal resilience factors (e.g., cognitive abilities, personality traits,
(epi)genetics, age, sex, spirituality, social support, and socioeco-
nomic status – all factors mentioned in the target article) can be
framed within the network perspective. For example, individual
differences in cognitive ability have been linked with variations
in network metrics (van den Heuvel et al. 2009). Personality
traits, such as low effortful control, have been associated with
compromised small-world connectivity (Fekete et al. 2014). Ge-
netics, age, and gender are all factors that have been found to in-
ﬂuence network architecture (Gong et al. 2009; Stam & van
Straaten 2012). Other resilience-related factors (e.g., social
support, socioeconomic status, and spiritual activities) have not
been directly studied within a network framework. As most of
them have been related to distributed changes in the brain
(Hölzel et al. 2011; Kanai et al. 2012; McEwen & Gianaros
2010), however, one may hypothesize that these changes also
would manifest at the level of network metrics and global
architecture.
Such framing of resilience-related factors within the network
perspective also can be extended to the speciﬁc appraisal mecha-
nism suggested by Kalisch et al. We suggest that a healthy and
optimal network architecture is a necessary neurobiological condi-
tion for intact appraisal mechanisms. Abnormalities in network
metrics (whether inherited or developed) lead both to the disrup-
tion of dynamic balance and to deﬁcient information integration
and transfer. This can lead to irregularities in low-level functions
such as sensory, motor, and regulatory processes (Levit-Binnun
et al. 2013; Levit-Binnun & Golland 2011), which can, in turn,
lead to abnormalities in the way one evaluates and reacts to stress-
ors. Moreover, as the authors state, appraisal is not a single
process but probably multiple, dynamic, and interactive opera-
tions. Abnormalities in network architecture may cause deﬁcits
in the access, engagement, and disengagement of these complex
operations (Dosenbach et al. 2008) leading to deﬁcient appraisal
mechanisms.
In sum, we suggest that a network perspective supports a trans-
diagnostic approach to resilience and can contribute to the devel-
opment of a unifying framework for studying global resilience
mechanisms. Notably, a direct link between network architecture
and mental resilience remains to be demonstrated. The accumu-
lating evidence nonetheless suggests that network approaches are
highly relevant to the search of a neurobiological framework for
the study of resilience.
Positive appraisal style: The mental immune
system?1
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Abstract: Instead of converging to one, all-embracing resilience
mechanism – that is, positive appraisal style –we encourage complementary
research strategies, exploring both vulnerabilities and resilience factors,
much like the biomedical sciences combine insights from
pathophysiology and immunology. Furthermore, we argue that research
with a strong focus on one central resilience mechanism may
overlook or undervalue other processes that can aid in maintaining
mental health.
Kalisch et al. break a lance for more resilience-focused research
and make the strong claim that positive appraisal style is the
single mechanism that can prevent the development of stress-
related disorders. We can only applaud a transdiagnostic approach
that explicitly combines research on brain and behavior in a well-
considered translational framework. We have a few comments,
however, that may dampen some of the initial enthusiasm about
this proposal. Our three main points concern the question of
whether a focus on resilience will result in the anticipated para-
digm shift, somemethodological considerations, and the appropri-
ateness of one, “all-in” resilience mechanism.
The authors’ description of resilience inspired us to an analogy
with human immunology. Resilience is deﬁned as maintaining
mental health despite exposure to stressors, and it can be seen
as the analogue of actively preserving physical health despite expo-
sure to pathogens such as bacteria or viruses. If we pursue this
comparison, positive appraisal style would correspond to the
human immune system, because the authors claim that this is
the one, central resilience mechanism.
Our ﬁrst main comment pertains to the desirability and de facto
impact of radically focusing on resilience. In contrast to the
authors’ suggestion of a complete shift away from conventional
disorder-focused research, we argue that it is important to under-
stand the pathogen’s mechanism of action in order to appreciate
the immune response. In other words, we are advocates of com-
plementary research strategies, exploring both vulnerabilities
and resilience factors.
From a therapeutic point of view, it seems that this hand-in-
hand approach may already have been set in motion. Over the
past 15 years, several psychotherapeutic methods implicating pos-
itive (re)appraisal have been developed; for example, positive psy-
chotherapy (Seligman et al. 2006), well-being therapy (Fava &
Tomba 2009), strengths-based cognitive behavioral therapy
(Padesky & Mooney 2012), and to a certain extent maybe even
mindfulness (Segal et al. 2002). (It is noteworthy that the neural
correlates of mindfulness and cognitive reappraisal are virtually
the same; Opialla et al. 2014.) Interestingly, all these treatment
strategies are being put forward as helpful adjuncts that should
not necessarily stand alone, but may be integrated with other ther-
apies. This indicates that the positive appraisal angle is valuable,
but mainly as a complement to the traditional approach.
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On top of that, psychopathology and resilience researchers will
often (admittedly, not always) be looking at two sides of the same
coin. For example, depressive rumination is characterized by an
abstract processing style (i.e., thinking about the causes, mean-
ings, and implications of an event). In line with this ﬁnding,
recent studies have found that a concrete processing style (i.e., fo-
cusing on the speciﬁc perceptual details of an event) counteracts
dysphoria (Watkins et al. 2009) and depression (Watkins et al.
2012). These examples illustrate that it seems advisable not to
completely discard pathology research, but rather to combine it
with the proposed resilience approach.
Our second main remark relates to some of the methodologi-
cal innovations proposed by the authors. First of all, we are not
sure whether abandoning self-report measures in laboratory set-
tings, and replacing them completely with physiological or behav-
ioral parameters, will prove to be a fruitful approach. Whereas
physiological measures might have the advantages of being
more objective and translatable to animal research, self-report-
based measures provide valid information about the subjects’ ex-
perience, which could be viewed as the ultimate criterion when
aiming to improve mental health (Boddez et al. 2013b). More-
over, subjective measures might be useful in the investigation
of high-level appraisal mechanisms, which appear to have
neural correlates that differ from low-level mechanisms
(Kalisch et al. 2006b).
In addition, we would like to scrutinize some of the laboratory
procedures that the authors propose as examples of reappraisal.
Although we recognize that an extinguished stimulus is ambigu-
ous (Bouton 2002) and may be subject to appraisal, we would be
wary of a priori equating extinction, a procedure in which the
subject experiences that the outcome is changed externally,
with a situation where the objective value of an event does not
change (e.g., the sacked employee does not get his job back).
The same holds for the counterconditioning procedures that
the authors mention. We do not preclude that extinction or
counterconditioning can be framed as reappraisal, but this
awaits empirical demonstration; for example, by showing that ex-
tinction performance is affected by manipulation of the well-
known appraisal dimensions. Given our consideration about the
actual change of stimulus outcome, we suggest that it may be
(more) interesting to focus on conditioning procedures in
which the threat value of a stimulus is changed in the absence
of new direct experience with this stimulus, the so-called retro-
spective revaluation procedures (e.g., backward blocking;
Boddez et al. 2013a).
Our third main point concerns the potential risk of putting all
one’s eggs in the same positive appraisal basket, and this for at
least two reasons. First, even though it may be meaningful to
look for general, integrative principles (Meiser 2011), a priori fo-
cusing on only one overarching mechanism can make researchers
lose sight of other important resilience (sub)mechanisms that may
prove instrumental in the development of new treatment options.
Two promising examples of such (sub)mechanisms are memory
and attention. Pilot data suggest that memory speciﬁcity training
reduces depressive symptoms (Raes et al. 2009). In addition, pos-
itive mood produces a broadening of attention that may play an
important role in the resilience against stressful events (Grol
et al. 2014). Kalisch and colleagues can of course claim that
these factors have an effect because they converge to positive ap-
praisal; but in such argumentation, appraisal itself becomes an
explanandum, again underlining the importance of other, explan-
atory (sub)mechanisms. In this regard, we also fear that broaden-
ing the deﬁnition of positive appraisal to a point where it includes
everything would render it a useless concept.
Second, we argue that it might sometimes be worthwhile to
look for resilience mechanisms that may protect only against spe-
ciﬁc pathological processes (Rutter 1993). For example, strong
perceptual discrimination abilities may protect against overgener-
alization (Lommen & Ehlers 2014), but not against any patholog-
ical process. Or, if we return to our immunology analogy: Just like
the development of highly speciﬁc vaccines has been of vital im-
portance to improving immunity to particular diseases, it may
be valuable to not exclusively focus on general protective
mechanisms.
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Abstract: The authors provide an original and integrative framework for
understanding the complex array of factors that contribute to resilience.
Their faith in the uniform beneﬁts of positive appraisals neglects the
potential costs of overly positive appraisals, however. As a result, their
theory may have difﬁculty capturing the complexity of appraisal’s role in
determining resilience.
What makes a person resilient to stress? As Kalisch et al. correctly
point out, the predictors of resilience are many, spanning individ-
ual differences (e.g., intelligence, emotion regulation, neuroti-
cism), social dimensions (e.g., perceived and received support,
social integration), and contextual factors (e.g., severity of expo-
sure, material resources, and current stress). In this stew of inﬂu-
ences, no single resilience ingredient has predominated, and
resilience usually is thought to derive from a complex array of
risk and protective factors (Bonanno 2004; Masten 2001). Al-
though theorists have made preliminary attempts to integrate
these factors along the lines of shared mechanisms (Benight &
Cieslak 2011; Mancini & Bonanno 2009; Masten et al. 2003),
the need for a better theoretical understanding of resilience
remains clear. In the target article, Kalisch et al. provide that un-
derstanding, making expansive use of a concept long recognized in
the stress and emotion literatures: appraisal (Lazarus & Folkman
1984; Russell 2003). The authors have shaken the dust off apprais-
al, provided a scholarly and sophisticated overview of it, and given
it a new pride of place as the single explanatory mechanism of re-
silience. In the process, they have provided a compelling and gen-
erative framework for the study of resilience.
Any single-mechanism theory has the virtue of parsimony. By
the same token, any single-mechanism theory has the potential
vice of oversimpliﬁcation. The authors’ account synthesizes an un-
wieldy resilience literature, provides a variety of falsiﬁable hypoth-
eses, and explains the heterogeneous nature of resilience
predictors. But it also relies excessively on a simple evaluative dis-
tinction between positive and negative appraisal that neglects, in
my view, the more complex situational and contextual demands
that must be accommodated (and appraised) in order to achieve
resilience. I will address my comments to this point.
The key contributions of Kalisch et al. are twofold. First, they
introduce an appraisal “style” that characterizes individuals’
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habitual interpretation of stressful experiences. Second, and more
important, they argue that appraisal is the single mediating mech-
anism of resilience. This last is a radical and deeply interesting
proposal. Thus, all of the varied predictors of resilience – per-
ceived social support, worldviews, self-enhancement, repressive
coping, perceived coping efﬁcacy, hardiness, mastery, and materi-
al resources – are hypothesized to contribute to resilience through
their inﬂuence on a more positive or benign appraisal of stressful
experiences. For individuals with a more positive appraisal style,
stressful events usually are interpreted more benignly, either
through positive situation classiﬁcation (for minor stressors) or
through positive reappraisal (for stressors that are objectively neg-
ative). For those with a more negative appraisal style, stressful
events are viewed in a more threatening light, resulting in
minor stressors being viewed as threatening and major stressors
as more catastrophic.
The authors’ argument on these points is straightforward and,
in the main, persuasive. But despite their assertions of the mul-
tidimensional nature of appraisal, their theory relies on a key as-
sumption: that positive (or non-negative) appraisal = positive
adaptation. Are positive appraisals always adaptive for function-
ing? A compatible literature suggests that emotions, both positive
and negative, are adaptive to the extent that they are sensitive
and appropriate to the context (Bonanno et al. 2007; Coifman
& Bonanno 2010). By extension, appraisals of an acute stressor
are likely also adaptive to the extent that they promote coping
behaviors appropriate to the context, not simply whether the ap-
praisal is positive or negative (though it seems clear that positive
appraisals hold a general adaptive advantage). For example, a
person who views a signiﬁcant stressor in too positive of a light
(through either positive situation classiﬁcation or easy positive re-
appraisal) might fail to mobilize his coping efforts and to antici-
pate signiﬁcant obstacles ahead. In effect, too positive of an
appraisal, either of the person’s capacity to cope or of the
event itself, would have potentially negative consequences for
long-term adaptation. Conversely, an excessively negative ap-
praisal of an event would likely lead to a defeatist response
that also fails to mobilize coping efforts. In both cases, it is not
simply the positive or negative valence of the appraisal but the
degree to which it supports, through an optimistic and realistic
appraisal of the objective circumstances, adaptive coping
behaviors.
Is there any evidence for this perspective? My colleagues and I
examined survivors of traumatic injury that required surgery at a
Level 1 trauma center (deRoon-Cassini et al. 2010). They were
assessed while in the hospital and at 1, 3, and 6 months post-
surgery. We identiﬁed four distinct trajectories of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) and depression symptoms: resilient,
gradual recovery, chronic distress, and delayed. A robust differ-
entiator of these trajectories was the person’s early perceived
coping efﬁcacy, an index of his or her appraisal of the event.
To our surprise, both excessively positive and excessively nega-
tive appraisals of coping efﬁcacy were maladaptive. Speciﬁcally,
the group who eventually showed a delayed PTSD response re-
ported the highest levels of perceived coping efﬁcacy, substan-
tially higher than the resilient group; whereas the group that
reported chronic distress showed the lowest levels of perceived
coping efﬁcacy. In between these extremes were resilient
persons, who viewed their coping efﬁcacy as neither excessively
positive nor negative. These ﬁndings indicate that an appraisal
of one’s coping that fails to take full stock of the realities of
the situation puts that person at risk.
Indeed, despite my broad agreement with the authors’ theoret-
ical framework and my belief that it is an important advance, their
emphasis on the uniformly adaptive value of positive appraisal fails
to contemplate the adaptive implications of negative appraisals. In
short, simple positive appraisal (and reappraisal) has difﬁculty pro-
viding a full accounting of the ﬂexible and adaptive union of sub-
jective experience and objective reality that is the hallmark of
resilience.
When at rest: “Event-free” active inference
may give rise to implicit self-models of coping
potential
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Abstract: Kalisch and colleagues highlight coping potential (CP) as a
principle resilience mechanism during event engagement. We complement
this discussion by exploring generative implicit CP self-models, arguably
emerging during “resting-state,” subsequent and prior to events. Resting-
state affords a propitious environment for Bayesian learning, wherein
appraisals/reappraisals may update active inferential CP self-models,
which then mediate appraisal style organization and resilience factor
valuation.
Kalisch et al. provide an impressive model that considers resil-
ience in terms of “quantitative outcome variables,” resulting
from events. Accordingly, events elicit mental representations,
which generate primary and secondary appraisals, the latter com-
prising coping potential (CP). Here we wish to underscore the
possible regulatory value of “event-free” resting-states regarding
implicit CP self-models and their role in mediating appraisal
styles and resilience factors. Resting-state is a critical period,
when we disengage from cognitively/affectively demanding envi-
ronmental cues and tasks, and where the brain is “free” to
process information from previous environmental interactions
(Spreng & Grady 2010) and to prepare for future engagements.
Neuroimaging data have implicated resting-state in the role of
maintaining coherent and cohesive conceptual representations
of self, or self-models (e.g., D’Argembeau et al. 2005; Schneider
et al. 2008). We propose that CP self-models assist in organizing
resource allocation strategies for adaptive appraisal styles and in
constructing value-based resilience factor representations.
Resting-state may therefore permit automatic recursive afﬁrma-
tions and updating of implicit self- and world-representations
per retrospective/prospective mental projections (Ostby et al.
2012). These representations then organize appraisal styles and at-
tribute self-relevant value to resilience factors for future event
engagement.
Using a Bayesian approach (Friston 2012; Helmholtz &
Southall 1962), we infer that during resting-state, implicit CP
self-models incorporate beliefs generated posterior to experienc-
ing the world. These self-models are then updated to maximize
prediction accuracy for future events (Bengtsson & Penny
2013). This prospective mental projection can occur explicitly,
but also implicitly (Gerrans & Sander 2014). From Bayesian learn-
ing theory, it follows that implicit CP self-models may emerge
from active inference of the world’s potential to elicit affective
self-states, promote/prevent goal achievement, and confer
reward/punishment (Moutoussis et al. 2014). Accordingly, active
inference uses previous experiences to generate implicit (and
explicit) representations of “efﬁcacy expectancies.”
These representations, or empirical priors (Friston et al. 2013),
hence constitute implicit self-models of CP and include
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representations of others’ capacity to help effectively in resolving
conﬂict (“other-efﬁcacy”). Implicit CP self-models reﬂect non-
conscious attitudes and predictions toward one’s capacity to
cope/adjust to a situation. Behavioral and neuroimaging data illus-
trate the existence of implicit self-models (Back et al. 2009;
Rameson et al. 2010), which may organize appropriate action
tendencies and cognitive strategies necessary for elaborating
positive protective appraisal/reappraisals. In alignment with
the authors’ PASTOR model, implicit CP self-models and
world-models (e.g., other-efﬁcacy, outcome expectancies)
would organize beliefs, attitudes, and interpretive biases,
which deﬁne appraisal styles, into a coherent narrative to min-
imize inconsistent future predictions (e.g., Bengtsson & Penny
2013). According to Kalisch et al., appraisal styles represent
important variables predicting a resilient outcome and are me-
diated by unconscious (and conscious) processes. Likewise, we
suggest that appraisal styles arise extensively from implicit CP
self-model representations.
Event-free resting-states provide a unique opportunity for im-
plicit CP self-models to renew and update per retrospective and
prospective self-state projections, although this renewal/updating
could not occur without appraisal/reappraisal mechanisms.
Whereas bottom-up active inference may give rise to empirical
priors of self, resting-state would equally permit top-down ap-
praisals, evaluating expected outcomes of self, as an effective
agent in the world. This dovetails nicely with neuroimaging
evidence suggesting iterative resting-state mental time travel,
from retrospective to prospective self-states (Ostby et al. 2012)
as well as resting-state default mode network comprising self-
referential substrates (Qin & Northoff 2011).
Hence, CP self-models may rely on the very appraisal styles
they previously elaborated. For instance, appraisals of empirical
priors and ensuing efﬁcacy expectancies (Ellsworth & Scherer
2003) may yield “pessimistic” predictions (e.g., punishment),
thus eliciting negative affective states. Consequently, reappraisal
operations may ensue, where empirical priors are re-evaluated/
re-interpreted and positive self-memories of coping and self-
efﬁcacy are incorporated. This parallels the authors’ proposal for
a memory-based “positive situation classiﬁcation” process. Conse-
quently, effective reappraisals would update empirical priors,
which give rise to self- and world-models, and would minimize
negative affective states experienced during rest. Hence, implicit
CP self-models may be maintained thanks to appraisal styles elab-
orated previously by earlier self-models.
In order to beneﬁt from positive appraisal styles, however, one
must equally beneﬁt from the value of resilience factors, an addi-
tional variable predicting a resilient outcome. CP self-models may
serve as a valuation mechanism for resilience factors such as social
support. Speciﬁcally, empirical priors may predict “other-efﬁcacy,”
as ensuing implicit CP self-models determine its self-relevant value.
It is not sufﬁcient to acknowledge one’s network of close others;
one must also appreciate the value in relying upon these close
others. The authors’ discussion of social support as a resilience
factor is very relevant to the ongoing neurocognitive research in
social anxiety disorder (SAD). SAD’s symptomatology is distin-
guished by elevated fear and avoidance of future social interac-
tions, and may reveal inadequate implicit CP self-models in
social settings. In a review paper currently under preparation,
we present published SAD event-free neuroimaging data to
inform our theory of discrepant generative SAD CP self-models
(Murray et al., in preparation). We highlight key self-related
neural substrates (e.g., pregenual anterior cingulate (Murray
et al. 2012) and putative social-valuation regions (e.g., orbitofron-
tal cortex [Ruff & Fehr 2014]), which illustrate structural/connec-
tional aberrancies in SAD during event-free states. Our
preliminary framework articulates SAD symptomatology as
arising from static and poorly deﬁned implicit event-free CP
self-models, the validation of which may depend disproportionate-
ly on social information. Nevertheless, these self-models may
prove incapable of exploiting positive social feedback in order to
update empirical priors. This may potentially result from deﬁcient
valuation and appraisals/reappraisal mechanisms effectuated
during event-free states (Murray et al., in preparation). Our
recent work reviewing neurocognitive evidence of SAD sympto-
matology would therefore lend support to our claim that event-
free implicit CP self-models may mediate the self-relevant value
of resilience factors such as social support.
Today, there exists increasing neurocognitive literature validat-
ing appraisal theory predictions (cf. Brosch & Sander 2013). Al-
though efforts to elucidate the neural substrates underlying CP
are still in their infancy, Kalisch and colleagues have set forth a
pragmatic framework for its future testing and analysis. We
hope to contribute to this discussion by promoting event-free
resting-state as an area of focus for the renewal and updating of
implicit CP self-models.
Phenotypic programming as a distal cause of
resilience
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Abstract:During early childhood, individuals with high sensitivity to early
programming adjust their phenotype in a way that is expected to be
adaptive in their later environment. These adaptations are hypothesized
to result in resilience in environments that match the early environment.
As appraisal style is a putative target of adaptive programming, early
experiences could be a distal cause of resilience.
Kalisch et al. make a convincing case that a positive appraisal style
is the proximal cause of transdiagnostic resilience. Another rele-
vant question is, what causes positive appraisal? In other words,
what is the distal cause of resilience? In my commentary, I
argue that early experiences determine an individual’s appraisal
of a certain situation and are therefore a distal, or ultimate,
cause of resilience.
Animals, including humans, have been shown to have consider-
able phenotypic plasticity. That is, individuals are able to adjust
their phenotype to meet environmental demands. This phenome-
non has been extensively studied in developmental contexts.
During early childhood, including the fetal period, individuals
are especially sensitive to programming effects of their environ-
ment (e.g., Gluckman et al. 2007; Lupien et al. 2009).
Individuals sample their environment for cues that more or less
reliably predict their future environment (Kuzawa 2005). Through
these cues, they learn about their environment and gradually
adjust their phenotype to match speciﬁc demands (Frankenhuis
& Panchanathan 2011). For example, humans are hypothesized
to adjust their stress-responsivity, which is closely tied to their ap-
praisal of stressful situations (Del Giudice et al. 2011; Ellis & Del
Giudice 2014). Although phenotypic programming might result in
resilience in environments that match the phenotype adjustment, it
is known also to have an important trade-off. If the later environment
turns out differently than predicted, a phenotype-environment mis-
match can have detrimental effects (Frankenhuis & Del Giudice
2012; Nederhof & Schmidt 2012).
Early in life, individuals are most likely to adapt their phenotype
to meet future environmental demands, compared with any other
period in life. Traditionally, this has been seen as a window of vul-
nerability. More recently, researchers have started to appreciate
the possible positive implications of such a period of increased
sensitivity (Andersen 2003). The window of vulnerability has
become a window of opportunity. During this window of
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opportunity, individuals are most sensitive to both positive and
negative cues in their environment, either to proﬁt optimally
from the environment or to arm oneself optimally against it
(Boyce & Ellis 2005; Del Giudice et al. 2011).
Several animal studies also support the notion of resilience
in matched and vulnerability in mismatched situations. For
example, Champagne et al. (2008) showed in rats that off-
spring of low-licking and -grooming dams performed better
in a contextual fear-conditioning paradigm compared with off-
spring of high-licking and -grooming dams. Variation in licking
and grooming behavior occurs naturally and can be inﬂuenced
by stressfulness of the environment (Ivy et al. 2008). Other
studies showed similar effects (Daskalakis et al. 2012), also
when using other stress-paradigms, such as maternal separation
(Biggio et al. 2014; Zalosnik et al. 2014), limited nesting mate-
rial (Santarelli et al. 2014), or prenatal stress (Van den Hove
et al. 2014). It must be noted, however, that not all animal
studies support the mismatch hypothesis (see Nederhof &
Schmidt 2012).
This might point in the direction of adversity having adap-
tive programming effects in some but damaging effects in
others. Nederhof and Schmidt (2012) proposed that program-
ming sensitivity might differ between individuals. This sugges-
tion was based on the observation that natural selection favors
diversity, because the future is uncertain. Indeed, it has been
suggested that, from an evolutionary perspective, it makes
sense to invest in offspring that differ in sensitivity to program-
ming effects (Belsky et al. 2007; Ellis et al. 2011). Individuals
with high programming sensitivity are hypothesized to adjust
their phenotype, including appraisal, in a way that is expected
to be adaptive in their later environment (Nederhof & Schmidt
2012). As a consequence, appraisal styles are expected to be
more positive in matched compared with mismatched situa-
tions in these individuals, resulting in resilience in matched sit-
uations and vulnerability in mismatched ones. In individuals
with low programming sensitivity, stressful events are hypothe-
sized to accumulate and increase the risk for stress-related dis-
eases (Nederhof & Schmidt 2012).
Recent evidence prudently supports this notion. Oldehinkel
et al. (2014) showed that early adversity increased the risk for
early-onset depression, but not for later onsets. They also
showed that those who experienced adversity but were not affect-
ed by depression before the age of 16 seemed more resilient
under stressful conditions compared with others who did not ex-
perience early adversity. A similar ﬁnding was published by
Nederhof et al. (2014), who showed that the interactive effects
of early and recent adversity depended on attention style, assum-
ing that attention style could be the result of programming effects.
It must be noted, however, that these two studies were conducted
in the same sample.
As far as I am aware, there is one other study in humans
providing evidence for resilience in matched and vulnerability
in mismatched situations. Brody and colleagues (2013)
showed that African-American youth from high-risk back-
grounds with high self-control and social/academic competence
had more physiological risk factors than did youth with similar
backgrounds but low self-control and competence. On the
other hand, these high-risk/high-self-control youth showed
fewer depressive symptoms compared with high-risk/low-self-
control youth.
Unfortunately, in none of these studies was appraisal style used.
Future research should investigate whether appraisal style is af-
fected by early adversity in an adaptive way that could constitute
resilience later in life. If such a notion would be supported, we
would come closer to an answer to the question of what the
distal cause for resilience might be.
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Abstract: We propose that the fundamental mechanism underlying
resilience is the integration of novel or negative experiences into
internal schemata. This process requires a switch from reactive to
predictive control modes, from the brain’s salience network to the
default mode network. Reappraisal, among other mechanisms, is
suggested to facilitate this process.
Although we agree with Kalisch and colleagues that positive ap-
praisal is an important mechanism of facilitating resilience, we
propose a more fundamental mechanism underlying resilience.
Speciﬁcally, based on a neurobehavioral framework (predictive
and reactive control systems theory; cf. Tops 2014; Tops et al.
2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b), we propose that integration of
novel and negative experiences into coherent internal models
(or “schemata”) of already integrated experiences is central to re-
silience (see also Kent 2012; Kuhl 2000; 2011; Kuhl et al. 2015),
with positive (re)appraisal and other mechanisms facilitating
such integration (cf. Fig. 1).
According to this framework, two control systems in the brain
can be distinguished: reactive versus predictive networks. Reac-
tive control appraises novel (schema-incongruent), salient, and
degraded stimuli and guides attention, emotions, and behavior
in immediate and continuous response to such stimuli. Reactive
control is typically accompanied by tense arousal and negative
affect, particularly when the stimulus is assessed as a potential
threat. This system includes brain areas overlapping with the
“salience network” (cf. Downar et al. 2002). By contrast, predic-
tive control is typically activated in the relative absence of
threats, or when the individual perceives the threat as predict-
able and manageable. This system includes brain areas overlap-
ping with the “default mode network” (DMN; cf. Buckner &
Carroll 2007).
During predictive but not reactive control, negative experienc-
es can be readily integrated into internal models representing re-
lationships between entities, motivations, actions, and outcomes
(also referred to as “the self-system”; e.g., Kuhl 2000; Kuhl
et al. 2015; see also Koole & Jostmann 2004; Quirin et al.
2011). This integration process puts negative experiences and con-
comitant emotions in perspective, and it provides the individual
with a sense of coherence (Antonovsky 1987), controllability
(Bandura 1977; Deci & Ryan 1980; Rotter 1954), and meaning
(Frankl 2004). When the individual is confronted with similar sit-
uations in the future, integrated experiences can be recalled and
will provide context and perspectives for perception and appraisal
of the situation. Individuals can thus more readily and ﬂexibly
switch from stressful reactive control, with its narrow focus on
the salient stimulus, to more relaxed predictive control, with its
prudent, mindful, attentional mode, in order to “keep their
heads” (Kuhl 2000; Tops et al. 2013b). In the end, this results
in affective relief and thereby facilitates resilience.
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Consequently, individual tendencies to accept and integrate
negative experiences (rather than to deny, repress, sensitize to,
or avoid them) constitute the basis for a continuous formation
of extended, integrated, and differentiated internal models and,
therefore, for personal growth and sustained resilience through-
out life (Kuhl 2000; 2011). Indeed, acceptance of negative expe-
riences has been related to physiological indicators of health and
has been shown to foster resilience following exposure to
trauma (Thompson et al. 2011).
Although the availability of well-integrated internal models may
be a prerequisite for resilience, highly incongruent emotional or
traumatic information may challenge internal models and resist im-
mediate integration. We suggest that in such situations, adaptive
switches from reactive to predictive control and concomitant inte-
gration can be facilitated by reappraisal, and by other subsidiary
mechanisms such as prospection or labeling of emotions, as those
involve effortful elaboration and semantization necessary for incon-
gruent experiences to become integrated. Prospection refers to the
mental representation and evaluation of possible futures, often in-
cluding planning, prediction, or construction of hypothetical sce-
narios. Indeed, prospection yields physical and psychological
beneﬁts in daily life and in resilience treatment approaches (Kent
2013; Seligman et al. 2013). Finally, labeling emotions verbally
(Burklund et al. 2014; Pennebaker 1993) or sharing them with
others (Rimé 2009) alleviates stress and facilitates integration,
much like reappraisal does. For example, when incongruent or un-
familiar experiences challenge collective knowledge and elicit neg-
ative emotions, affective sharing can accommodate and absorb
these experiences into socially shared internal models, thus reduc-
ing their negative valence and concomitant negative emotions
(Rimé 2009) by facilitating predictive control.
In terms of the neural underpinnings of the capacity to shift
from reactive to predictive control modes and to integrate nega-
tive experiences, the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) plays a key role,
with partly different functions for left and right IFGs. The right
IFG is implicated in elaborative appraisal of novel (emotional)
stimuli and is more strongly interconnected with limbic (emo-
tional) areas such as the amygdala and the striatum. The left
IFG is implicated in translation of novel emotional experiences
into semantic information that later can be integrated into exist-
ing internal models of the predictive control system (as supported
by DMN areas such as posterior cingulate and medial prefrontal
cortex, precuneus, and posterior hippocampus; Tops et al.
2014b).
There is indeed evidence that the resiliencemechanisms consid-
ered subsidiary in the present framework also may be facilitated by
the left IFG. For example, this area often coactivates with areas of
the DMN during prospection (Spreng et al. 2009). Also the left
IFG has been implicated in successful encoding of negative mem-
ories during reappraisal (Hayes et al. 2010) and in the inhibition of
interfering appraisals or other distractors (Andrews & Thomson
2009), a process that contributes to reappraisal. Further, individu-
als who accept negative experiences, but not those who deny them,
show left IFG activation in anticipation of uncontrollable pain
(Salomons et al. 2007). Finally, similar to what is found in studies
of reappraisal, during verbal labeling of unpleasant emotions, acti-
vation of the left IFG (including Broca’s area) increases, whereas
amygdala activity and bodily arousal decrease (Torrisi et al. 2013;
cf. Bach et al. 2008; Creswell et al. 2007; Frühholz et al. 2012;
Herwig et al. 2010). Hence, particularly the left IFG appears to
have an intermediate status between reactive and predictive
control, allowing for important switches between modes of
control, which in turn promote resilience.
In sum, our neurobehavioral framework emphasizes integration
of negative experiences as a fundamental neurocognitive mecha-
nism underlying sustainable resilience, while not ignoring the rele-
vance of (re)appraisal or other resilience mechanisms. Although
this framework is functional in nature, it is nonreductionistic,
because it considers a broad array of psychological processes. Con-
sequently, our framework has the potential to integrate psycholog-
ically and biologically oriented approaches toward resilience.
Animals can tell us more
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Abstract: From a behavioural biologist’s point of view, we argue: (1) The
study of resilience in animals should not be restricted to neuronal
mechanisms. Rather, questions of ontogeny, function, and evolution also
Figure 1 (Quirin et al.). A neurobiological model of resilience based on the integration of negative experiences, derived from predictive
and reactive control systems theory. DMN=default mode network; IFG=inferior frontal gyrus.
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should be addressed to achieve a comprehensive understanding. (2)
Implementing new paradigms from animal welfare research in studies of
resilience would allow an assessment of appraisal styles in animals.
In their target article, Kalisch et al. propose a theoretical frame-
work for the neuroscientiﬁc study of general resilience mecha-
nisms that are applicable to both human and animal research.
In this commentary, we argue from a behavioural biologist’s
point of view that animals could tell us more if (1) this framework
were extended and (2) new paradigms were included to assess ap-
praisal styles in animal research, as well.
Concerning (1), more than 50 years ago, in his seminal publica-
tion “On Aims and Methods of Ethology,” Nobel prize winner
Nikolaas Tinbergen (1963) argued that a comprehensive under-
standing of behavioural phenomena should give equal attention
to the questions of causation, ontogeny, survival value, and evolu-
tion, and to their integration. We recommend the Tinbergen
framework be applied to the study of resilience in animals as
well, because the broader our understanding of resilience, the
more successfully we can apply that understanding to humans. Ac-
cordingly, the study of resilience in animal research should not be
restricted to elucidating the underlying neuronal, cellular, and
molecular mechanisms in adult individuals (causation). Rather,
it is likely that these mechanisms are shaped by environmental
stimuli and genes during sensitive phases of life (ontogeny). Typ-
ically, this shaping process is not conﬁned to the early postnatal
period, but occurs from the prenatal phase through to adoles-
cence and beyond (Sachser et al. 2013). We therefore recommend
that ontogenetic perspectives be integrated into future experi-
mental animal research on resilience mechanisms.
In the target article, a positive appraisal style is considered the
key resilience mechanism, and therefore, optimism is regarded as
the common ﬁnal path to mental health. Given that these traits
are shaped by natural selection, the question concerning function
(survival value) arises. At ﬁrst sight, it seems plausible that a positive
appraisal style would maximize Darwinian ﬁtness. But if a positive
style was superior to other appraisal styles, natural selection ought
to have selected against non-positive versions. The empirical data
available from animals show, however, that as in humans, various
appraisal/coping styles exist (e.g., Koolhaas et al. 2010). From this
it follows that a positive appraisal style cannot always be the best
option in all environmental situations, and hence, cannot be regard-
ed as the only path to mental health. Animal studies addressing the
costs and beneﬁts of different appraisal styles could, therefore,
make a valuable contribution to the debate on this topic in
humans (e.g., Sweeny & Shepperd 2010).
Current biomedical animal research focuses strongly on so-
called model species, and most experimental work on resilience
probably is performed using laboratory mice. Addressing the
question of evolution by conducting comparative studies with a
range of species would broaden this approach and improve our
understanding of resilience signiﬁcantly. Members of any given
species are equipped with physiological, motivational, behaviou-
ral, and resilience mechanisms to cope with the demands of
their speciﬁc ecological niche. Because different species inhabit
different ecological niches, we also should expect different
coping mechanisms to have evolved. This also means that it is
very unlikely that a single animal model would reﬂect human re-
silience in a comprehensive way. It is, therefore, important to un-
derstand resilience mechanisms in a variety of species. This would
signiﬁcantly facilitate translation from animal research to humans.
Concerning (2), Kalisch et al. suggest that a resilience readout
in an animal experiment would require two elements: a battery
of stressors that adequately models human-life stressors, and a
“mental health” testing battery assessing the animal’s functioning
before and after having experienced the stressors. Such testing
may indeed shed light on behavioural and neurobiological path-
ways to resilience, but it is unlikely to provide a good understand-
ing of the role of stimulus appraisal in the generation of emotional
responses. We note that appraisal style can be assessed directly in
animals, as well.
In 2004, Harding and colleagues developed methods to deter-
mine emotional states by measuring differences in judgement bias
in rats. The animals were trained to press a lever to obtain a food
reward in response to one tone (“positive tone”), and to refrain
from pressing the lever in response to a different tone (“negative
tone”) to avoid the presentation of white noise. Having learned to
discriminate between these two “reference tones,” the rats’ re-
sponses to ambiguous, intermediate tones were investigated.
Animals that were housed in unpredictable conditions responded
less often to the “ambiguous tones” and showed longer response
latencies to such tones than did animals that were housed in a pre-
dictable environment. Hence, rats in unpredictable – that is, more
stressful housing conditions – show behaviour indicating reduced
anticipation of a positive event, reﬂecting a pessimistic judgement
bias. They judged “the glass is half empty and not half full.”
Meanwhile, such cognitive bias investigations have been per-
formed in a wide range of species including mice, dogs, sheep,
and rhesus macaques (e.g., Mendl et al. 2010) and clearly show
that positive and negative appraisal styles exist, and can be as-
sessed also in animals. The use of such techniques in studies of re-
silience would, in this way, help to detect emotional biases in
judgements similar to those found in humans.
In summary, the Tinbergen framework provides us with an ex-
cellent road map for a thorough investigation of resilience mech-
anisms in animals. In addition, new behavioural paradigms such as
cognitive judgement bias tests allow the assessment of degrees of
“optimism” and “pessimism”; that is, different appraisal styles in
nonhuman animals. The adoption of a broader range of questions
and research tools will signiﬁcantly advance our understanding of
this topic, and thus, contribute to a broader understanding of re-
silience in humans – because the animals are able to tell us more.
Stability through variability: Homeostatic
plasticity and psychological resilience
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Abstract: According to Kalisch et al., adopting a cognitive positive
appraisal style promotes internal bodily homeostasis and acts as a
safeguard against the detrimental effects of stress. Here we will discuss
results from recent noninvasive brain stimulation studies in humans to
illustrate that homeostatic plasticity provides a neural mechanistic
account for the positive appraisal style theory of resilience.
The expression of behavioural adaptive responses to stress is
proposed to reﬂect an important evolutionary principle by
which individuals are able to maintain stable behaviour or
display behaviour that meets environmental demands as a func-
tion of their available internal resources. The degree to which in-
dividuals can meet the continuing challenge between stressors
and available internal resources depends on a complex interplay
among environmental load, experience, and cognitive capacity.
The organism’s ability to display situation-appropriate responses
and downregulate stress is argued to reﬂect processes of adapta-
tion. These processes of adaptation actively contribute to resil-
ience and psychological well-being by enabling the organism to
deal better with comparable stressful situations in the future
(McEwen 1998). In fact, Kalisch et al. propose that a cognitive
positive appraisal style serves as a protecting factor against the
damaging effects of stress and promotes resilience and well-being.
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The degree to which an individual can adopt a cognitive positive
appraisal style is arguably determined by the ﬂexibility of the
central nervous system for maintaining internal bodily homeosta-
sis. In particular, the dynamic range of changes as a result of
context-related demands is known as brain plasticity, and it
provides a neurobiological basis for the individual’s ability to
generate, select, and execute situation-appropriate behavioural
(coping) strategies. More speciﬁcally, the up- and downregulation
of cortical excitability levels reﬂect an important aspect of brain
plasticity that is considered fundamental to humans’ ability to
adapt and anticipate to their surroundings on the basis of experi-
ence (Lourenco & Casey 2013). Long-term potentiation and long-
term depression, also known as input- and synapse-speciﬁc
Hebbian plasticity, have been identiﬁed as basic neurobiological
principles by which cortical excitability and synaptic signal trans-
mission can be respectively enhanced or reduced (Barrionuevo
et al. 1980; Lømo 1966; Pascual-Leone et al. 1998).
The modulation of neuronal excitability levels arguably depends
on an intricate balance between excitatory (glutamatergic) and in-
hibitory (GABAergic) circuits (Lui & Lachamp 2006). In general,
increased cortical excitability has been linked to greater plasticity
and being beneﬁcial to adaptive behaviour, whereas enhanced in-
hibition of cortical excitability levels has been associated with im-
paired plasticity and behavioural impairments (Johnston 2009).
Importantly, however, the regulation of the balance between in-
hibitory and excitatory systems keeps neural circuits within a func-
tional range (Whitt et al. 2013). This regulatory process is called
homeostatic plasticity and satisﬁes two necessary conditions for
successful adaptation, namely stability and variability, and pre-
vents states of excessive neuronal hypo- and hyperexcitability
(Bienenstock et al. 1982; Quartarone et al. 2006).
A typical example of an organism’s adaptive response to stress is
the ﬁght–ﬂight response, which, among many other physiological
reactions, includes activation of the hypothalamus-pituitary-
adrenal cortex (HPA) axis and the release of the hormone cortisol.
Several studies have found that cortisol negatively affects brain
plasticity by inﬂuencing the inhibitory system (Milani et al.
2010; Sale et al. 2008). In a paired associative stimulation (PAS)
study in which peripheral nerve stimulation is combined with
transcranial magnetic stimulation of the cerebral cortex to
elevate neural excitability levels, it was shown that the administra-
tion of cortisol in healthy volunteers interferes with PAS-induced
increases in cortical excitability (Sale et al. 2008). The observed re-
ductions in cortical excitability were interpreted as effects caused
by increased inhibitory activity, which, at ﬁrst glance, seems at
odds with more-recent ﬁndings showing that cortisol administra-
tion increases cortical excitability levels (Milani et al. 2010). In
the latter study, cortisol administration reduced intracortical inhi-
bition and was interpreted as a cortisol-driven decrease in
GABAergic activity (Milani et al. 2010).
This paradoxical ﬁnding can be explained by homeostatic plas-
ticity: Cortisol administration increases cortical excitability, but
when combined with another excitatory intervention, such as
PAS, the effects of cortisol become inhibitory to prevent cortical
hyperexcitability (cf. Siebner et al. 2004). Furthermore, it is pos-
sible that cortisol promotes brain plasticity acutely but has a dis-
ruptive effect when circulating levels are chronically elevated.
How these temporal effects exactly translate to the behavioural
domain remains an open question. Nonetheless, in agreement
with Kalisch et al., homeostatic plasticity plays an important role
for keeping the brain in a functional range in response to stress.
Homeostatic plasticity thus provides a protective physiological
mechanism, which promotes psychological resilience by allowing
a certain amount of variability on top of stability.
Because abnormalities of inhibitory circuits and cortical plastic-
ity have been repeatedly demonstrated in patients with depression
(Bajbouj et al. 2006; Player et al. 2013), impaired homeostatic
plasticity in response to stress can provide an account, at least in
part, for the relation between lowered psychological resilience
and presence of depressive symptoms. More indirect support
comes from a study showing a positive association between neu-
roticism and reduced intracortical inhibition in healthy volunteers
(Wassermann 2001). These reductions may hint at an imbalance
between inhibitory and excitatory circuits and provide a neurobi-
ological basis for suboptimal coping strategies due to cortical hy-
perexcitability. That neuroticism is characterized by a lack of
cognitive positive appraisal style and a susceptibility to experienc-
ing anxiety and depression concurs with the inverse relation
between neuroticism and psychological resilience (Campbell-
Sills et al. 2006). Moreover, in stressful conditions, neurotic indi-
viduals tend to display a limited amount of coping strategies or
reside in stereotypical responses that were successful on prior oc-
casions (Parkes 1986). As brain plasticity in healthy individuals is a
mechanism for initiating a more dynamical range of situation-
appropriate coping behaviours, such maladaptive behavioural re-
sponse patterns arguably are due to aberrant brain plasticity.
In this commentary, we have introduced homeostatic plasticity
as a candidate neurobiological mechanism to explain the psycho-
logical effects of cognitive positive appraisal style on well-being.
Suboptimal forms of homeostatic plasticity are argued to more
easily lead to a dysfunctional imbalance between the inhibitory
and excitatory cortical circuits that undermines behavioural ﬂexi-
bility and lowers psychological resilience. In addition to comple-
menting the model of Kalisch and colleagues, homeostatic
plasticity may further help set the physiological boundaries for
studying the psychological mechanisms of resilience.
Quantifying resilience: Theoretical or
pragmatic for translational research?
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Abstract: Quantifying resilience allows for several testable hypotheses,
such as that resilience is equal to the number of mental health problems
given a known quantity of stressor load. The proposed model lends itself
well to prospective studies with data collection pre- and post-adversity;
however, prestressor assessments are not always available. Challenges
remain for adapting quantifying resilience to animal research, even if
the idea of its translation value is signiﬁcant.
In light of the National Institutes of Health–initiated paradigm
shift toward dimensional approaches to measuring mental health
outcomes, as deﬁned in the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC;
see Cuthbert 2014a; Insel et al. 2010), the current review offers
a new framework nicely aligned with this approach. Kalisch
et al. provide not only a dimensional perspective but a quantiﬁable
one. The review focuses on resilience rather than illness and sug-
gests that resilience should be transdiagnostic, another tenet of
the RDoC initiative. Of course, true resilience would necessarily
be transdiagnostic – patients who compensate for deﬁcits in one
domain by showing impairments in another would not be consid-
ered resilient (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder patients who
successfully reduce hyperarousal symptoms by abusing substanc-
es; Bremner et al. 1996).
Quantifying resilience allows for several testable hypotheses,
such as that resilience is equal to the number of mental health
problems given a known quantity of stressor load. Although cata-
loguing stressor load may seem problematic, most studies assess
stressors along a continuum – for example, post-traumatic stress
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disorder researchers quantify trauma load with questionnaires
that assess degree of trauma exposure (Elhai et al. 2005). A com-
prehensive measure of total stress exposure (both major and
minor, as the authors suggest) may not always be possible,
however; if the outcome of interest is resilience in the face of
trauma, for example, a measure of trauma load may sufﬁce.
The proposed model lends itself well to prospective studies with
data collection at two time points (i.e., pre- and post-adversity);
however, not all studies have the luxury of prestressor assessments.
In such cases, the authors argue that the cumulative mental
health problems post-stressor represent the individual’s response,
which assumes that there were no problems prior to the stressor.
Although this ignores a host of predisposing risk factors, it may still
provide a heuristic model to study – that is, the inverse ratio of
problems to stressor load.
Kalisch et al. also suggest focusing on resilience mechanisms,
rather than factors – an important distinction inasmuch as a
number of factors could operate through the same mechanism,
thereby reducing the number of analysis units. In fact, risk/resil-
ience factors are many, including but not limited to genetic
(Binder et al. 2008), epigenetic (Norrholm et al. 2013), endocrine
(Glover et al. 2012; Morgan et al. 2000), neuroanatomical (Admon
et al. 2013; Etkin & Wager 2007), and social (Feder et al. 2013).
Yet they may converge on a limited number of mechanisms.
Further, the authors argue for a single global resilience mecha-
nism, that is, positive appraisal, as an explanatory model for resil-
ient outcomes. This is an attractive notion, but it may be overly
simplistic and yet at the same time involve complex cognitive
demands. In most cases, positive appraisal may be difﬁcult to
observe directly and is unlikely to model well in animal research,
thereby decreasing its translational applications. Other alternate
resilience mechanisms, however, such as less-sensitive amygdala
reactivity to threat (Rauch et al. 2000), better emotion regulation
(Etkin et al. 2006), or prefrontal inhibition of fear memories
(Milad et al. 2009), can be applied to the same quantiﬁable frame-
work without invoking higher cognitive function.
The innovative contribution of the positive appraisal style
theory of resilience (PASTOR) may be less in the speciﬁc mech-
anism proposed than in the mathematical formulation of the resil-
ience phenomenology. Although still largely theoretical in nature,
the formula offers a guiding framework in which to organize the
variables used in the study of resilience.
As stressors may vary and include physical threat or injury, pain,
diseases, and challenges to immune system, to name a few, they
impose various types of psychological and physical overload in
an acute or chronic way – hence, various mechanisms may under-
lie coping responses. The idea of a global resilience mechanism
can help put in perspective interpretations of studies of the ana-
tomic, cellular, and molecular pathways underlying an improve-
ment in survival and ﬁtness. This can be instructive, as the
molecular and cellular mechanisms are divided into those that
are common versus those that are speciﬁc across different cell
types, brain regions, and behaviors.
The idea of being resilient to many and not to just a few stress-
ors can be used to calculate an overall resilience index to be com-
pared with an index representing an animal’s general behavioral
ﬂexibility. It has been argued that improving overall memory
strength may improve the capability of coping with various
mental disorders. Some of the biological mechanisms underlying
general resilience may involve better control of the environment
or be induced by exposure to an enriched environment.
Interpretations of the animal behavioral responses to stress as
maladaptive can change as we learn more about their biological
signiﬁcance. For example, when the forced swim test is used re-
peatedly, an increase in the extent of the immobility during the
re-test is often interpreted as despair or learned helplessness.
Animals may show enhanced behavioral immobility in the re-
test as an adaptive response, however: They display more immo-
bility in the warmer water, but swim more in the colder water
to combat the body temperature loss (Reul et al. 2014).
Another caveat is that an organism may be resilient to certain
adversities, but vulnerable to others. For example, an individual
can be resilient to food deprivation or physical pain but sensitive
to losing a mate. Would this suggest that there is vulnerability in
the speciﬁc pathway related to empathy and reproductive func-
tion, or resilience to hunger and pain?
In conclusion, individual differences in coping with stress may
allow “testing” different coping strategies both at the individual
and species levels. Some maladaptations for an individual can be
viewed as helpful and protective for species survival. For
example, for an alpha male in some species, losing competitive-
ness because of inability to cope with stress or threat from other
males can lead to a downgrade of the position in the hierarchy
that is helpful for the survival of the population, even though it
can be viewed as a loss for the individual.
Toward a translational neuropsychiatry
of resilience
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Abstract: Neuropsychiatry integrates neuroscience and clinical
pathophysiology of the human brain-mind interface. Kalisch et al. provide
an important advance with a clear, quantitative, uniﬁed neuropsychiatric
model of resilience, a crucial adaptive response to adversity. They highlight
positive appraisal style, describing underlying neural circuitry and
mechanisms. This provides a foundation for the development of biomarkers
and targeted therapeutics across the range of neuropsychiatric disorders.
Resilience is a crucial component of the success of complex biolog-
ical systems.The importanceofpsychobiological resilience inhuman
health is increasingly appreciated incontemporarymedicine.Recent
neuroscientiﬁc methodologic developments and ﬁndings are build-
ing on classic observations and starting to elucidate elements and
mechanisms of resilience (Wu et al. 2013). The time is therefore
ripe for a synthetic conceptual framework to guide and be reﬁned
by empirical work at the brain-mind interface. Kalisch et al. have
put forth an impressive integration of ongoing work in the context
of a clear model and approach that can advance care across the
range of neuropsychiatric disorders, which produce tremendous
suffering and constitute an enormous global disease burden.
The homeostatic systems that maintain functioning and success,
despite adversity, have been reﬁned over the course of evolution
(Bernard 1878/1974). Kalisch et al. provide a sophisticated over-
arching account of the functions, processes, and neural circuits in-
volved. They also posit a key role for positive stimulus appraisal
processes in shaping adaptive emotional responses to stressors.
In so doing, they bring mechanistic focus to a potential fulcrum
for optimizing mental health.
Two general aspects of their approach are notable from a psy-
chiatric research agenda perspective. First, the perspective is trans-
diagnostic. This is timely and important; psychiatry is moving from
a categorical, descriptive classiﬁcation of disorders to a dimension-
al, biological approach (Cuthbert 2014b). Such an approach is
more aligned with the rest of medicine, and it will permit the
development of biomarkers and the identiﬁcation of new disease
mechanism-based subtypes of illness and subgroups of patients
(Silbersweig 2013). Biomarkers will, in turn, allow the development
of more-targeted therapeutics, as well as the development of
predictors of which individual patients will respond to them.
Second, the approach represents a shift from a focus on under-
standing and reversing negative emotional-behavioral processes
toward a (not mutually exclusive) focus on understanding and en-
hancing positive emotional-behavioral processes (Epstein et al.
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2006). This not only provides new avenues for therapeutic devel-
opment, but also is consonant with patients’ desires to think in
terms of maximizing health and well-being.
From a psychological perspective, the highlighting of the pro-
tective role of positive appraisal and reappraisal is consistent
with current cognitive-behavioral therapy approaches that help
patients identify maladaptive, negatively biased appraisal styles
and learn skills to shift them toward more-objective, empowering
styles (Smits et al. 2012).
From a behavioral, neuroscientiﬁc perspective, the top-down,
prefrontal processes of cognitive appraisal, in the context of
goals and experience, meet up with the bottom-up processes in
the sensory, subcortical, and limbic processing stream that label
the salience of stimuli, events, or experiences (Cutuli 2014).
This connectivity plays an important role in mediating motivation
and response selection. Kalisch et al. perform a great service to
the ﬁeld by clarifying terms; by being speciﬁc about the mediating
neuroanatomy at the sub-region level; and by developing a quan-
titative, testable resilience equation relating stressor load and
mental problem burden, using measures, factors, interactions,
and outcomes in a uniﬁed, probabilistic model.
From a behavioral, neuroscientiﬁc point of view, it is also
notable and important that Kalisch et al. seek to identify common
underlying and higher-level processes regulating resilience. Doing
somakes evolutionary and neurodevelopmental sense, and it is con-
sistent with physiological feed-forward and feedback mechanisms
underlying homeostasis and allostasis, for acute and chronic stress
(McEwen 2013). It also creates a path toward the development
of new interventions, whether biological or cognitive-behavioral.
In fact, current models of gene-environment interactions are incor-
porating epigenetics and synaptic plasticity (Desplats 2015), and
they also provide temporally dynamic mechanisms by which emo-
tional experience-dependent learning occurs, and by which either
somatic or psychological interventions can modulate the relevant
ﬁnal common neural pathways to reduce maladaptive fear and
stress responses or enhance safety responses, or both (Johansen
et al. 2011).
Neurophysiologically, these processes may involve altering the
balance between activation and inhibition; modifying response
thresholds, magnitude, and duration; switching sets for approach
and avoidance behaviors; and altering overall processing capacity
and ﬂexibility. Such processes may be automatic and unconscious
or volitional. All of this is consistent with the brain’s role in real-
time integration of its two overarching functions – being the
highest-order orchestrator of the changing internal milieu and
needs of the organism, and mediating interactions with the chang-
ing contingencies of the external (including social) world
(Mesulam 2000; Rolls & Grabenhorst 2008).
Kalisch et al.’s metalevel, yet still granular, approach also can
provide a foundation for screening capabilities that may be able
to distinguish who will develop difﬁculties in the setting of adver-
sity, trauma, abuse, or neglect. Such biological risk–resilience pro-
ﬁling is a prerequisite for trajectory-altering early intervention and
for the ultimate goal – prevention of profound and potentially
transgenerational mental and physical disease sequelae.
Broadening the deﬁnition of resilience and
“reappraising” the use of appetitive motivation
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Abstract: Kalisch et al.’s PASTOR model synthesizes current knowledge
of resilience, focusing on mechanisms as a common pathway to
outcomes and highlighting neuroscience as a method for exploring this.
We propose the model broaden its deﬁnition of resiliency to include
positive indices of recovery, include positive affect as a mechanism, and
approach motivation as distinct from overcoming aversive motivation.
Kalisch and colleagues deﬁne resiliency as “an empirically ob-
servable phenomenon, namely that someone does not
develop lasting mental health problems although he or she is
subject to adversity” (sect. 2, para. 2). By limiting the deﬁnition
of resilience to not developing mental health problems, Kalisch
et al. have included only half of the picture. More-expansive
deﬁnitions of resilience include individuals who are doing par-
ticularly well in the face of negative life events. For example,
Tugade and Fredrickson (2004) deﬁne resilience as “character-
ized by the ability to bounce back from negative emotional ex-
periences by ﬂexible adaptation to the changing demands of
stressful experiences.” (p. 320). This deﬁnition includes mech-
anisms such as the experience of positive affect, nurturing
social interactions, creativity, a focus on positive memories,
and even physical health. Although Kalisch et al. submit
some of these as resilience mechanisms, they also can be out-
comes indicative of resilience. The possibility that someone
may actually show increased well-being following a negative
life experience is not addressed in the PASTOR deﬁnition
and measurement of resiliency. Frazier et al. (2009) found
that 25% of participants who had experienced a traumatic
event actually reported increases in life satisfaction from pre-
to post-trauma. Including positive outcomes will more accurately
reﬂect the goals of resiliency research to study individuals who
are ﬂourishing rather than struggling.
Further, some of these mechanisms, such as positive affect,
should themselves be considered general mechanisms. According
to Fredrickson’s (1998; 2001) broaden-and-build theory of posi-
tive emotion, positive emotions are thought to facilitate recovery
from negative life events by broadening people’s attention (Fre-
drickson & Branigan 2005), inducing more-creative thinking
(Isen et al. 1987), and contributing to a broad-minded coping
style (Fredrickson & Joiner 2002). In this way, positive affect is
similar to, but independent from, a positive appraisal style. Posi-
tive affect may mediate the relationship between resilience
factors – such as social support, personality, coping style, and
physiological variables such as vagal control (Oveis et al. 2009) –
and outcomes related to resiliency – such as decreased susceptibil-
ity to mental and physical illness.
Similarly, Kalisch et al. describe resilience mechanisms as those
that reduce aversive motivation. Recent research suggests that ap-
petitive motivation may be just as important a focus of resilience
mechanisms. Orthogonal to aversive motivation, humans decide
whether to engage in appetitive motivation separately. As one
example, although ﬁnding an event aversive, someone who expe-
riences anger may move toward and engage with it. In the context
of appraisal or reappraisal processes, appetitive motivation repre-
sents an important driving force.
In some cases, rather than minimizing the averseness of a stres-
sor through reappraisal, the reappraisal process may focus atten-
tion on certain positive aspects of the stressful experience,
motivating appetitive action. For example, someone who experi-
ences the death of a loved one may focus on reminders of the de-
ceased in an effort to maintain a connection and call up the
positive feelings associated with the loved one. O’Connor et al.
(2008) found that when individuals classiﬁed as having complicat-
ed grief (characterized by a chronic and intense sense of longing
and searching for the deceased and preoccupation with thoughts
of the loved one) are shown photos of their deceased loved one,
neural networks associated with rewards and appetitive motiva-
tion in the nucleus accumbens are activated. This supports the
idea that the coping process broadly, including appraisal and re-
appraisal, includes appetitive motivation in addition to simply
minimizing aversion.
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If we think about the role of appetitive motivation in relation
to interference inhibition, we see that rather than inhibiting
negative appraisals, resiliency may involve inhibiting reward
processes that can undermine efforts at moving forward from
a stressful experience. For individuals with complicated grief,
appetitive motivation driving the desire to focus on a lost
loved one interferes with their ability to accept the reality of
the loss and contributes to symptoms of painful yearning and
preoccupation with thoughts about the deceased. In this
case, inhibition in the service of resilience necessarily involves
inhibiting this reward process. What is typically thought of as a
positive reward motivation can have a negative impact on re-
covery. Hence, in cases where an individual’s reappraisal may
conﬂict with reality, the appetitive motivation (e.g., engaging
in reveries about the deceased as self-soothing) actually may
result in poorer mental health outcomes (O’Connor et al.
2008).
Resilience also may depend on mechanisms outside of the indi-
vidual’s own appraisal. Shared meaning around the stressful expe-
rience may be determined collectively in a community or group. If
an individual’s positive appraisal or reappraisal is in conﬂict with
the appraisals of the group, it likely will lead to neither mental
stability nor resilience. The experience and expression of positive
emotion in the context of certain traumatic events are neither
always adaptive nor associated with recovery. For example,
Bonanno et al. (2007) found that women who smiled when dis-
closing experiences of childhood sexual abuse reported higher
levels of social withdrawal, illustrating the important role of
context in the relationship between positive emotion following a
negative life event and recovery. Similarly, Soenke et al. (under
review) found that individuals described as experiencing the
death of someone close and responding with a positive emotion
activity were rated less favorably than those engaging in activities
that directly focused on the loss.
The PASTOR model produced by Kalisch and colleagues is an
excellent synthesis of the current state of knowledge on resil-
ience, focusing on mechanisms as a common pathway to out-
comes, and highlighting how neuroscience could be used to
advance our knowledge in this area. Our criticism is simply
that they do not go as far as they could – they fail to include pos-
itive affect as a mechanism, and they approach motivation as dis-
tinct from overcoming aversive motivation. The authors point
out that interference inhibition is necessary as a mechanism;
we also would add that certainstressful situations require inhibi-
tion of approach motivation and inhibition of positive appraisal,
especially when they conﬂict with the contextual social appraisal
or reappraisal of a situation. These suggestions do not undercut
the PASTOR model, but extend the possible mechanisms the
model should consider.
Resilience: The role of accurate appraisal,
thresholds, and socioenvironmental factors1
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Abstract: Adding to the resilience model of Kalisch and colleagues, we
suggest that resilience is associated with accurate rather than excessively
positive or negative appraisal or reappraisal styles; that complex systems
do not always change in linear fashion; that linkages of individuals,
families, and communities markedly affect individual resilience; and that
resilience research focus on speciﬁc factors or mechanisms as well as
more global ones.
To date, most research on psychological resilience has identiﬁed
individual biopsychosocial factors associated with this construct
but has not investigated how these factors relate to one another
and what common mechanisms may mediate their impact (South-
wick & Charney 2012). Kalisch et al.’s ambitious “A Conceptual
Framework for the Neurobiological Study of Resilience” makes
an important contribution to the literature by proposing a com-
prehensive, theory-driven, and integrated approach to studying
resilience. We agree with many points made by the authors, in-
cluding: (1) the need for coherent and integrated models of resil-
ience; (2) the limitations of a categorical versus dimensional and
transdiagnostic approach to operationalizing resilience; (3) the
need to assess a broad range of stressors and traumas when study-
ing resilience; and (4) the importance of longitudinal studies.
In this commentary, we raise four issues for the authors to
consider.
First, according to the authors, positive appraisal style is “the
common resilience mechanism onto which all resilience factors
converge and through which they exert their protective effects
on mental health” (Table 1 of the target article). Although a sub-
stantial body of evidence does point to the resilience-enhancing
effects of positive appraisal, negative appraisal (e.g., ability to
detect and respond to danger) is also critical for resilience and sur-
vival. Positive attention or appraisal draws animals and humans
toward stimuli that are pleasurable and rewarding and that
sustain life, whereas negative attention or appraisal directs them
away from threats and dangers. Both are essential to maintaining
resilience.
In our view, both excessively negative and excessively positive
appraisal and reappraisal styles can compromise resilience. On
the one hand, as noted by the authors, when people with an exces-
sively negative appraisal and reappraisal cognitive style face chal-
lenges, they typically overestimate the likelihood or magnitude of
a negative outcome, or they underestimate their capacity to
cope – or both. On the other hand, an excessively positive style
can lead to inadequate preparation as the result of an underesti-
mation of risk and an overestimation of ability (Schneider 2001).
For example, as noted by Schneider (2001, p. 250), overly positive
appraisals may “involve self-deception or convincing oneself of
desired beliefs without appropriate reality checks.” Similarly, it
follows that higher appraisal scores (i.e., AS, continuous index of
appraisal style) do not necessarily translate to greater levels of re-
silience, because the relationship between AS and resilience is
likely curvilinear. Accordingly, we suggest that resilience can be
fostered by appraisals and reappraisals that are generally positive
but also accurate and realistic, which lead to stimulus-appropriate
responses.
Second, the authors propose that resilience be operationalized
as a continuous quantitative outcome. Complex adaptive systems
do not always change in a linear manner, however. Thresholds
abound in nature, from coral reefs (Fung et al. 2011) to brain cir-
cuits (Dietrich & Horvath 2011) to psychological performance
(Dutilh et al. 2011; Krystal 1978); and when a threshold is
crossed, a phase transition may take place that makes crossing
back difﬁcult or impossible because the system has undergone a
fundamental change, a property known as hysteresis (Walker &
Salt 2006). For example, an athlete may positively appraise his ca-
pacity to endure intense physical challenges, such as running mar-
athons. But he may be unaware that his coronary arteries have
gradually become occluded, until one day he has a massive
heart attack, at which point he crosses a threshold and becomes
far less physically and likely psychologically resilient. One deﬁni-
tion of resilience is “the capacity to absorb disturbance; to
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undergo change and still retain essentially the same function,
structure and feedbacks, without crossing a threshold to a differ-
ent system regime – a system with a different identity” (Walker &
Salt 2006, p. 32). Applying this deﬁnition, resilience involves
knowing where one’s thresholds may lie and distance from these
thresholds, understanding the primary drivers that cause the
system or individual to cross a threshold, and ﬁnding ways to
move the threshold or move away from it.
Third, by the authors squarely placing resilience in the indi-
vidual and considering socioenvironmental factors as “distant
inﬂuences” on mental health, we believe they underestimate
the importance of complex linkages of individuals, families,
communities, cultures, and the environment in fostering resil-
ience. These systems and linkages are constantly adapting to
change and interacting with one another. Although promoting
positive cognitive appraisal/reappraisal style in the individual
is important, we believe that it is critical to also intervene at
other levels. For example, the most effective way to enhance re-
silience in children involves providing a safe, stable, and loving
environment (Masten 2014). Accordingly, resilience-enhancing
interventions for children might include affordable housing,
safer neighborhoods, better schools, and classes in effective
parenting.
Fourth, the authors’ idea that resilience research “should
focus not on any speciﬁc dysfunction or pattern of dysfunction
but on global or average dysfunction” (sect. 1.4, para. 1) contrasts
with a substantial literature on learning and the utility of assess-
ing and fostering speciﬁc strengths and domains of functioning.
For example, scenario-based training (Salas et al. 2006), a highly
realistic form of training where the individual receives real-time
constructive feedback while practicing a speciﬁc skill or set of
skills, is one of the most effective ways to learn, and is essential
for training ﬁreﬁghters, police ofﬁcers, and soldiers. Although in-
terventions to enhance overall well-being, such as exercise, med-
itation, and improved sleep hygiene, are known to enhance one’s
capacity to deal with stress (Southwick & Charney 2012), equally
important are person-speciﬁc interventions, similar to personal-
ized medicine.
The notion that resilience is not simply the absence of vulner-
ability, but instead a positive attribute that can be characterized,
studied at a mechanistic level, and taught is, in its own way, a
recent and revolutionary idea. We applaud the efforts by
Kalisch et al. to advance a formal model for resilience that is
grounded in cognitive neuroscience and that has a number of
broad implications for the ﬁeld of stress. In this commentary,
we highlighted a number of directions that might be pursued in
the further development of this and other models for resilience.
It is critical that we progress in this area of research in order to
prevent and alleviate suffering in people who, all too commonly,
confront extreme challenges to their well-being.
NOTE
1. Parts of this commentary were written as an employee of the U.S.
Government and such parts are not subject to copyright protection in
the United States.
Reappraisal and resilience to stress: Context
must be considered
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Abstract: Kalisch et al. propose that positive reappraisal constitutes a
resilience mechanism for highly stressed individuals. Both empirical and
theoretical accounts suggest that this claim is too simplistic – the
relationship between reappraisal and resilience depends on context.
Indeed, there may be contexts in which reappraisal leads to harm, not
resilience. Future research should examine multiple regulatory
processes as well as context.
In their proposed PASTOR (positive appraisal style theory of re-
silience) framework, Kalisch et al. present a transdiagnostic
model of resilience. This model is extremely timely, and I
applaud the authors’ efforts at unifying the existing literature
and recommending a path forward for future research on resil-
ience. Although there are several speciﬁc claims made in their
article, I will focus speciﬁcally on one aspect of the PASTOR
model: positive reappraisal. The authors claim that positive ap-
praisal style is the sole mediating resilience mechanism.
Further, they claim that in highly stressful situations where
initial positive appraisals are difﬁcult, positive reappraisal (chang-
ing one’s appraisal to experience less negative emotion) consti-
tutes one key aspect of positive appraisal style. They conclude
that “positive reappraisal ability is therefore an inherent aspect
of positive appraisal style as the one mediating resilience mecha-
nism” (sect. 4.2.5, para. 6).
The idea that positive reappraisal is a key aspect of resilience is
consistent with decades of research on emotion regulation, which
has consistently documented the positive effects of reappraisal.
For example, higher levels of reappraisal use have been associated
with less depression, less anxiety, more social support, and more
positive affect (Aldao et al. 2010; Gross & John 2003). In the
context of high stress, individuals high in reappraisal ability report-
ed lower levels of depressive symptoms (Troy et al. 2010). This
body of work supports Kalisch et al.’s argument that the ability
to use positive reappraisal when one is stressed may be one key
mechanism contributing to resilience.
The argument that changing one’s appraisal is the sole mecha-
nism that causes resilience in all highly stressful situations seems
too simplistic, however. Several theoretical models emphasize
the idea that no process is universally adaptive in all contexts
(Endler 1975; Lazarus 1993a; Mischel 1968). Instead, these per-
spectives suggest that we can only understand the utility of a
process if we consider the speciﬁc context in which it is used.
For example, consider an individual who is highly stressed
because he is in danger of losing his job due to impending
layoffs. Here, the use of reappraisal to try to down-regulate his
negative emotions is likely to promote resilience. He can focus
on how the job loss may provide an unexpected opportunity to
explore a new career path. He may also remind himself of how
highly qualiﬁed he is for a range of other jobs and so will likely
ﬁnd another job soon. Hence, in a largely uncontrollable context
(he likely cannot do much to prevent the layoff), changing one’s
appraisals is likely to help the individual control one of the only
things he can: his emotional response.
Importantly, however, reappraisal may not be useful in a con-
trollable stressful context. For example, if a person is in danger
of losing his job because of poor performance at work, changing
his appraisal so he feels less negative may ironically impede resil-
ience. If the situation causing stress is controllable, he should take
direct action to change the situation (e.g., work harder). To the
degree that a realistic negative appraisal of the situation (i.e.,
“this is a really bad situation, and if I don’t do something to ﬁx
this soon, it will get much worse”) motivates direct action, main-
taining negative emotion may help promote resilience. Hence,
the use of positive reappraisal to decrease negative emotions in
this context may prevent rather than promote resilience because
feeling better about a controllable situation may prevent the indi-
vidual from taking the direct action that is needed to decrease the
effects of the stressor.
Indeed, recent work from my colleagues and me supports this
hypothesis (Troy et al. 2013). We found that in the context of rel-
atively uncontrollable stress, reappraisal ability was associated
with less depression. In the context of relatively controllable
stress, however, reappraisal ability was associated with more
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depression. These results support the idea that reappraisal ability
may be a critical component of resilience, but only in some con-
texts. In the case of controllable stress, maintaining a negative ap-
praisal of a situation may help lead to resilience, whereas using
reappraisal to change one’s emotions may impede resilience or
even harm the individual. This argument is in line with function-
alist accounts of negative emotion, which emphasize the idea that
negative emotions can be useful because they can motivate us to
take appropriate action when needed (Parrot 2002). Therefore, al-
though Kalisch and colleagues argue that resilience is character-
ized by limiting negative emotion using reappraisal, in some
contexts maintaining or even increasing negative emotion may
be the most resilient course.
Although our research focused on just one aspect of context –
controllability – it is likely that there are many other important
contextual variables that moderate the effects of reappraisal on re-
silience. For example, Sheppes and Gross’ (2011) process-speciﬁc
timing model suggests that the emotional intensity of stressful sit-
uations also may moderate the effects of reappraisal, with reap-
praisal being least effective in the most intense contexts.
Research on other emotion-regulation strategies (e.g., distraction,
acceptance) also has shown positive links to resilience (Shallcross
et al. 2010; Sheppes & Gross 2011). Together, these ﬁndings are
consistent with a growing body of research that highlights the im-
portance of context in resilience (Aldao 2013). These models of
emotion regulation emphasize the idea that resilience is character-
ized by the ﬂexible use of many different emotion-regulation strat-
egies depending on contextual demands (Bonanno et al. 2004;
Kashdan & Rottenberg 2010) and psychopathology may be char-
acterized by the inﬂexible, context-inappropriate use of emotion
regulation (Bonanno & Burton 2013).
Overall then, although it seems clear that reappraisal is one im-
portant mechanism that contributes to resilience, it is unlikely that
it is the sole mechanism that causes resilience in all stressful con-
texts. Indeed, in some contexts, reappraisal might constitute a risk
factor for negative outcomes. Moving forward, it seems that the
best approach to elucidating the transdiagnostic mechanisms of
resilience would involve examining multiple regulatory processes
across a diversity of contexts, rather than focusing all of our scien-
tiﬁc attention on just one process.
Social ecological complexity and resilience
processes
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Abstract: A social ecological model of resilience avoids the reductionism
of simple explanations of the complex and multisystemic processes
associated with well-being in contexts of adversity. There is evidence
that when stressors are abnormally high, environmental factors account
for more of an individual’s resilience than do individual traits or
cognitions. In this commentary, a social ecological model of resilience is
discussed.
The search for a unifying framework to explain resilience is a
worthy goal, but Kalisch et al. have chosen an overly reductionistic
explanation for positive adaptation under adversity. Research on
resilience is showing that the protective processes that account
for people’s survival are not just individual, but are as likely to
be social and ecological aspects of the individual’s life (Masten
2011; Theron et al. 2015; Ungar et al. 2012). By its very nature,
resilience implies the presence of a stressor, and the nature of
that stressor will inﬂuence how each protective process affects
outcomes related to well-being. Whereas a positive appraisal
style may be adaptive in some contexts where there is lower expo-
sure to risk, it may lead to worse mental health outcomes, or be
ineffective, in contexts where it produces faulty cognitions about
the threats posed and the solutions required to resolve life’s chal-
lenges (Seligman 2011). In this brief discussion, I will deﬁne resil-
ience in social ecological terms, discuss the differential impact
social ecologies have on resilience processes, and discuss the
dangers that a focus on positive appraisal style may have for clin-
ical processes and social policies that unintentionally place respon-
sibility for change solely on the individual.
Whether we look at the work of the epigeneticist (Jaffee et al.
2007), the neuropsychiatrist (Perry 2009), the medical anthropolo-
gist (Panter-Brick & Eggerman 2012), or the clinical social worker
(Sanders et al. 2014), there is general agreement:When individuals
are exposed to signiﬁcant amounts of adversity, the amount of var-
iance in positive developmental outcomes that is accounted for by
the person’s environment will be equal to or greater than that ac-
counted for by individual variables (Abramson et al. 2010;Cicchetti
2010; Kassis et al. 2013; Tol et al. 2011). For example, Romanian
orphans did much better developmentally when they were
adopted by well-resourced families in Britain (Beckett et al.
2006); young children who are burdened with risk factors that
predict delinquency are more likely to avoid early school dropout
and criminality when their environments (homes and schools) are
loaded with resources to socialize them well (Brame et al. 2001).
In both cases – neglected orphans and potential delinquents –
the locus of control for changes to life trajectory is external to the
child, though a positive disposition and willingness to take advan-
tage of these resources can help individuals develop in positive
ways. For this reason, resilience is increasingly being thought of
as the capacity of systems to adapt, rather than the capacity of indi-
viduals to overcome challenges. A social ecological model of resil-
ience suggests that human systems help individuals navigate to
resources, and negotiate for resources to be provided in meaningful
ways (Ungar 2011).
Even if we make the assumption that it is possible to reduce re-
silience to a cognitive process, the environment/individual interac-
tion (with the environment likely accounting for more of the
variance in outcomes than individual factors such as cognitive
style, intelligence, or personality) will inﬂuence the degree of suc-
cessful coping that is achieved. For example, in a nonresponsive
environment (e.g., chronic parental neglect) or a consistently op-
pressive environment (e.g., persistent racism), a positive appraisal
may actually have the unintended consequence of undermining
the experiencing of one’s personal efﬁcacy (Hopkins et al. 2012;
Obradovic ́ et al. 2010). After all, children who are racially margin-
alized but who make an unrealistically positive appraisal of their
capacity to resist oppression may actually be ill-prepared to
cope with the challenges they face. Instead, an accurate appraisal
of the world as grim and hopeless may cue children to emotionally
withdraw in order to protect themselves from exposure to threats
to their mental health (APA Task Force 2008).
In one sense, Kalisch et al. are correct. We require a transdiag-
nostic approach to resilience that identiﬁes the processes (plural,
not singular) that are associated with resilience. Unfortunately, a
model that reduces resilience to purely internal cognitive process-
es overlooks the need for a differential “diagnosis” of resilience
(Ungar 2015) that accounts for the complex patterns of environ-
mental inﬂuence along with cognitive processes. In this sense,
an experiment that models resilience with a rodent should never
forget that the subject would do quite ﬁne if the handler
stopped imposing stressors in the ﬁrst place. Rather than reducing
our understanding of resilience, our models should be more
systemic and ecological. Different factors matter more or less in
different contexts.
A tentative model ﬁrst published by Ungar (2011) accounted
for these complex aspects of individuals’ interactions with their
social ecologies. To summarize:
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In the context of above normal exposure to adversity
(∑A>average A for a population):
R1,2,3... = f PSC, E( )OAv, OAc( ) M( )
In the equation, resilience processes over time (R1, 2, 3…)
will vary by the interaction between a person (P) and his or
her environment (E), while keeping in mind the person’s
strengths (S) and challenges (C). Processes are mediated by
the opportunities (O) that are available (AV) and accessible
(AC) for adaptive coping. They also are mediated by the
socially constructed meaning systems (M) that shape appraisals
of the risks and resources that individuals experience (e.g.,
whether they experience these resources as useful). This
social ecological interpretation of resilience includes positive
appraisal style as part of the denominator (M), but keeps it
fully contextualized.
Although Kalisch et al. certainly expand the theory of appraisal
style and generously note the complexity of appraisals that are
related to resilience, their model’s locus of control remains inter-
nal brain functions, when we know that changes to the environ-
ment can trigger brain functions that, quite literally, shape
cognitions and resilience processes. This is more than a question
of which comes ﬁrst, trigger or cognition. Arguably, where there
is signiﬁcant risk exposure, it is the environment that accounts
for the majority of the change in individuals’ appraisals. Positive
reappraisal is preferred, but unrealistic unless one is privileged
enough to have opportunities (such as family supports) to justify
optimism.
Beyond resilience: Positive mental health and
the nature of cognitive processes involved in
positive appraisals
doi:10.1017/S0140525X14001733, e125
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Abstract: Although the PASTOR model provides a comprehensive
framework to study resilience, it faces some challenges. First, some
higher-order concepts (e.g., meaning) may be difﬁcult to model in the
laboratory. Second, deﬁning resilience as an absence of pathology might
be conceptually restrictive. Finally, the proposal that the severity of the
event is associated to different appraisal mechanisms needs further
evidence.
With their PASTOR model, Kalisch et al. propose a uniﬁed trans-
lational model of resilience that can be applied to different disor-
ders. They offer some compelling evidence for this translational
model and also some valuable speciﬁc suggestions for planned re-
search. Despite their conceptual attractiveness, however, transla-
tional models in psychopathology face some difﬁculties.
Using animal models, or experimental methodologies in
general, to study some key higher-order processes (e.g.,
meaning) or secondary emotions (e.g., shame) can be problematic.
An interesting parallel occurred with the learned helplessness
model of depression, initially based on animal research. The
initial model (Seligman 1975) suggested that unavoidable and un-
escapable aversive events were sufﬁcient causes of depression.
Yet, to extend the model to human depression (which includes
speciﬁc symptoms such as guilt), the model had to be reformulat-
ed by including the attributional style (i.e., the way individuals typ-
ically attribute the cause of the event) as the mediating factor
between facing an uncontrollable aversive event and the onset
of depression (Abramson et al. 1978). For example, the search
for meaning (Park 2010) and the reconstruction of shattered
core beliefs (Janoff-Bulman 1992) are key processes in human ap-
praisal associated with resilience. It is difﬁcult to foresee how
these constructs can be adequately manipulated under experi-
mental conditions. Furthermore, these complex processes also
bring into sharp relief the fact that (re)appraisal often is associated
with lengthy and complicated trajectories that develop over time
(Bonanno et al. 2011). Also, (re)appraisal is not necessarily
focused on the immediate evaluation of a situation, as it is typically
studied when using experimental paradigms.
A second challenge for the PASTOR model is related to its def-
inition of resilience. According to Kalisch et al., resilience is an
outcome observed when “someone does not develop lasting
mental health problems” after having been exposed to adversity.
In other words, Kalisch et al.’s approach is anchored on a negative
mental health framework (i.e., a view of mental health based on
the presence/absence of symptoms). Accordingly, the way they
propose to deﬁne and measure global resilience (e.g., by psycho-
pathological instruments such as the General Health Question-
naire capitalizes on a restricted view of resilience focused on
symptoms.
Yet despite the focus of the PASTOR model on symptoms,
recent models of positive mental health emphasize that mental
health must be deﬁned not only in terms of symptoms, but also
in terms of the presence of capacities, strengths, and well-being
(Keyes 2005; Maddux et al. 2012). Any robust model of resilience
should seriously integrate the perception of beneﬁts (Helgeson
et al. 2006) or even posttraumatic growth (Fredrickson et al.,
2003; Calhoun & Tedeschi 2013) being a frequent experience
among those exposed to adversity. Therefore, researchers
should attend to the idea that positive dimensions of mental
health (e.g., autonomy, self-acceptance, or sense of control; Ryff
& Singer 1998) could be intrinsic aspects of a more comprehen-
sive deﬁnition of resilience (Waugh & Koster 2014).
In terms of the quantiﬁcation of PASTOR (sect. 3.1), restricting
resilience to low presence of symptoms may reduce the variability
of the observed data and the predictive power of the model. In
other words, it is likely that simply not showing mental health
symptoms is not a robust indicator of true resilience (e.g., a
reduced vulnerability to develop future psychological crises in
facing signiﬁcant stressors).
Kalisch et al. convincingly state that research on resilience
should focus more on mechanisms than on describing factors as-
sociated to it, on which there is already an abundant literature.
It is easy to agree with the authors in their call for doing research
beyond questionnaires and self-reports, thereby overcoming a
limitation of research trends in psychology in the last decade
(Baumeister et al. 2007). In terms of mechanisms, Kalisch et al.
propose a model that takes into consideration both automatic
and controlled processes in the appraisal of aversive situations
(sect. 1.3). Although they pay more attention to conscious mech-
anisms of appraisal (sect. 4.2.5), there are relevant data, from ex-
perimental psychopathology, showing that automatic cognitive
processes also may play an important role in the appraisal
process. For example, using eye-tracking methodologies,
Sanchez and Vázquez (2014) found that normal, healthy partici-
pants pay more attention to happy than sad faces. On the contrary,
clinically depressed participants have difﬁculties disengaging from
sad faces (Sanchez et al. 2013), as well as engaging with happy
faces (Duque & Vázquez 2015).
Hence, automatic attentional processes do participate in initial
stages of appraisal, and what is even more important, they have a
signiﬁcant impact on mood regulation. For example, after the
induction of a depressed mood in the laboratory, the more time
participants gaze at happy faces, the stronger their recovery from
that negative mood (Sanchez et al. 2014). Therefore, appraisal/re-
appraisal mechanisms should be understood within the broader
scope of voluntary and automatic emotion-cognition processes.
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Finally, also in relation to the cognitive processes involved in pos-
itive appraisals leading to resilience, one of the claims of the
PASTOR model (sect. 4.2.5) is that positive appraisals are very
common in minor or moderate aversive events, but very unlikely
in strongly aversive situations. The evidence in the trauma literature
does not provide a direct support for this hypothesis, however. It has
been shown that a variety of positive emotions can be experienced in
the immediate aftermath of stressful events such as a devastating
earthquake (Vázquez et al. 2005), a massive terrorist attack
(Vázquez &Hervas 2010), or in the ﬁrst 72 hours after a myocardial
infarction (Castilla & Vázquez 2011). These ﬁndings reveal that
even in highly aversive situations, positive appraisal processes may
be more common than expected, and also that they may emerge
during the events (Vázquez et al. 2008).
In conclusion, the PASTOR model makes a valuable effort to
create a framework to establish consistent bridges between
animal and human research. Yet, human responses to adversity
can be very complex, often including higher-order psychological
constructs (e.g., reconstruction of shattered beliefs) as well as out-
comes that go beyond resilience (e.g., psychological growth). A
sound model of resilience should consider these intrinsic ingredi-
ents of human response to life adversities.
The temporal dynamics of resilience: Neural
recovery as a biomarker
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Abstract: Resilience can be deﬁned as the capability of an individual to
maintain health despite stress and adversity. Here we suggest to study
the temporal dynamics of neural processes associated with affective
perturbation and emotion regulation at different time scales to
investigate the mechanisms of resilience. Parameters related to neural
recovery might serve as a predictive biomarker for resilience.
According to Kalisch et al. resilience should be considered a dimen-
sional and quantiﬁable outcome; that is, sustained or improved
mental health following stress and adversity, where stress is concep-
tualized in the broadest sense, as an aversive emotional response.
Importantly, the authors emphasize the distinction between resil-
ience factors and mechanisms, the latter being of prime interest
given that these describe the general processes through which resil-
ience can be achieved. Resilience mechanisms exert their inﬂuence
by actively limiting aversion in order to adaptively achieve long-
term functioning. According to their theory, the main resilience
mechanism is positive (re)appraisal, which is supported by inhibi-
tion of negative appraisals under severe stress. Overall, we
welcome the authors’ well-informed effort to bring together re-
search on emotion regulation, stress, conditioning, and extinction
to understand resilience. In the following, we will ﬁrst address a po-
tential general problem of the theory. Second, we will suggest a way
to investigate resilience mechanisms by focusing on the temporal
dynamics of physiological recovery from stress and adversity.
Let us start with the potential problem. The theory of Kalisch
et al. is rather ambitious – or, as the authors themselves state,
radical. They suggest that there is a single, general resilience
mechanism that serves as a common ﬁnal path of all resilience
factors, namely positive (re)appraisal. The appeal of such an ap-
proach is that it seems to explain much, from psychological phe-
nomena down to intricate animal research on extinction.
Imagine, however, if we found out that resilience can be explained
only by reduced sensitivity – a short perturbation within a negative
appraisal system, with fast recovery to normal.. In our understand-
ing, this would not by itself necessitate a positive appraisal style.
Kalisch et al. probably would argue that this form of resilience
is supported by the ﬁrst claim of their theory (i.e., positive apprais-
al), as the threat is appraised (in the long run) “non-negatively.”
Deﬁning positive appraisal as everything that is not appraised neg-
atively, however, blurs the important distinction between positive
and negative valuation that is realized by distinct brain circuits
(Schardt et al. 2010; Staudinger et al. 2009; 2011) and also ne-
glects the relevance of the time domain. We therefore think
that the theory Kalisch et al. propose might rely too heavily on a
speciﬁc interpretation of the psychological term appraisal and,
as a consequence, the theory is difﬁcult to deﬁne and to operation-
alize unambiguously from a neurobiological perspective.
Although we agree that it is necessary to unite psychological
theories of resilience mechanisms with neurobiology, we think
that it might be helpful to approach resilience in a more reduc-
tionist and physiological fashion: Once stress response is deﬁned
in physiological terms, we can monitor its signatures (e.g., heart
rate and blood pressure increase, cortisol levels, amygdala activa-
tion, etc.) and investigate the neural processes by which an organ-
ism manages to recover from those changes. Such neural recovery
processes can be considered (proxies of) resilience mechanisms in
themselves. As such, they do not necessarily have to rely on a
general ability, but could instead be domain speciﬁc as well; that
is, sometimes relying on decreased sensitivity for aversion, some-
times on positive (counter)appraisal, and sometimes on inhibition
of negative aversion. A focus on physiological changes and their
recovery has several advantages: First, it is neutral on whether re-
silience is achieved by conscious/effortful or unconscious/auto-
matic processes. Second, it can easily be quantiﬁed by
measuring changes in physiological parameters.
The second point we want to make is closely related to the
aforementioned argument and pertains to the relevance of tempo-
ral dynamics of resilience mechanisms on different time scales. A
crucial element in resilience is the ability of an organism to
achieve stability through change, a process known as allostasis
(McEwen & Wingﬁeld 2003) – in our case, to regain homeostasis
after a stressful event. Importantly, allostasis can relate to both
rapid (e.g., autonomic) and slower (e.g., cognitive) adaptations
to a stressor, associated with speciﬁc neural markers; these pro-
cesses, at the same time, all have a speciﬁc time course in their
own respect. In other words, recovery (or lack thereof) is inher-
ently a temporal phenomenon: (Neuro)physiological parameters
of the stress response (reﬂecting a system state) may recover,
may show sensitization, may be perturbed in the long range, or
may even show aftereffects long after the acute stressor is gone.
For example, it has been shown that the success of effortful
emotion regulation in humans can be measured by a reduction
of the amygdala signal (Erk et al. 2010b; Lamke et al. 2014;
Walter et al. 2009), and that the dynamics of recovery of the amyg-
dala signal are predictive of later amygdala responses to aversive
stimulation (Walter et al. 2009). Circuits known to be involved
in automatic as well as volitional emotion regulation (e.g., func-
tional connectivity between the prefrontal cortex and amygdala)
are affected by stressful situations, and changes within these cir-
cuits could be observed even long after the stress has waned
(Veer et al. 2011). Moreover, aftereffects of aversive emotional re-
sponses could even be demonstrated a year after effortful emotion
regulation (Erk et al. 2010a).
We therefore suggest that one way to foster resilience research
might be to focus on the temporal dynamics of changes in those
brain circuits on different time scales, and on the mechanisms
that are involved in the recovery of brain responses to stressful sit-
uations. We hypothesize that the ability to recover from perturba-
tions and the temporal pattern of recovery could serve as an index
or biomarker that will be predictive of resilience in the long run.
The mechanisms that contribute to such recovery might be
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diverse, or they might indeed be of a more general nature, the
latter being in keeping with the theory of Kalisch et al. In this
sense, our proposed research strategy might be a natural extension
of the generalized theory of resilience as proposed by Kalisch
et al., but might also be of interest to other theoretical accounts
of resilience.
Do we know how stressed we are?
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Abstract: I take issue with Kalisch et al.’s formulation of PASTOR,
arguing that care must be taken in understanding what is meant by
“appraisal.” I examine the implications of PASTOR given two competing
possibilities for what counts as an appraisal – ﬁrst, if appraisal is
restricted to conscious reﬂection on one’s circumstances, and second, if
appraisal is expanded to include subconscious mechanisms of evaluation.
The target article seeks to reorient psychiatric research from a
focus on dysfunctions and illnesses to a focus on mental health,
by proposing a view according to which the active process of resil-
ience to variable and diverse stressors is what counts for mental
health. It further suggests that a single unifying mechanism pro-
tects against stress and mediates resilience, namely, the style in
which someone evaluates and reacts to a challenge. This is
called the positive appraisal style theory of resilience
(PASTOR). Although much depends on what constitutes an “ap-
praisal,” Kalisch and colleges say unfortunately little about it.
On their picture, appraisal is a context-dependent process of eval-
uation that determines one’s aversive or appetitive motivation
toward a stimulus. As shown in their Figure 3, this involves an in-
dividual ﬁrst representing and reﬂecting on a given situation, and
then making judgments about, for example, its novelty, pleasant-
ness, or compatibility with her goals. The individual’s emotional
response then follows directly from this appraisal.
Intuitively, this kind of judgment may include the kind of ex-
plicit, conscious reﬂection and deliberation familiar to philoso-
phers in action theory. The portrayal of global resilience
mechanisms as operating entirely via conscious reﬂection and
evaluation is inconsistent, however, with a commonly endorsed
picture of the mind that understands much of our cognition to
be implicit and outside of conscious awareness. In many circum-
stances, we just do not know how stressed we are.
Using indirect methods, current research in social psychology
has begun to reveal many interesting failures of self-knowledge.
Wilson (2002), Gilbert (2009), and others have shown that this
lack of awareness extends to the affective character of our own ex-
periences. In his work on happiness Haybron (2008) calls this
problem affective ignorance, stressing that, not only do we some-
times misjudge or mistake our feelings, but that we can be “essen-
tially blind to hedonically important aspects of our experience”
(p. 61). Whereas sudden, sharp changes in our affective state
have a way of calling attention to themselves (e.g., accidentally
hitting one’s funny bone), persistent affects and moods are
often diffuse and elusive. We even adapt to some pains and annoy-
ances, failing to notice them at all (e.g., suddenly realizing how ir-
ritating the refrigerator sounds only when it turns off). In a recent
study, Evans and Johnson (2000) demonstrate that low-intensity
noise in an ofﬁce space raised physiological and behavioral mea-
sures of stress, but did not affect workers’ reports of perceived
stress compared with a quiet ofﬁce. This shows how affective
and psychophysiological stress responses often come apart from
self-report. An individual can be feeling anxious or depressed,
while sincerely claiming, and believing themselves, to be happy.
In other words, affective response to the environment may have
little to do with explicit, reﬂective evaluation of the environment.
When it comes to stress and affect, we are not often able to recognize
or articulate exactly which stimuli demand a response in the ﬁrst
place. Indeed, on this reading of appraisal, positive appraisal style
does not seem to protect against stress at all. Because of this, our
resilience mechanisms cannot plausibly depend solely on conscious
reﬂection about our circumstances. Stress depends on more than
just explicit judgment on whether conditions are favorable.
The PASTOR approach could be improved by expanding its
notion of appraisal to include unconscious evaluative processes.
The Evans and Johnson study is especially revealing in this vein,
as it demonstrates how stressors often affect us without reﬂective
awareness. Resilience research should be interested in discover-
ing, for example, what differentiates those with a more resilient
or positive stress response in a noisy ofﬁce, regardless of how
they reﬂectively feel about their work environment. This suggests
that when it comes to resilience mechanisms, positive appraisal is
simply positive affective or psychophysiological response relative
to stressor load. To make a positive evaluation, on this picture,
is just for an organism to make the best of its circumstances,
whether challenging or routine. Resilience is normalized to indi-
viduals’ actual performance in the face of various stimuli.
I would like to sound a note of caution here. Care should be taken
in examining the philosophical implications of this kind
of normalization for our understanding of mental health and well-
being, especially if a normalized understanding of positive appraisal
style is adopted into the very methodology of resilience research, as
Kalisch et al. suggest when they propose that “it might be neces-
sary…to choose study cohorts that are confronted with single
classes of stressors” (sect. 4.2.8, para. 4). Contrary to what Kalisch
et al. claim, socioenvironmental factors are not distant inﬂuences
on mental health. In particular, in marginalized populations for
whom mental health is a crucial concern, systemic inequality
raises the magnitude of everyday environmental stressors, and
limits many social support–based stress-aversion strategies
(Satcher 2001). Therefore, regardless of how resilient an individual
might be, it is possible that resiliencemechanisms inevitably will col-
lapse in certain environments. A population of individuals all suffer-
ing equally is not, colloquially speaking, doing ﬁne. It simply cannot
be the case, from an ethical perspective, that what is statistically
normal in this case determines what counts as mentally healthy.
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Abstract: We are delighted by the broad, intense, and fruitful discussion
in reaction to our target article. A major point we take from the many
comments is a prevailing feeling in the research community that we
need signiﬁcantly and urgently to advance resilience research, both by
sharpening concepts and theories and by conducting empirical studies at
a much larger scale and with a much more extended and sophisticated
methodological arsenal than is the case currently. This advancement can
be achieved only in a concerted international collaborative effort. In our
response, we try to argue that an explicitly atheoretical, purely
observational deﬁnition of resilience and a transdiagnostic, quantitative
study framework can provide a suitable basis for empirically testing
different competing resilience theories (sects. R1, R2, R6, R7). We are
conﬁdent that it should be possible to unite resilience researchers from
different schools, including from sociology and social psychology, behind
such a pragmatic and theoretically neutral research strategy. In sections
R3 to R5, we further specify and explain the positive appraisal style
theory of resilience (PASTOR). We defend PASTOR as a comparatively
parsimonious and translational theory that makes sufﬁciently concrete
predictions to be evaluated empirically.
R1. Individual-level and social-level approaches:
Friends, not foes
We begin this response as we ended our target article, by
conﬁrming again that we do not at all deny the important
inﬂuence of social factors, namely of social support, in
the protection against stress-related mental dysfunctions,
and that we see great potential in interventions that
target social and environmental variables (Janicki-Deverts
& Cohen 2011; Reissman et al. 2011; Southwick et al.
2011; Zautra 2014). We merely dare conjecture that the un-
questionable effects of social support and other nonindivid-
ual resources on mental health, emphasized in the
commentaries by Bennett & Windle; Chang, Reddan,
Ashar, Eisenbarth, & Wager (Chang et al.); IJzerman
& Lindenberg; Kimbrel & Beckham; Southwick,
Pietrzak, Charney, & Krystal (Southwick et al.);
Ungar; and Washington, can be explained by how they
shape stressor appraisal and how they affect stressor expo-
sure. If this turned out to be true, what would be the con-
sequences for the development of resilience-promoting
interventions? And could these consequences be unethical,
as Ungar and Washington imply?
First of all, we think that discovering newways to promote
mental health, including ways that involve directly changing
appraisals or underlying neural processes, or both, can only
be highly desirable in a ﬁeld where scientiﬁcally grounded
and empirically tested effective and efﬁcient intervention
programs are still scarce. We cannot choose from a rich
basket of resilience interventions, and therefore, basically
any new possibility to improve mental health should be
welcome, regardless of what route is taken to achieve the
effect. This pragmatic stance, and the sobering experiences
we have had over the years working as psychiatrists and neu-
roscientists of how difﬁcult it is to change appraisals and
brain functions, includes the realistic prediction that it is
highly unlikely that cognitive-neuroscientiﬁc resilience re-
search ever will discover the “magic pill” that produces resil-
ient robots that can be used and exploited for any kind of
stressful activity. Positive appraisals may be protective but,
as Washington notes, “regardless of how resilient an indi-
vidual might be, it is possible that resilience mechanisms in-
evitably will collapse in certain environments.”
That implies that new intervention methods that might
be developed from the kind of research that our target
article tries to promote will almost certainly never replace
the need to work also at the socioenvironmental level.
Rather, individual-level interventions will complement
social-level approaches. So, taking into account individual
factors and better understanding the relationship between
socioenvironmental and individual factors might have the
advantage that we can better tailor socioenvironmental in-
terventions to individual needs. For example, if the effect
of social support on resilience indeed were mediated by ap-
praisal, it would make much sense to provide social
support–enhancing interventions speciﬁcally to those indi-
viduals who perceive their social support as low and suffer
from this perception. By contrast, individuals who already
feel well supported (regardless of whether this appraisal is
correct or not), as well as those who do not value social
support much and feel strong enough to cope without,
would most likely not beneﬁt from such an intervention.
Also, socioenvironmental interventions, even if well-
tailored, may be limited in their efﬁcacy and efﬁciency, for
example, because they do not manage to change
everyone’s appraisals to the better (the skeptic or misan-
thropist might not be impressed by offers of better social in-
tegration) and hence do not achieve optimized stress
responding in every participant. In these cases, socioenviron-
mental interventions might proﬁt from augmentation by ad-
junctive enhancements through psychological or
neurobiological routes of the positive appraisals they are in-
tended to generate. Those enhancements might include
pharmacological strengthening of positive memories of
social support, similar to current attempts to augment psy-
chotherapy with drugs that improve the formation of safety
memories made during exposure-based treatments
(Graham et al. 2014).
Positive appraisals might also be generated or enhanced
independent from the intended effects of a socioenviron-
mental intervention, simply as an add-on, to improve
overall outcome. For example, a socioenvironmental inter-
vention that increases perceived social support could be
supplemented with a cognitive-neuroscientiﬁc intervention
that improves the ability to discriminate safety from threat.
Hence, individual tailoring, augmentation, and supple-
mentation are possible clinical beneﬁts of an individual-
level approach to resilience. Let us also not forget that, in
many cases, socioenvironmental factors simply will be out
of the hands of the clinician, educator, or counselor
working with at-risk individuals, and therefore, exclusively
betting on socioenvironmental interventions is certainly
not an option for resilience research. In this last scenario,
indeed, replacement of socioenvironmental action is a
fourth possible beneﬁt of individual-level action.
There is even a wider political implication to an approach
that involves strengthening individuals. One could argue
that individual-level methods will increase the pressure
on people to function in adverse environments and will
allow those in power more easily to exploit those who are
not. We believe that this risk needs to be weighed against
the chances that an individual-level approach bears for
helping individuals stay healthy, and in this cost-beneﬁt
analysis, we estimate the beneﬁts to weigh more than the
costs. Further, there is a paternalistic notion in seeing
people as weak and dependent on help frommore powerful
others who might have the capacity to change the world for
them.
We know that this is not a standpoint taken by any of our
commentators, and we apologize in advance to those
readers who might ﬁnd the following political “manifesto”
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ill-suited for a biobehavioral research article. But we would
like to take this opportunity to emphasize that we believe
that individual-level resilience research has a potential to
empower individuals to lead freer and more autonomous
lives and also to be more resistant to economic or political
pressures, simply because they need less time and energy to
stay healthy despite those pressures. Ultimately, resilient
individuals will have a higher capacity to involve themselves
in a constructive fashion in economic or political decision-
making processes and to participate socially. This can only
be beneﬁcial for the ﬂourishing of democratic societies, in
particular when the stability of these societies is challenged
by natural or man-made threats. We would thus make a
bold claim (to be empirically evaluated by a different disci-
pline of science than ours) that resilient individuals make
resilient countries.
R2. Explaining the inﬂuence of social factors and of
coping behaviors on mental health
In section 3.1 of our target article, we deﬁne the degree of
resilience R someone exhibits at some timepoint T2 during
or after stressor exposure by normalizing mental health
changes ΔΣP occurring between baseline (T1) and T2 to
the stressor load incurred in between, as expressed in the
equation: RT2 = 1/(ΔΣP/ΣS) = ΣS/ΔΣP, P signifying mental
problems. (See also Fig. 1 in that section.) Normalization
of mental health changes ΔΣP to stressor load ΣS has prac-
tical and conceptual importance. This can be illustrated by
assuming a case where stressor load ΣS between T1 and T2
is low in a subject (compared with other subjects or with
other measurement intervals in the same subject). Here,
a maintenance of mental health or even a decrease in
mental problems over that interval (i.e., a small, range-cor-
rected ΔΣP value) would be a trivial effect that should not
be considered a case of resilience. (Remember that resil-
ience is not just mental health but mental health in the
face of adversity.) Accordingly, in the equation, the sub-
ject’s relatively small ΣS value would result in smaller RT2
scores than in subjects with higher stressor load ΣS but sim-
ilarly stable mental health (who could rightly claim to be
more resilient). When compared with subjects with
higher stressor load and increased mental health problems,
our subject would have a comparable RT2 score, provided
comparable ratios of ΣS and ΔΣP. (This means that two
subjects with different mental health trajectories would
still be classiﬁed as similarly resilient.) Hence, to sum up
this ﬁrst point, our formalization avoids simply equating re-
silience with mental health, and thereby preserves the orig-
inal meaning of the term resilience.
The subject in the example also could have a higher RT2
score than other subjects; for example, when another
subject had a higher stressor load and the concomitant in-
crease in mental problems in that subject outweighed the
higher stressor load, or when another subject showed in-
creased mental problems despite low stressor load.
Another point to note about our formalization, therefore,
is the relativity of the R score in terms of the stressor expo-
sure and the mental stability of the sample. This certainly
precludes comparing R scores between individuals from
different types of samples (e.g., a soldier in combat
versus a physician in internship), but it allows for compar-
ing R scores between individuals from similar samples,
which can be very practical for multicenter or replication
studies.
A third point is that our formalization permits a concep-
tualization of how social factors (and also coping behaviors;
see further below) affect mental health and of how this
relates to resilience. As explained in detail in section
4.2.4.1, section 4.2.4.2, and Figure 4 of the target article,
we hypothesize that the inﬂuence of social factors can be
explained by their inﬂuence on appraisals, while consider-
ing that they also affect stressor load ΣS. Hence, in our
framework, social support (if perceived) can improve
one’s perceived coping potential, making a threat appear
less threatening and thereby reducing the likelihood of ex-
aggerated, inappropriately costly stress responses and ulti-
mately of mental problems P. This happens without
effects on stressor exposure ΣS. Therefore, compared
with a subject with identical stressor load (!) but lower per-
ceived social support, a subject with higher perceived social
support is less likely to develop mental problems and will be
classiﬁed as more resilient. Further, social support (if re-
ceived) can factually reduce stressors S, likewise reducing
the likelihood of costly stress responses and ensuing
mental problems P. Better mental health, however, does
not necessarily count as better resilience, as long as the
mental health effect simply (trivially) reﬂects reduced stres-
sor load, as discussed above.
Ungar rejects our hypothesis, arguing that we neglect
the role of opportunities for adaptive coping offered, or
not, by the environment. We would counter that coping op-
portunities do enter into our equation, namely by deter-
mining one’s perceived coping potential and by
additionally deﬁning stressor load. So, when the stressed
employee that we used as an illustrative example at
several instances throughout the target article (starting in
sect. 1.3) has the opportunity to cope with an externally
caused increase in performance pressure (a stressor, S)
by working harder – for example, because his family will
take over some of his domestic obligations for a while –
this will both increase his perceived coping potential and
reduce stressor load (by avoiding excessive demands).
This is another example where we do not deny the inﬂu-
ence of social factors on mental health or resilience, but
simply split that inﬂuence into those effect paths going
via stressor appraisal, thus acting distally on resilience,
and those going via stressor exposure.
IJzerman & Lindenberg argue that a secure, complex,
and ﬂexible self, shaped in early development by social
thermoregulation and operationalized (in approximation)
by a secure attachment style, among others makes people
cope more constructively, that is, behave in a way that
strengthens social bonds and activates social support.
They propose that securely attached individuals spontane-
ously produce prosocial emotional responses that function
to assure their social partners that they are understood
and supported (such as when they respond to their part-
ner’s anger with a spontaneous smile rather than with retal-
iation, or when they display understanding and
encouragement of their partner’s goals). We have no objec-
tions against the idea that behaviors that promote perceived
and received social support eventually promote resilience
and mental health (see above). We merely want to point
out again that our model deals with variables such as a
secure attachment style, the associated adaptive coping be-
haviors, and the resulting social support as, one, reducing
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stressor load ΣS and as, two, promoting resilience indirect-
ly, by providing positive appraisals.
The examples of adaptive coping brought by IJzerman
& Lindenberg are helpful in allowing us to clarify better
than we may have in our target article the role of behavior,
which we let affect mental health outcomes by bearing on
stressor load ΣS (similar to received social support). In the
target article’s section 2 we deﬁned stress (threat, aversive,
fear) responses as adaptive reactions that serve to assure
survival and reproduction by avoiding, removing, or mini-
mizing threats. In our preceding phenomenological deﬁni-
tion in its section 1.3, we included overt behavior – primary
(defensive) or secondary (compensatory and recuperative)
coping responses such as ﬂight or ﬁght, avoidance, impact
preparation, support seeking, resource building, and so
forth – among the many components of the stress response.
One such primarily adaptive behavioral stress response
(best classiﬁed as defensive coping) is the increase in
work efforts produced by the employee in the example in
that same section 1.3. The response is adaptive because it
minimizes chances of failure and of being exposed to addi-
tional and potentially more severe stressors such as being
criticized, downgraded, or sacked. Hence, adaptive behav-
ioral coping limits increases in ΣS and thereby promotes
mental health. Adaptive coping behavior may be promoted
by knowledge about how to achieve goals and by metacog-
nitive insight into one’s weaknesses and strengths and one’s
motivators – faculties that also may help avoid stressor ex-
posure in the ﬁrst place (Lau).
R3. On the adaptive nature of stress and on optimal
stressor appraisal (speciﬁcation of PASTOR)
This is also our response to several commentators who
blame us for not acknowledging the adaptive nature of
stress responses, and in particular the active behavioral
coping aspect of stress responses (Bennett & Windle;
Egloff; Freund & Staudinger; Juslin; Mancini; South-
wick et al.; Troy). We think this is a misrepresentation
of our theory, but we realize that we also may have
invited this misrepresentation by imprecise wording,
namely in the ﬁrst paragraph of section 4.2.5 on reappraisal.
We therefore emphasize here that because of the primarily
adaptive nature of stress responses (pointed out in sects.
1.3, 2, and 4.2.4.1), we do not propose that stress responses
should be avoided at any costs. What we say is that “al-
though primarily adaptive, stress responses can become
deleterious if they are very intense, prolonged, or chronic –
by exhausting internal, but also social or monetary resourc-
es and interfering with the pursuit of other important goals,
as summarized in the concept of allostatic load (McEwen &
Stellar 1993)” (sect. 1.3, para. 3). We go on to argue that
as a consequence, any mechanism that helps the organism ﬁne-
tune stress responses to optimal levels, to terminate them if no
longer necessary, and to remain ﬂexible enough to switch to
possible alternative coping strategies, thereby facilitating efﬁ-
cient deployment of resources, is likely to protect all or most
of the systems involved in the stress response and therefore
to prevent a large range of stress-related dysfunctions. (sect.
1.3, para. 3)
We illustrate the importance of “optimized aversion,” “op-
timizing stressor-induced aversion,” “optimally regulat[ing]
stress responses,” and “react[ing] to…stressors with opti-
mized aversion” (sect. 1.3); “ﬂexibly adjust[ing] aversive
motivation to appropriate levels” and “optimization of aver-
sion” (sects. 2 and 4.2.8); and “limitation of…aversion”
(sect. 4.2) by taking the example of the stressed employee
to the point where he fails despite increased work efforts,
and perseverance is not an option anymore. The employee
develops “dislike for the job, decreased efforts or even
avoidance of work, and diminished job-related self-efﬁcacy
perceptions” (sect. 1.3). These, too, are adaptive stress re-
sponses, precisely because they help preventing “pointless
perseverance and [the resulting] exhaustion” (i.e., the
costs of a more inﬂexible and unnecessarily prolonged
stress response). If he is smart, the pitiable employee
now will “search for alternative coping strategies, such as
reducing ambitions and redeﬁning work objectives or
looking for another job.” Looking for a better job therefore
is another example of what may be considered an adaptive
coping behavior (see sect. R2), which functions to contain
stressor load S (e.g., unemployment).
The more important point to make here, however, is that
an aversive over-reaction potentially can be harmful at two
stages: It can make the employee persevere unnecessarily,
until the point of exhaustion; or later, provided he earlier
has chosen to give up, it can prevent the employee from
looking for a smarter solution, and instead induce “a gener-
alized amotivational, lethargic state” (sect. 1.3). Both ex-
haustion and lethargy would ﬁgure as increases in mental
problems (ΔΣP) in our model. What could cause the
harmful over-reaction? Or better, what could prevent it?
The “dislike for the job” and the “diminished job-related
self-efﬁcacy perceptions” that stop perseverance are realis-
tic appraisals that are neither negative (in the sense that
they do not exaggerate the aversive consequences of
failure) nor too positive (incorrectly appetitive). (Here,
Beer & Flagan; Crespi; Freund & Staudinger; Juslin;
Koole, Schwager, & Rothermund (Koole et al.); Lau;
Mancini; Sachser & Richter; Southwick et al.; and
Ungar have a point in insisting that unrealistically appeti-
tive or delusional appraisals are likely to be harmful,
which not to have mentioned is clearly a weakness of our
target article.) Similarly, to prevent generalized lethargy,
the employee must “not extend [his] aversion and
reduced self-efﬁcacy perceptions to work life generally or
even to any kind of challenging situation” (sect. 1.3). That
is, he must avoid unrealistically aversive appraisals (as
well as unrealistically appetitive appraisals). Avoiding such
appraisals is key for producing adaptive stress responses, in-
cluding at the level of behavioral coping. Such stress re-
sponses will come with costs, but these costs will be
appropriate in relation to the costs of not responding.
From the comments, we realize that we have not ade-
quately deﬁned what we consider as “negative” and “posi-
tive.” So what is an optimal appraisal style that assures
adaptive stress responding? If we understand “negative”
as any appraisal that exaggerates the aversive consequences
of a threatening situation, in the sense of pessimism or cat-
astrophization, then seeing a threat as what it is does not
count as negative. Responding to a barking mastiff with
staying still and keeping away is an adaptive stress response
that is caused by a realistic appraisal of the threatening
nature of the dog. This appraisal is not negative in our ter-
minology. Responding to the mastiff with panic and
running away is the result of an exaggerated, that is, nega-
tive or pessimistic appraisal that an attack is unavoidable
and imminent and escape is the only, though small,
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chance to stay alive. It is the equivalent of an employee who
has once failed on the job and now believes that he is
unable to achieve anything, whether on the job or in any
other difﬁcult situation.
So the art is to avoid unnecessarily aversive motivational
states because these cause unnecessary costs, including the
costs of stupid decisions. According to this deﬁnition of the
term negative, we have deﬁned a negative appraisal style as
might be found in a patient who “consistently overestimate
[s] the aversive consequences of challenging situations
(outcome magnitude dimension) or the probability of
such aversive consequences (outcome probability dimen-
sion), or both; he may also consistently underestimate his
ability to cope (coping dimension)” (sect. 4.2.2). To summa-
rize this, we clarify here that “non-negative” in PASTOR
claim 1 signiﬁes a realistic threat appraisal. We thank the
commentators for their scrutiny.
Nevertheless, we have not termed our theory “non-neg-
ative” or “non-pessimistic” or “realistic” appraisal style
theory, but positive appraisal style theory. This was done
only partly for simplicity. In part, also, we intended to
take into account that the inherent unpredictability of life
always limits the certainty with which we can estimate
outcome magnitudes, outcome probabilities, and our
coping potential. The realism of appraisal is an ideal that
can only be approximated. Ultimately, appraisal must
remain subjective and uncertain (sects. 4.2.1 and 4.2.5).
(See also the argument that it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd an objective
standard for realism in the criticism of depressive realism
[Moore & Fresco 2012].) Further, the different appraisal
dimensions are not independent, and any ﬁnal appraisal
outcome is always the result of a complex interplay of dif-
ferent appraisals along different appraisal dimensions (see
our exemplary discussion in sect. 4.2.1). Therefore, espe-
cially in complex situations, “individuals [have] many
degrees of freedom in evaluating” the situation (sect.
4.2.5). Unless the outcome of such a complex (often
social) situation is potentially highly dramatic and irrevers-
ible (e.g., death), it may therefore be well adaptive to
choose a more optimistic scenario among the many possible
outcomes, simply because this reduces or avoids the costs
of mounting anticipatory aversive behaviors. This might
even be done knowingly, and it might be done also when
a grimmer scenario appears slightly more likely but still
within some conﬁdence interval of the likelihood of the
more optimistic scenario. Surely, clearly unrealistic positive
appraisal choices are maladaptive (Crespi; Freund &
Staudinger; Koole et al.; Lau; Mancini; Sachser &
Richter; Southwick et al.; and Ungar).
Figure R1 tries to illustrate the optimal range of apprais-
als on a dimension of realism where an ideal, completely re-
alistic appraisal has a value of 0, an extremely unrealistically
aversive appraisal has a value of −1, and an extremely unre-
alistically appetitive (“delusional”) appraisal has a value of
1. It can be seen that the bulk of the appraisals considered
optimal live on the positively signed side of the axis, which
is why we think that positive is a suitable term to describe
the type of appraisals we believe are protective. Disease-
oriented, pathophysiological research traditionally is con-
cerned with appraisals on the negatively signed side of
the axis.
There is another reason why we think that positive is the
best term for describing optimal appraisals. The inherent
complexity of the world also implies that is it difﬁcult to
predict not only what is going to happen and how we are
going to be able to cope with it, but also what this means
for us. In order to choose his most adaptive response, not
only is the pressured employee going to calculate the prob-
ability of failure and the probability and magnitude of the
sanction that might follow failure, but he also will take
into consideration the further consequences of a possible
sanction. At ﬁrst sight, being sacked appears clearly bad,
but it also might be taken as a welcome opportunity for ex-
ploring a new career path (Troy) or making a more funda-
mental change to one’s life, as a test of morale or faith, as a
possibility to mature and grow personally, as an opportunity
for chance entering one’s life, and so forth. Although evo-
lution has surely equipped us with mechanisms that make
us avoid social exclusion, it is not objectively possible to
determine the absolute value of a social-exclusion event
such as being sacked. Again, “individuals [have] many
degrees of freedom in evaluating” a situation (sect. 4.2.5).
So the employee may consider his chances to avoid sanc-
tion by increasing his work efforts as high, and he may be
sure he will be sacked if he does not, but he still may
choose not to work more, because he does not ﬁnd being
sacked particularly terrible. This might apply even if he
does not appraise his ﬁnancial or social resources to cope
with unemployment as sufﬁcient from a material point of
view. And it is not guaranteed that this ostensibly maladap-
tive behavior will lead to mental dysfunction. A poor man
can be healthy. (And is that not what resilience is about?)
Brummelman & Walton make a similar argument in
their description of a girl performing poorly at school but
Figure R1. Range of appraisals considered protective by positive appraisal style theory of resilience (PASTOR) in relation to the realism
of the appraisal. Realistic appraisals attach a correct emotional-motivational value to a situation, whether that value is aversive or
appetitive. Unrealistic appraisals consist of seeing a situation as either worse than it is (negative sign on the realism axis) or better
than it is (positive sign). For simplicity, the term positive is used for appraisals that are either completely realistic (both non-negative
and non-positive, i.e., 0) or mildly unrealistically appetitive (moderate positive values). The adaptive nature of mildly positive
appraisals results from the inherent unpredictability of the world, making realistic judgments difﬁcult and conferring an advantage to
optimistic, stress-reducing judgments.
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not appraising that as a threat. The point here is that a
narrow evolutionary perspective, which we basically
endorse as extremely useful for behavioral analysis, comes
to its limits, by leaving out the essentially constructivist
nature of human world interpretation (Raskin 2002) and
the subjective importance of associated attitudes and
value systems. Hence, if we deﬁne protective, resilience-
promoting appraisals functionally as those that generate op-
timized stress responses, then this leads us not only to the
conclusion that they range from realistic (non-negative,
non-pessimistic) to mildly positively unrealistic (see above
and Fig. R1). In addition, we have to acknowledge that
some people do well (mentally) with what might appear ir-
rational choices, perhaps because they confer a sense of
comprehensibility or meaningfulness of life and the
world, of authenticity, creativity, or transcendence (Anto-
novsky 1987; Frankl 2004; Maslow 1971; Seligman et al.
2006), “meta-needs” (Maslow 1971), or values that are
not readily integrable into an evolutionary-biological per-
spective and originate from worldviews or personal philos-
ophies that transcend a merely hedonistic perspective. And
we also have to acknowledge that these people probably do
well because of – and not in spite of – their choices. (Credit
to Quirin, Kent, Boksem, & Tops [Quirin et al.] and
Vázquez for highlighting these aspects.) Nonsatisfaction
of meta-needs is aversive and can cause stress, and endur-
ing the stresses of physical hardships or social conﬂicts can,
in sum, even reduce stress if it leads to meta-need satisfac-
tion. In other words, we appraise situations not only with
respect to their (un)pleasantness and compatibility with
or conduciveness to hedonic needs and goals, but also
with respect to what they mean for our meta-needs and
goals. Both can be subjectively relevant outcomes. And pos-
itive appraisal therefore can involve giving the pursuit of
meta-goals more weight than the pursuit of hedonic
goals, with a potential to reduce stress and its long-term
costs for mental health speciﬁcally in situations where
hedonic need satisfaction is difﬁcult or impossible.
The advantage of cultivating a meta-hedonistic world-
view, then, is that it offers additional needs and goals
against which the meaning of an anticipated outcome can
be evaluated (for the importance of relative goal valuation,
see also sect. 4.2.5). This wider range of criteria can be ex-
ploited to appraise ostensibly aversive or “anti-hedonistic”
outcomes as appetitive, to “ﬁnd the good in the bad.” If an
individual has a repertoire of such “positive” appraisal con-
tents at her disposal and is used to employing them, the
process of ﬁnding the good in the bad may be relatively ef-
fortless and automatic (positive situation classiﬁcation; see
PASTOR claim 2 and sect. 4.2.5). In many cases, especially
under massive stressor exposure, however, it will be neces-
sary to enforce these alternative, appetitive appraisals
against the strong opposition of the aversive appraisals gen-
erated more or less spontaneously by vestigial appraisal
systems that have been fashioned by evolution to assure
hedonic need satisfaction. In this (but not only in this) re-
appraisal process (PASTOR claim 2, sect. 4.2.5), interfer-
ence inhibition (PASTOR claim 3, sect. 4.2.7) is likely to
be an important mental faculty. It remains to be mentioned
that this “non-hedonistic” facet of positive appraisal can be
assumed to be restricted to humans.
We were reluctant to discuss these deﬁnitional issues in
so much detail in the target article for reasons of space, but
also because we are more interested in the neurocognitive
processes that bring about positive appraisals than in actual
appraisal contents (see sects. 4.2.6, 4.2.8, and 6), and
because we prefer to study appraisal style experimentally,
by observing emotional reactions, rather than by employing
questionnaires that ask about speciﬁc appraisal contents
(sect. 4.3). We nevertheless now feel obliged to spell out
more clearly our deﬁnition of positive appraisal style. We
therefore supplement PASTOR claim 1, as in Table R1,
Table R1. Positive appraisal style theory of resilience (PASTOR)
Claim 1: Positive appraisal style
A generalized tendency to appraise potentially aversive stimuli or situations in a positive fashion is the proximal cause for resilience to
stressors (adversity, challenge, trauma …). A positive appraisal style is the common resilience mechanism onto which all resilience
factors converge and through which they exert their protective effects on mental health.
[“Positive” refers to appraisals that do not overestimate the magnitude, probability, or uncontrollability of a potential aversive outcome
(realistic or non-negative or nonpessimistic appraisals). In addition, “positive” refers to appraisals that attach appetitive value to
ostensibly aversive outcomes.]
Claim 2: Positive reappraisal
In mildly aversive situations, positive appraisal is achieved easily by positive situation classiﬁcation (comparison with earlier, successfully
managed situations or activation of positive cultural stereotypes). However, in aversive situations that are strong enough to
automatically trigger negative appraisals, protective (less negative) appraisals (see claim 1) result from positively reappraising the
situation.
[Reappraisals may be invited externally, by improvements in the situation, or be generated internally, by reconstruing a situation.
Reappraisal processes may occur at different levels of the cognitive hierarchy, from effortless, automatic, nonconcious, and
nonvolitional to highly effortful, conscious, and volitional.]
Claim 3: Interference inhibition
The positive adjustment of appraisals in strongly aversive situations (reappraisal proper) requires a capacity to inhibit the interference
resulting from competing negative appraisals and from the accompanying aversive emotional reactions.
The text in square brackets provides precise deﬁnitions of key terms in order to prevent possible misinterpretations (cf. Table 1).
Refer to the following sections from the target article for more details: 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. (for claim 1), 4.2.5 (for claim 2), and 4.2.7 (for claim 3).
Response/Kalisch et al.: A conceptual framework for the neurobiological study of resilience
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 38 (2015) 59
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14001526
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:26:01, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
with an explanatory parenthesis. (Note also the explanatory
parenthesis in claim 2, necessitated by a frequent miscon-
ception of reappraisal processes as being solely volitional
and conscious; cf. sects. R4 and R5.)
With respect to the appraisal style (AS) score proposed as
a self-report measure for assessing appraisal contents in
section 4.2.8 and Figure 5 in the target article, we specify
that it should index not the magnitude of the positivity of
appraisals (which would lead to a curvilinear relationship
between AS and R; Southwick et al.) but to what extent
positive appraisals generalize across stimuli and situations.
R4. Comparison of positive appraisal style with
other constructs or models
One demarcation to make is that positive appraisal style as
deﬁned in the target article and speciﬁed in the previous
section is not merely optimism (Carver & Scheier;
Sachser & Richter) but a broader construct. Most
notably, it also includes seeing things as positive that are
not (or do not seem to be; see above). But even when com-
paring positive appraisal style and optimism only on the
realism dimension (Fig. R1), two additional differences
must be noted. Given the many formulations of a deﬁnition
of optimism that can be found in the literature, it seems
wisest to rely on the accepted and widely used instrument
for measuring optimism, the Life Orientation Test, or
LOT-R (Scheier et al. 1994), when trying to understand
the construct. The operationalization of optimism in the
form of the LOT-R does not include the realistic (both
non-negative and non-positive) estimates that are part of
a positive appraisal style. And it does not include estimates
of coping potential. (The LOT-R effectively invites people
to think about the probability and magnitude of possible
outcomes, although Scheier and Carver [1985] theoretical-
ly consider optimistic coping potential estimates as one at-
tribute of the optimistic personality.)
This demarcation of positive appraisal style from opti-
mism does not imply that behavioral paradigms measuring
optimistic decision biases in animals (Mendl et al. 2010), as
proposed by Sachser & Richter, cannot be a highly useful
source of information on some of the neurobiological
substrates of positive appraisal. But to more broadly study
positive appraisal style in animals, paradigms such as dis-
crimination, unconditioned stimulus (UCS) deﬂation,
counter-conditioning, or extinction (which involve a realis-
tic analysis of a nonreinforced stimulus as safe, or safer,
than it used to be; see 4.3.3) or the study of response termi-
nation after stressor exposure also may be necessary.
We only brieﬂy mention in this context that many or all
of our appraisal systems presumably have evolved in
more hostile environments than those provided by contem-
poraneous industrialized societies. In more hostile environ-
ments, where vital threats are frequent, it may be more
adaptive to be negative by default (left side of the axis in
Fig. R1). This has been expressed in the motto “better
safe than sorry,” which well characterizes the workings es-
pecially of our evolutionarily oldest appraisal systems, re-
sponsible for generating low-threshold defense responses
(see sect. 4.2.5). It is therefore not surprising that natural
selection has not eliminated non-positive versions of ap-
praisal, as Sachser & Richter rightly note (though not
denying that positive appraisals also may have survival
value). Our theory, however, tries to explain resilience in
today’s comparatively safe, developed societies, in accor-
dance with our goal, formulated in the introductory para-
graph of the target article, to promote mental health in
the industrialized world.1
Koole et al., in their “counter-regulation” model, em-
phasize the potential dangers of intense and persistent pos-
itive emotional states and the corresponding importance of
maintaining a steady emotional balance. Hence, it is adap-
tive to limit not only negative emotional states but also pos-
itive states. Positive emotional states can be limited by
directing attention to negative information and activating
negative appraisals. We ﬁnd this idea very interesting and
worth testing in an outcome-based study framework (sect.
3 of the target article; see also sect. R6 of this response).
We nevertheless would like to remark that we do not rec-
ommend generation of “intense positive emotional states”
(Koole et al.) as a way to resilience, and that we do not
think that the type of cautiously optimistic appraisal style
that we have deﬁned as positive here (Fig. R1) is conducive
to such states.
Soenke, O’Connor, & Greenberg (Soenke et al.), on
the other hand, emphasize the resilience-promoting func-
tion of positive emotion. Importantly, in their model, the
value of appetitive motivational states not only lies in
their not being unnecessarily aversive (as in PASTOR,
where avoiding negative appraisals will in many cases effec-
tively lead to mildly appetitive states) or in inhibiting the
aversive system via neural opponency mechanisms (see
sect. 4.2.7, including Note 2). Rather, positive emotions
have a series of adaptive consequences, such as broadening
attention and allowing creative thinking and a more broad-
minded perspective. Thereby, appetitive motivational
states constitute an independent, second way to resilience
in addition to positive appraisal style, mediating the
effects of a range of upstream resilience factors. But appe-
titive motivation also can result in poorer mental health
outcomes, for instance, when they conﬂict with reality or
keep people from disengaging from sources of distress.
We think that a model, such as PASTOR, that focuses on
avoiding the costs of unnecessary aversive responses is
more parsimonious, and that effects of positive emotion
can be understood as distal factors that work by facilitating
positive appraisal (and thereby reducing unnecessary aver-
sion). We nevertheless think that, as in the case of Koole
et al.’s ideas, ultimately this has to be tested empirically.
Koole et al.’s and Soenke et al.’s models are two in a
series of proposals that invoke a wider range of emotion
generation and regulation processes as potential resilience
mechanisms, including deployment of attention (i.e., dis-
traction from negative information; see also Luyten,
Boddez, & Hermans (Luyten et al.); Egloff; Troy;
and Vázquez) and suppression of emotional expression
(Egloff). Many of these models (see also Boden et al.
2014; Bonanno & Burton 2013; Cheng 2001; Kashdan &
Rottenberg 2010; Opitz et al. 2012; Troy et al. 2013)
stress the importance of ﬂexibly using different strategies,
depending on situational demands or personal characteris-
tics (Egloff; Troy).
One argument to support the adaptive value of distrac-
tion is work by Sheppes et al. (2014), who show that distress
ratings in response to high-intensity negative stimuli are
more easily attenuated by volitional distraction than by vo-
litional reappraisal (Egloff; Grecucci & Job; Troy). We
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note that these commentators mistakenly reduce the notion
of reappraisal in PASTOR to volitional (“cognitive,” con-
scious, higher-level) forms of reappraisal, despite the ex-
plicit statement in PASTOR claim 2 that reappraisal also
can occur at lower levels of the cognitive hierarchy (see
also sect. R5 and the explicit explanatory parenthesis
added to PASTOR claim 2 in Table R1). Leaving aside
this misrepresentation, the commentators fail to appreciate
that Sheppes and colleagues’ studies investigate the down-
regulation of acute aversive states. It remains unclear from
these studies whether distraction is also better than voli-
tional reappraisal is in attenuating the aftereffects of stres-
sor exposure (e.g., traumatization) or in dealing with
repeated exposures to the same or similar stressors. Both
effects are likely to be much more important for long-
term outcome than acute regulation success. Interestingly,
Sheppes et al. make the argument that
the major cost of distraction is that motivationally it does not
allow processing, evaluating, and remembering emotional in-
formation, which are crucial for one’s long-term goals and adap-
tation…. Speciﬁcally, distraction is not conducive to emotional
events being repeatedly attended to and provided with ade-
quate explanation, a requirement that is at the heart of many
long-term goals where an individual has to face difﬁculties
and of adaptation. (Sheppes et al. 2014, p. 165)
In support, they cite evidence that distraction can produce
rebound effects when stressor exposure is repeated (Thir-
uchselvam et al. 2011) and is maladaptive when long-
term adjustment is required (Kross & Ayduk 2008),
whereas repeated reappraisal efforts can gradually change
stimulus evaluation (Blechert et al. 2012).
We do not want to exclude that distraction (or also ex-
pressive suppression) can be adaptive, in particular, by
counteracting tendencies of perseveration or rumination.
Hence, distraction and expressive suppression may be strat-
egies that protect speciﬁcally against depressive-type dys-
functions (Joormann et al. 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema et al.
2008; see also Sheppes et al. 2014). However, they also
may be maladaptive in other individuals or situations, espe-
cially when used frequently. As Sheppes et al. note:
Common to several anxiety disorders is a tendency to overgen-
eralize a disengagement or avoidance regulatory response (see
Campbell-Sills & Barlow 2007; Foa & Kozak 1986, for reviews).
Avoidance usually starts in response to high-intensity emotional
stimuli, but over time, it ends up spilling over to seemingly low-
intensity stimuli … although disengagement strategies are
helpful in providing short-term relief, they are maladaptive in
the long run and can perpetuate anxiety and fears. (Sheppes
et al. 2014, p. 177)
Hence, distraction and expressive suppression may be dys-
function-speciﬁc but not general resilience mechanisms in
our terminology introduced in section 1.3, which is why we
do not include them in our model. Whether ﬂexibility in
the use of different strategies (Egloff; Troy) is a better ex-
planation than positive appraisal style is for resilient out-
comes is yet another question. We would invite
proponents of the idea to operationalize this construct
and to make it amenable to empirical testing (Bonanno &
Burton 2013).
The crucial question of the long-term effects of stressor
exposure can be understood best within the global frame-
work of allostatic plasticity (McEwen & Stellar 1993), that
is, the cerebral and bodily adaptations that help the organ-
ism deal with future exposures to identical or similar
stressors (sect. 1.3). Whenever an individual’s appraisals
are lastingly changed during or in the aftermath of a stress-
ful situation (such as when an initially neutral stimulus
becomes feared due to an aversive experience, or when
one’s perceived coping potential increases as the result of
a successfully mastered challenging situation), this consti-
tutes a case of allostatic plasticity (sect. 4.2.4.3). The
latter example is an instance of positive reappraisal (sect.
4.2.5; process class 2, PC2, in sect. 4.2.8 and Fig. 5) – that
is, the appraisal value attached to the coping potential di-
mension of the situation increases. This increase will
make coping easier the next time one encounters the situa-
tion (unless one has developed a delusional power percep-
tion; see section R3). In the best case, the increase in
perceived coping potential is so profound and long-lasting
that retrieving the new appraisal content is entirely auto-
matic and effortless at the next situation encounter. In
this case, reappraisal processes are no longer necessary,
and the situation will be positively evaluated as a result of
spontaneous positive situation classiﬁcation (sect. 4.2.5;
process class 1, PC1). This makes the question of how
new appraisal contents are written into memory, consoli-
dated, and later retrieved particularly interesting, as exem-
pliﬁed in section 4.3.3 for the safety memories generated
during the reappraisal process of fear extinction (which
changes the value attached to the outcome probability di-
mension of a conditioned stimulus).
Discussing the important role of developmental factors
in resilience (see also IJzerman & Lindenberg;
Sachser & Richter), Nederhof reminds us that allostatic
plasticity is particularly prominent during early childhood,
and in particular during certain sensitive time windows
and in individuals with high programming sensitivity
(Belsky et al. 2007). She argues that individuals lastingly
adjust their appraisal styles during these developmental
periods to meet predicted future environmental
demands. In the terms of PASTOR, then, appraisal style
could be a mediator of the effects of early-life history (a re-
silience factor) on resilience. Perhaps, better understand-
ing how appraisal contents are transformed into strong
and stable memories in sensitive periods of life (or also in
sensitive individuals) could help ﬁnd ways to make appraisal
styles more positive in vulnerable people, too.
Relatedly, Luyten et al. and Vázquez make the valu-
able comment that reappraisal also may occur after the
event (such as in “retrospective revaluation”; Boddez
et al. 2013a). This ties in with the idea by Quirin et al.
that new experiences have to be integrated in a meaning-
ful and coherent way into internal self-models, which
sometimes is easier in the absence of acute threat
(Quirin et al.’s “predictive control” mode). In a similar
vein, Murray, Gerrans, Brosch, & Sander (Murray
et al.) propose that event-free resting states provide an
opportunity for updating implicit self-models via reap-
praisals (in particular, of one’s coping potential) – in
other words, for reorganizing one’s appraisal style.
Where self-model integration is successful to the extent
that new appraisals become implicit and unconscious,
this will result in spontaneous and effortless positive situa-
tion classiﬁcation. Murray et al. invoke Bayesian learning
principles to explain this integration process. We think
these are excellent ideas that have the potential to
advance importantly our mechanistic understanding of
the allostatic plasticity of appraisal.
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Finally, Crespi conceptualizes resilience as a trait (in-
cluding “resilient genotypes”), which we explicitly do not
(see our outcome-based deﬁnition of resilience in sects.
1.1, 2, and 3.1). Hence, we cannot endorse his juxtaposition
of sensitivity (a personality marked by strong responses to
both aversive and appetitive events; Pluess & Belsky
2013) and resilience. We do not want to exclude,
however, the possibility that a positive appraisal style may
be negatively associated with a tendency not only for
overly aversive responses, but also for overly appetitive re-
sponses (see our reply to Koole et al. above). In other
words, positive appraisers might be comparatively less-sen-
sitive people in the terms of Crespi. This quality may keep
positive appraisers as we deﬁne them from maximally ex-
ploiting the beneﬁts of good environments, which,
however, is a different story.
R5. Value of an appraisal-based theory for
translational, neurobiological resilience research
Resilience research in animals has made tremendous pro-
gress in the past few years, including the identiﬁcation of
entirely novel molecular or cellular mechanisms that
shape resistance to chronic social stress (e.g., Agudelo
et al. 2014; Chaudhury et al. 2013; Dias et al. 2014; Fried-
man et al. 2014; Issler et al. 2014). With new ﬁndings arriv-
ing at a fast pace, animal research runs the same risk as
human resilience research of losing itself in vast amounts
of data. Already, neurobiological review papers on resil-
ience are starting to enumerate long lists of molecules,
physiological mechanisms, or brain systems (from gluta-
mate receptors in the hippocampus, brain-derived neuro-
trophic factor [BDNF] or serotonin, over neurogenesis or
prefrontal inhibition, to the hypothalamus-pituitary-
adrenal gland [HPA] axis or the reward system, and so
forth) (Feder et al. 2011; Franklin et al. 2012; Russo
et al. 2012). (Compare our criticism of the human resil-
ience literature in sect. 3.5). However, if this disparate
knowledge is to contribute to the understanding of
human resilience, it must be organized in a meaningful
way and be related to human cognition and behavior.
Clearly, BDNF or glutamate or any other molecule is in-
volved in so many different functions that it can hardly be
considered a “resilience molecule” in any narrow sense,
and the same applies to any neurophysiological process or
brain region or brain circuit. In the same vein, no molecular
or neurophysiological manipulation will just make people
resilient, if not appropriately designed and contextualized.
Understanding human resilience can succeed only if one
acknowledges the brain’s orchestrating role as an informa-
tion processing machine whose job it is to ﬁnd and organize
appropriate responses to changes in the external and inter-
nal environment, as emphasized in more elegant language
by Silbersweig. Hence, neurobiological or neurophysio-
logical experiments in mouse or rat models can provide im-
portant insights if – and only if – they elucidate the inner
workings of an information processing procedure that
also exists in a homologous fashion in humans and plays a
role there in supporting resilience to stressors. It is there-
fore of utmost importance to identify what those critical in-
formation processing procedures are and in which context
they are used. And the process of identifying critical proce-
dures should start at the functional level, asking on what
type of information they work and what type of behavioral
change they produce; in other words, what are they good
for? Only after such fundamental clariﬁcation can one
meaningfully analyze the identiﬁed procedures at the
levels of their algorithmic and neural implementation
(Marr 1982).
It is for this reason that we have proposed the concept of
appraisal as a possible guiding principle for resilience re-
search. Appraisal is functionally deﬁned as the information
processing procedure that translates a stimulus or situation
into an emotional reaction. This deﬁnition derives from the
empirical observation from both animal and human behav-
ioral research that emotional reactions are not simply deter-
mined by stimulus input, and therefore cannot be
conceived as mere stimulus-response phenomena (sect.
4.2.2; Moors 2009). Appraisal theory very plainly argues
that one must assume a step (or steps) of evaluation
between the stimulus and the response, in order to
explain that the same stimulus can induce very different re-
actions in different individuals or at different time points or
in different contexts in the same individual (e.g., Arnold
1969; Moors 2009; Scherer 2001; see sect. 4.2.2 for more
references). This functional deﬁnition is entirely agnostic
as to the nature of the evaluation process (its algorithmic
or neural implementation) and it applies both to how
humans and to how non-human animals “make” emotions.
If one accepts that appraisal, by explaining the genera-
tion and manifestation of stress responses, is the key infor-
mation processing procedure for resilience, then it
becomes relevant what type of appraisals there are (algo-
rithmic level) and how they are implemented in the brain
(neural level). We emphasize in various places in our
target article that current knowledge strongly indicates
that there is not just one appraisal process, but many, and
that these different types of appraisal processes can be
found at different levels of the cognitive hierarchy, from
very effortless, automatic, nonconscious, and nonvolitional
processes to those highly effortful, controlled, and conscious
processes that presumably exist only in humans (cf. sects.
4.2.2, 4.2.5, and 5.1 and Leventhal & Scherer 1987;
Moors 2009; Robinson 1998). (To Lau, this description is
reminiscent of Kahnemann’s [2011] dual-process model,
with its fast intuitive system 1 and an analytic and deliberate
system 2, although we should say that we do not make a
claim that appraisals in humans are organized in this
simple dichotomic fashion. Some commentators [Egloff;
Grecucci & Job; Washington] incorrectly assume we
consider appraisal to involve only high-level, conscious
[“cognitive”] processes. Others [Beer & Flagan] incor-
rectly assume the contrary.) Animal research is valuable
in elucidating the neural bases of the more lower-level ap-
praisal processes that can be assumed to be highly homol-
ogous between humans and, for example, rodents.2
Exactly deﬁning those processes and creating the best-
suited behavioral paradigms to study them requires the
careful ethological-analytic approach described by
Sachser & Richter.
If used in this way, animal research can be a valuable tool
in resilience research. Nevertheless, animal models can
never free the human resilience researcher from the obliga-
tion to ask which role an appraisal process, deﬁned etholog-
ically and studied neurally in animals, plays in humans and
how it is complemented (or sometimes antagonized) by
higher-order appraisal processes that are reserved to the
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human species. A good example is provided by Vázquez,
who reminds us that the principle of learned helplessness
(in human, psychological terms: diminished perceived
self-efﬁcacy) was highly successful in explaining certain
depression-like behaviors in rodent models but was insufﬁ-
cient to deal with the complexities of the human disorder
(Abramson et al. 1978). In such cases, an appraisal-based
analysis can be a useful guide, allowing researchers to ask
which other appraisal dimensions on top of coping potential
are relevant in determining which types of emotional
reaction (lethargy, sadness, anxiety, and so forth), how
these dimensions interact, and which human-speciﬁc neu-
rocognitive processes are involved in producing these ap-
praisal contents, on top of conserved, vestigial processes.
Our much-used example of the stressed employee served
to demonstrate the value of such an appraisal-based analy-
sis for enlightening human resilience research, too.
To our great pleasure, many commentators have made a
variety of speciﬁc suggestions about potential (neuro)bio-
logical resilience mechanisms – the effects of cortisol on
neural function (Hermans & Fernández; Schutter,
Wischnewski, & Bekkering [Schutter et al.]); cortical
excitability and its regulation through (cortisol-sensitive)
homeostatic plasticity mechanisms (Schutter et al.; see
also Silbersweig); neural network properties (Levit-
Binnun & Golland); neural reorganization during
resting state (Murray et al.); neural mechanisms of
stress response termination (Walter, Erk, & Veer
[Walter et al.]); lateralizations in prefrontal function
(Quirin et al.); and orbitofrontal-striatal functional con-
nectivity (Beer & Flagan). It was beyond the scope of
our target article to ﬂesh out PASTOR in any neurobiolog-
ical detail. (Beginning in section 4.3.2, we brieﬂy mention
some brain regions or circuits that we think are likely to
be relevant, based on their association with some of the
process classes posited by PASTOR, but without attempt-
ing to be exhaustive or formally integrating neural elements
into the theory.) Similarly, here, for reasons of space and
focus, we will not exhaustively discuss these many fascinat-
ing ideas. We will limit ourselves to commenting in a few
cases where we think the authors have underestimated
the value of our appraisal-theoretic approach for informing
and organizing (neuro)biological resilience research.
The case of amygdala “reactivity” or “responsiveness” or
“activation” to threat (Hermans & Fernández; Shumyat-
sky, Jovanovic, & Handler [Shumyatsky et al.];Walter
et al.) is a good opportunity to apply an appraisal-based
analysis in order to make sense of an empirically observed
neural phenomenon. Within the appraisal framework,
amygdala reactivity no longer comes out of the blue but
is either part of the appraisal process or its result (i.e.,
part of the subsequent execution of the emotional re-
sponse). On this basis, one can ask further questions,
such as to which appraisal dimensions amygdala activity is
sensitive (e.g., outcome magnitude? probability? coping
potential?); at which processing level (nonconscious? con-
scious?) these dimensions are determined; how, neurobio-
logically speaking, the amygdala constructs appraisals and
response execution; and which other neural systems coop-
erate or compete with the amygdala in the emotion gener-
ation process. Hence, a theory-guided analysis is able to
confer meaning to observations of amygdala reactivity (or
other neural phenomena) in speciﬁc experimental settings
and speciﬁc groups of subjects and to inspire further
experiments. In a second step, it then permits one to for-
mulate reasonable hypotheses about what amygdala reac-
tivity under deﬁned experimental circumstances implies
for an individual’s resilience. For example, if the amygdala
is found to be sensitive to changes in outcome probability as
implemented in a fear conditioning and extinction experi-
ment, and if resilience theory posits extinction learning
ability as a potentially critical reappraisal faculty (sect.
4.2.7), then it is promising to ask whether changes in amyg-
dala activity during extinction predict resilience; whether
they mediate life-history effects on resilience (e.g.,
because stressor exposure during critical ontogenetic time
windows shapes amygdala function; Hartley & Lee 2015);
or how molecular or cellular features of amygdala function
during extinction contribute to resilience.
Another change in stimulus input inviting an adjust-
ment of responding is when a stressor ceases to exist,
and being able to terminate stress responses after stressor
termination is likely to be adaptive. PASTOR explains
such response adjustment as an adjustment of outcome
appraisals, allowing for using response termination as
another way to assess (re)appraisal style (sect. 4.3.3).
Walter et al. assign a particularly prominent role in resil-
ience to these recovery processes, both in the short term
(acute stress response) and in the long term (aftereffects
of stress; cf. the themes of allostatic plasticity and apprais-
al memories discussed in sect. R4). Interestingly, to
advance this important topic, they recommend a more
atheoretical, primarily neurophysiological analysis of
recovery phenomena in the different systems that partic-
ipate in stress responses (autonomic nervous system, HPA
axis, brain circuits, etc.), including also amygdala response
recovery.
On a general note, ﬁrst, we would reply that there is
nothing like atheoretical neuroscience. Every neuroscien-
tiﬁc experiment is by necessity based on a large number
of, often implicit, theoretical assumptions. For example,
to choose only the threat stimulus used in a stress experi-
ment to evoke amygdala activation (or heart-rate increases
or cortisol release) requires a conceptualization of the
model organism’s goals and its needs, and of how the exper-
imental stimulus might interfere with them. In the same
vein, focusing on certain readouts (amygdala activity,
heart rate, cortisol) always implies assumptions about the
functions of the systems that produce the readouts. Inevi-
tably, these considerations will have to be made when
trying to establish a recovery measure that could serve as
a “biomarker that will be predictive of resilience in the
long run” (Walter et al.). More speciﬁcally, then, one
could easily think of an example where quickly recovering
is not adaptive at all, for instance, because the environment
is highly unpredictable and stressor termination cannot be
trusted (unclear outcome probability), or because the con-
sequences of outcome occurrence could be disastrous (high
outcome magnitude), or because one has no ways of man-
aging the occurrence of the feared outcome (low coping
potential). Here, benignly but not unrealistically optimistic
appraisals in the sense of PASTOR’s positive appraisal style
(sect. R3, Fig. R1) preclude quick recovery, which would
have to be considered in the planning of a recovery ex-
periment. Hence, making underlying assumptions explicit
and designing and interpreting experiments based on a the-
oretical framework are likely to improve neurobiological
investigation.
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Another very good example, we found, of how an ap-
praisal framework can organize the interpretation of biolog-
ical data was Hermans & Fernández’s analysis of the
(presumed) effects of cortisol release during acute stress
on resilience. They suggest that cortisol modulates the
function of neural appraisal systems, notably by affecting
the balance between subcortical (including amygdala) and
prefrontal processing, and thereby may determine resil-
ience. Although Hermans & Fernández seem to consider
this biological explanation as competing with PASTOR,
we note that they reserve a proximal place in the causal
chain toward resilience to appraisal and that it is by corti-
sol’s effects on appraisal that cortisol’s (presumed) effects
on resilience are understood. Providing a conceptual link
between biological determinants of appraisal and of indi-
vidual differences in appraisal, on the one hand, and resil-
ience, on the other, exactly is one of the intentions of
PASTOR.
We are therefore conﬁdent that combining a functional
analysis based on an appraisal framework with cognitive-
algorithmic and neural-level analysis will much advance re-
silience research. It will be exciting in the coming years to
explore the appraisal functions and resilience effects of cor-
tical excitability and homeostatic plasticity mechanisms
(Schutter et al.), of features of neural network architec-
ture (Levit-Binnun & Golland), of their experience-
dependent shaping and reorganization during resting
states (Murray et al.), of the relation of these processes
to stress aftereffects (Walter et al.), and of the interplay
of limbic and prefrontal functions (Beer & Flagan;
Hermans & Fernández; Quirin et al.; Walter et al.).
R6. Need for empirical research based on an
atheoretical deﬁnition of resilience
Our discussion in section R1– about whether the positive
effects that a reduced stressor exposure has on mental
health can truly count as effects on resilience R, or
whether, alternatively, an increase in resilience should be
stated only if good mental health outcomes cannot
merely be explained by reduced stressor exposure –may
appear unnecessarily academic, given the unquestionable
link between stressor exposure and mental health. There
is, however, an important practical advantage in providing
a comparatively clear and unambiguous mathematical for-
malization of the construct one tries to measure (such as
in our equation in sect. 3.1 of the target article), and in
sticking to it. The advantage is that it enormously facilitates
empirical research: For the individual researcher, it can
provide guidance on how to analyze data and report
results; and for the research community, it permits easier
comparison of ﬁndings and reduces discursive ambiguity.
Ambiguity is an issue when one researcher deﬁnes resil-
ience based on the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale
(CD-RISC; Connor & Davidson 2003; see Kimbrel &
Beckham), one based on the ego resiliency scale (ER 89;
Block & Kremen 1996), another one based on the Resil-
ience Scale for Adults (RSA; Friborg et al. 2003), and so
forth. (See Windle et al. [2011] for a summary of the 15
most used questionnaires in the ﬁeld.) Ambiguity also is
not resolved by general deﬁnitions that do not include
guides toward operationalization. Examples of such deﬁni-
tions provided by the commentators include
“the process of effectively negotiating, adapting to, or
managing signiﬁcant sources of stress or trauma” (Windle
2011, in Kimbrel & Beckham);
“the ability to bounce back from negative emotional ex-
periences by ﬂexible adaptation to the changing demands
of stressful experiences” (Tugade & Fredrickson 2004, in
Soenke et al.), a deﬁnition that includes “mechanisms
such as the experience of positive affect, nurturing social in-
teractions, creativity, a focus on positive memories, and
even physical health,” according to these commentators,
for whom resilient individuals are those “who are ﬂourish-
ing rather than struggling”;
or “the capacity to absorb disturbance; to undergo
change and still retain essentially the same function, struc-
ture and feedbacks, without crossing a threshold to a differ-
ent system regime” (Walker & Salt 2006, in Southwick
et al.).
Even if the community could agree on just one of these
scales or deﬁnitions, an additional and perhaps even more
serious problem would be that they all include implicit or
explicit theoretical assumptions on how good mental
health outcomes are achieved, whether through a combina-
tion of ﬁve speciﬁc factors (personal competence, trust/tol-
erance/strengthening effects of stress, acceptance of
change and secure relationships, control, spiritual inﬂuenc-
es), as in the CD-RISC; through a speciﬁc personality con-
struct, as in the ER 89; through a series of intrapersonal and
interpersonal protective factors (family support and cohe-
sion, external support systems, dispositional attitudes and
behaviors), as in the RSA (descriptions as in Windle et al.
2011); or through any of the abilities or mechanisms in
the above general deﬁnitions. Hence, all of these approach-
es to resilience already anticipate resilience factors and
mechanisms, the identiﬁcation of which should be the
goal of empirical resilience research. By contrast, an explic-
itly atheoretical deﬁnition of resilience that is based purely
on mental health status and stressor exposure is agnostic as
to what a study might ﬁnd and can therefore be used by re-
searchers from different theoretical backgrounds to test
their predictions.
In our ambition to propose a pragmatic operationaliza-
tion of resilience that constitutes some sort of lowest
common denominator and could ﬁnd acceptance across
schools of thinking as a common ground for model
testing and comparison, we also have based our deﬁnition
of resilience exclusively on the presence of mental prob-
lems or dysfunctions (as rightly noted by Kimbrel &
Beckham). By contrast, we have refrained from including
in our deﬁnition aspects of positive psychology such as “life-
insight” (in Freund & Staudinger); “appreciation of life,”
“more intimate social relationships,” “personal strength,”
“engagement,” or “wisdom” (in Jayawickreme, For-
geard, & Blackie [Jayawickreme et al.]); “positive
affect,” “creativity,” “well-being,” or “ﬂourishing” (in
Soenke et al.); or “capacities,” “beneﬁts,” “autonomy,”
“self-acceptance,” or “sense of control” (in Vázquez).
We completely agree with the commentators that those
are highly interesting topics and worthy of investigation.
Also, as we noted in section R3, we believe that non-hedo-
nistic valuations contribute to a positive appraisal style and
thereby beneﬁt mental health. So, wisdom or self-accep-
tance, or being engaged in meaningful activities, may in-
crease resilience through the proximal mechanism of
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positive appraisal. Nevertheless, basing a deﬁnition of resil-
ience on any of these terms simply would overburden resil-
ience research with complex semantic debates about the
nature of these constructs and enormous problems of oper-
ationalization. In this context, it also may be worth remem-
bering that Foucault’s (2006) criticism of how psychiatry
deﬁnes mental illness already is difﬁcult enough to
counter. Deﬁning what is wisdom, well-being, or strength,
or even happiness or fulﬁlment (Seligman et al. 2006) and
making them goals for mental health research is not only
ambitious but also associated with signiﬁcant ethical and
political implications (e.g., Antonovsky 1995).
An exceptionmay be the concept of growth (or “posttrau-
matic growth”; seeFreund& Staudinger; Jayawickreme
et al.; Vázquez), which refers to the observation that some
people appear to develop a more mature or positive person-
ality when experiencing hard times (Joseph & Linley 2006;
Tedeschi & Calhoun 2004). In our framework, psychologi-
cal growth could be framed atheoretically and without ref-
erence to constructs from positive psychology simply as a
decrease in mental problems during/after adversity (nega-
tive ΔΣP; see the lowest of the three mental-problem trajec-
tories in Figure 1 of the target article). Growth then would
be a highly resilient outcome (high R). From Jayawickreme
et al. we learn that there is an ongoing debate as to the
exact nature of posttraumatic growth, and perhaps investigat-
ing what brings about improvements in mental health could
contribute to clarifying the construct.
To sum up this discussion, our focus is entirely on
making empirical research on resilience possible, not ex-
cluding that this research also may yield results that are
of relevance to other, related research ﬁelds. In the same
vein, we have proposed PASTOR only to generate testable
experimental hypotheses. If empirical resilience research
were to result in falsiﬁcation of PASTOR and to ﬁnd
better explanations in Ungar’s social ecological model, or
Carver & Scheier’s and Sachser & Richter’s optimism-
based accounts, or models that invoke a wider range of
emotion generation and regulation processes (Egloff;
Juslin; Koole et al.; Luyten et al.; Quirin et al.; Troy;
Vázquez), or pronounced (neuro)biological formulations
(e.g., Hermans & Fernández; Levit-Binnun &
Golland; Schutter et al.; Walter et al.) – to name but a
few proposals made by the commentators – then our initia-
tive would have served its purpose.
R7. Toward a concerted international research
effort
In our attempt to advance empirical resilience research, we
felt very much encouraged by Chang et al. and Kleim &
Galatzer-Levy, whose commentaries we understand as
calls for a concerted international and interdisciplinary re-
search effort that must aim at conducting extensive large-
scale longitudinal studies in humans. We wholeheartedly
agree with these commentators when they point out that
resilience research needs large sample sizes and high sam-
pling frequencies for stressor events and resilience out-
comes in order to be able to address problems such as a
low base rate of stressor events, a low rate of nonresilient
outcomes (see also Boden & McLeod), heterogeneous
distributions, and variable temporal outcome trajectories,
all of which are inherent to resilience research and make
studying resilience particularly challenging. We also agree
that recent advances in data collection and data analysis
should be exploited for this purpose.
These and other commentators have made a range of
suggestions about what an optimal study design and a
data-analytical strategy should look like. Suggestions
include also taking into account vulnerability factors
(Boden & McLeod; Luyten et al.), which precisely may
put people at risk for psychopathology because they com-
promise the working of resilience mechanisms (Boden &
McLeod); incorporating self-report measures into laborato-
ry paradigms in order to get access to subjects’ experience
(Luyten et al.); analyzing also factors or mechanisms that
protect against speciﬁc dysfunctions, instead of exclusively
focusing on general resilience mechanisms (Luyten et al.;
Southwick et al.); assessing outcome (mental health ΣP)
not just at two, but at several time points TX (Chang
et al.; Vázquez) (a clear methodological desideratum
only brieﬂy mentioned in sects. 4.2.4.3, 4.3.5, and 5.2);
and employing functional methods (Chang et al.) or
latent-growth mixture modeling and machine learning ap-
proaches for data analysis (Kleim & Galatzer-Levy). Nat-
urally, there is also variation in how our commentators
appraise the value of laboratory experiments (our sect.
4.3), some of them arguing that these experiments are un-
likely to achieve stress levels that would engage resilience
processes in normal, healthy individuals (Boden &
McLeod), others that they may not tell us much about
non-hedonic needs or goals or the underlying value
systems (Vázquez).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all these
points in detail. We believe that the wide interest our
target article has aroused and the many valuable and con-
structive suggestions made by the commentators show
that this is a good time to act and to forge a global alliance
for large-scale multicenter longitudinal studies that take
human resilience research to the same level as contempo-
raneous pathophysiological research. These studies could
provide an opportunity for evaluating different resilience
theories and for better elucidating how socioenvironmental
(Bennett & Windle; Chang et al.; IJzerman & Linden-
berg; Kimbrel & Beckham; Southwick et al.; Ungar;
Washington) or developmental (IJzerman & Lindenberg;
Nederhof; Sachser & Richter) factors shape resilience.
They could allow for comparing resilience factors and
mechanisms in different age groups (Bennett & Windle).
They could help the community develop better tools for
measuring stressor exposure (Kimbrel & Beckham).
They could be a basis for designing dedicated experimen-
tal interventions that test the causality of an identiﬁed
mechanism (Brummelman & Walton; Jayawickreme
et al.; Southwick et al.). We would hope they would
lead to new prevention programs (whether these consist
of social-psychological interventions, as in the elegant ex-
amples provided by Brummelman & Walton, or in cogni-
tive-skills trainings or in neuroscientiﬁc interventions).
Human research must be closely interlinked with animal
research (Sachser & Richter; Shumyatsky et al.) in the
elucidation of mechanisms and development of interven-
tions. Such a resilience research initiative would not
replace, but complement, psychopathological research
initiatives.
By providing a “mathematical formulation of the resil-
ience phenomenology” (Shumyatsky et al.) and
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attempting to ﬁnd a possible mechanistic explanation for
the many disparate ﬁndings in the literature, it was our in-
tention to offer the community “a guiding framework in
which to organize the variables used in the study of resil-
ience” (Shumyatsky et al.). Regardless of whether our
ideas survive the test of time, we think that common
action is urgently needed to advance mental health re-
search in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
NOTES
1. Put succinctly and a bit provocatively, we believe that coun-
tries or societies where living is surviving need not psychobiolog-
ical research but more resources and better politics. Some of our
commentators criticizing us (wrongly, we think) for not sufﬁcient-
ly acknowledging socioenvironmental factors (see sect. R1) may
have had those more disadvantaged societies in mind. This is
not to say that resilience research may not be inspired from the
analysis of cases of extreme resilience (resilience to extreme
stressors) that can sometimes be found in those societies (Crom-
bach & Elbert 2014).
2. We permit ourselves here to note with some satisfaction that
a distinguished neurobiologist and animal researcher with de-
clared skepticism toward psychological explanations recently has
acknowledged that “Pavlovian aversive conditioning [is] appropri-
ately conceived of as involving a process in which the meaning of
the CS has been changed” (LeDoux 2014), which is an appraisal-
theoretic statement par excellence.
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